There are four possible scenarios in which the internecine conflict in the Aam Aadmi Party can play out at the National Council meeting scheduled for March 28. Each of these suggests the faction of Prashant Bhushan and Yogendra Yadav will have to accept, one way or another, a formalising of their defeat in what has been a year-long, bitter power struggle against Arvind Kejriwal.
This is because the terrain of the battlefield – the National Council – is unsuitable for the Bhushan-Yadav faction to launch its sally.
The National Council, AAP’s highest policy-making body, has as its members convenors of district and state units and has the power to co-opt an additional 50 members who are experts in different fields or are eminent personalities or belong to social groups deemed inadequately represented. It also includes those who were present at the party’s first meeting. Altogether, 328 of its members have voting rights.
The National Council is empowered, among other things, to elect members of the National Executive, which is the party’s highest executive body, and to recall members from it. AAP’s constitution says all decisions in all its bodies at different levels “shall be taken by consensus, failing which by a majority vote”.
It is this method of taking decisions that tosses up four possible scenarios in which the confrontation between Kejriwal and Bhushan-Yadav can culminate. One, the warring factions broker truce before March 28 and the National Council endorses this agreement by consensus. Two, the Kejriwal faction moves a resolution dropping Bhushan and Yadav from the National Executive, wary as it is of the pinpricks and challenges being mounted by them in the future.
Three, a resolution is moved demanding the overturning of the National Executive’s majority decision of March 4 to drop Bhushan and Yadav from the Political Affairs Committee, which discharges executive functions between two meetings of the National Executive. Four, the party witnesses the messy and complicated process of a split.
Vantage position
The outcome in each of the four scenarios depends on the assets the rival factions possess. The dominant faction has Kejriwal as its spearhead – he is a proven vote-gatherer, is in power (arguably the best vantage position to occupy in a battle), and commands popularity beyond the party rank-and-file. These attributes are essential to win electoral contests, which AAP would desperately require in order to successfully transit from a movement into a political formation across the country.
It is because of Kejriwal’s attribute of being the principal crowd-puller, in itself a function of virtues people perceive in him, that the power equation in the party has always been tilted against the Bhushan-Yadav duo. However, it became undeniably skewed following AAP’s landslide victory in Delhi, more so because they opposed the electoral strategies Kejriwal pursued.
But this is not to say that Bhushan and Yadav do not have assets in their own arsenal, the most formidable of which is their image. Bhushan is perceived to be the conscionable public interest litigant, has engaged in several legal cases for the disempowered, and fought to expose the menace of crony capitalism, which has been among AAP’s most alluring points of its campaign.
Yadav’s persona has been created in the TV studios and also through his analytical writings – he is erudite, arguably the country’s best spokesperson, and boasts enviable skills in predicting election results. The notoriously fickle middle class, for sure, remains in thrall to the kind of image both leaders embody.
Images whether in bloody wars or political battles do not guarantee success; the troops you command and the assets you possess do. Delhi is decidedly Kejriwal’s, as is Punjab, the only two states in the country where AAP is of relevance. This means AAP’s volunteer base in these two states will rally behind Kejriwal. Again, the party’s growth elsewhere in the country will be predicated on its performance in Delhi, from which only he can reap dividends or suffer losses.
Unequal battle
In this sense, the battle between Kejriwal and the Bhushan-Yadav is an unequal battle, having as its principal driver the quest for power for deciding the party’s agenda and political behaviour. This aspect Yadav and Bhushan understand well. They have taken to moral posturing, hoping it would inspire volunteers to mount pressure on Kejriwal against precipitating the crisis to their detriment.
For instance, both Bhushan and Yadav have reportedly offered to relinquish all important posts in the party as long as the concept of swaraj is implemented in the party, minutes of the Political Affairs Committee are made public, an effective network of communication is established between volunteers and those in authority, and the gender imbalance in the National Executive is set right.
AAP’s base of volunteers is remarkably heterogeneous. The Bhushan-Yadav faction has a greater appeal among, or sympathy of, AAP’s well-heeled middle class followers who are intellectually inclined and belong to the NRI crowd. Unfortunately for them, the number of these volunteers is not substantial. Their effectiveness as a pressure group is consequently limited.
But even this limited effectiveness is diminished because the outcome of a possible showdown in the National Council will be decided, in the absence of consensus, by voting. Considering the largest chunk of National Council members comprise district and state convenors who, by definition, are interested in electoral politics, it will not be wrong to assume that they will rally behind the faction which gives them the best chance to nudge closer to power, the quest for which drives politics. Otherwise too, AAP requires power to translate its professed idealism into reality.
Kejriwal is a proven winner. Bhushan and Yadav are not; in fact, even their ability to build a party from the grassroots is debatable. The duo has tried to offset Kejriwal’s advantage of being a vote-gatherer by subtly arguing that he, unlike them, is reluctant to expand into other states. This line of argument was thought to have an intrinsic appeal for National Council members who are understandably keen to engage in electoral politics.
But even this appeal has dimmed because of AAP announcing last week that it has no objection to state units wishing to participate in politics. However, their decision to fight elections will depend on whether they build an organisational structure from the booth to the district to the state levels, identify a person who could become the chief ministerial candidate, and have the ability to bankroll its campaign.
Corrective measures
Who then decides whether a state unit’s preparation for election is requisite? Obviously, the National Executive, or more pointedly, Kejriwal, who will need to campaign for a state unit in order for it to even have the hope of registering a good showing in Assembly polls. In other words, it makes sense to vote the horse which has won a race twice over (2013 and 2015 Delhi polls) rather than the one who has not ever.
Not only this, the Political Affairs Committee has made public its decisions of March 17, in a step which could be seen as conceding to the demands of Yadav and Bhushan to publish the minutes of the meetings of its bodies. Similarly, the National Executive could easily set right the gender imbalance manifest among its members.
Call these corrective measures or steps to neutralise Yadav and Bhushan or a face-saver for them to step down voluntarily from the National Executive. Whichever way you view AAP’s recent decisions, these have incorporated the Bhushan-Yadav faction’s agenda and consequently diminishes its appeal.
Considering the lay of the battlefield and their relative strengths, Yadav and Bhushan face tough odds in emerging victorious in a possible showdown in the National Council. The options before them are to accept a face-saver before March 28 or remain defiant, be defeated in the National Council and court irrelevance (or, from their perspective, political martyrdom). For a person as invested in electoral politics as Yadav, it might make sense to step down from the National Executive and, in return, oversee AAP’s Haryana unit and/or its kisan wing, which could acquire great salience because of the countrywide grumble over land acquisition.
The Kejriwal faction will find it hard to satisfy Bhushan, whose busy schedule of fighting court cases rules him out of 24/7 political activism. Perhaps he would be satisfied as long as certain mechanisms are incorporated in the party structure and, in addition, Yadav is made in-charge of Haryana. Or a new co-national convenor is appointed to oversee the party with Kejriwal. But the co-convenor cannot be one from the Bhushan-Yadav faction, such as Prof Anand Kumar, whose name many twitteratis have mooted.
If an agreement is not clinched between the two factions before March 28, it seems inevitable that a resolution would be moved in the National Council for dropping Bhushan and Yadav, unless, obviously, someone from their faction initiates a petition demanding the revision of the Political Affairs Committee’s decision of March 4. Judging from the relative strength of the two factions, they will most likely get excluded from the reconstituted National Executive, a prospect damaging to AAP in the short-term but which would also lead to their inevitable marginalisation in the party.
Reparable damage
But this could kick in the fourth scenario. The Bhushan-Yadav faction could split the party. AAP’s Constitution states, “Decisions regarding merger, split and dissolution shall be taken at a Plenary Session comprising of all office bearers, members of all organs at every level and Members of Parliament, State Legislature, Corporations and Panchayats.” The decision, to be effective, requires two-third votes of members present and voting.
Perhaps barring Haryana, it is debatable where else the Bhushan-Yadav could emerge as the dominant faction. Again, in the unlikely scenario of the Bhushan-Yadav faction winning the majority vote in the National Council, the Kejriwal faction could also opt to split the party. It will, for sure, take Delhi and Punjab, thus reducing the other AAP group to just an entity on paper.
Both Bhushan and Yadav could through their criticism scar AAP, besides citing examples of how or why certain decisions were taken during the days they too belonged to the inner circle. This could damage AAP’s image, but it might not be irreparable. Time will be AAP’s insulator – it has five long years to rule Delhi and, as we all know, stings lose their venom over an inordinately long period.
Ajaz Ashraf is a journalist from Delhi. His novel, The Hour Before Dawn, published by HarperCollins, is available in bookstores.
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This is because the terrain of the battlefield – the National Council – is unsuitable for the Bhushan-Yadav faction to launch its sally.
The National Council, AAP’s highest policy-making body, has as its members convenors of district and state units and has the power to co-opt an additional 50 members who are experts in different fields or are eminent personalities or belong to social groups deemed inadequately represented. It also includes those who were present at the party’s first meeting. Altogether, 328 of its members have voting rights.
The National Council is empowered, among other things, to elect members of the National Executive, which is the party’s highest executive body, and to recall members from it. AAP’s constitution says all decisions in all its bodies at different levels “shall be taken by consensus, failing which by a majority vote”.
It is this method of taking decisions that tosses up four possible scenarios in which the confrontation between Kejriwal and Bhushan-Yadav can culminate. One, the warring factions broker truce before March 28 and the National Council endorses this agreement by consensus. Two, the Kejriwal faction moves a resolution dropping Bhushan and Yadav from the National Executive, wary as it is of the pinpricks and challenges being mounted by them in the future.
Three, a resolution is moved demanding the overturning of the National Executive’s majority decision of March 4 to drop Bhushan and Yadav from the Political Affairs Committee, which discharges executive functions between two meetings of the National Executive. Four, the party witnesses the messy and complicated process of a split.
Vantage position
The outcome in each of the four scenarios depends on the assets the rival factions possess. The dominant faction has Kejriwal as its spearhead – he is a proven vote-gatherer, is in power (arguably the best vantage position to occupy in a battle), and commands popularity beyond the party rank-and-file. These attributes are essential to win electoral contests, which AAP would desperately require in order to successfully transit from a movement into a political formation across the country.
It is because of Kejriwal’s attribute of being the principal crowd-puller, in itself a function of virtues people perceive in him, that the power equation in the party has always been tilted against the Bhushan-Yadav duo. However, it became undeniably skewed following AAP’s landslide victory in Delhi, more so because they opposed the electoral strategies Kejriwal pursued.
But this is not to say that Bhushan and Yadav do not have assets in their own arsenal, the most formidable of which is their image. Bhushan is perceived to be the conscionable public interest litigant, has engaged in several legal cases for the disempowered, and fought to expose the menace of crony capitalism, which has been among AAP’s most alluring points of its campaign.
Yadav’s persona has been created in the TV studios and also through his analytical writings – he is erudite, arguably the country’s best spokesperson, and boasts enviable skills in predicting election results. The notoriously fickle middle class, for sure, remains in thrall to the kind of image both leaders embody.
Images whether in bloody wars or political battles do not guarantee success; the troops you command and the assets you possess do. Delhi is decidedly Kejriwal’s, as is Punjab, the only two states in the country where AAP is of relevance. This means AAP’s volunteer base in these two states will rally behind Kejriwal. Again, the party’s growth elsewhere in the country will be predicated on its performance in Delhi, from which only he can reap dividends or suffer losses.
Unequal battle
In this sense, the battle between Kejriwal and the Bhushan-Yadav is an unequal battle, having as its principal driver the quest for power for deciding the party’s agenda and political behaviour. This aspect Yadav and Bhushan understand well. They have taken to moral posturing, hoping it would inspire volunteers to mount pressure on Kejriwal against precipitating the crisis to their detriment.
For instance, both Bhushan and Yadav have reportedly offered to relinquish all important posts in the party as long as the concept of swaraj is implemented in the party, minutes of the Political Affairs Committee are made public, an effective network of communication is established between volunteers and those in authority, and the gender imbalance in the National Executive is set right.
AAP’s base of volunteers is remarkably heterogeneous. The Bhushan-Yadav faction has a greater appeal among, or sympathy of, AAP’s well-heeled middle class followers who are intellectually inclined and belong to the NRI crowd. Unfortunately for them, the number of these volunteers is not substantial. Their effectiveness as a pressure group is consequently limited.
But even this limited effectiveness is diminished because the outcome of a possible showdown in the National Council will be decided, in the absence of consensus, by voting. Considering the largest chunk of National Council members comprise district and state convenors who, by definition, are interested in electoral politics, it will not be wrong to assume that they will rally behind the faction which gives them the best chance to nudge closer to power, the quest for which drives politics. Otherwise too, AAP requires power to translate its professed idealism into reality.
Kejriwal is a proven winner. Bhushan and Yadav are not; in fact, even their ability to build a party from the grassroots is debatable. The duo has tried to offset Kejriwal’s advantage of being a vote-gatherer by subtly arguing that he, unlike them, is reluctant to expand into other states. This line of argument was thought to have an intrinsic appeal for National Council members who are understandably keen to engage in electoral politics.
But even this appeal has dimmed because of AAP announcing last week that it has no objection to state units wishing to participate in politics. However, their decision to fight elections will depend on whether they build an organisational structure from the booth to the district to the state levels, identify a person who could become the chief ministerial candidate, and have the ability to bankroll its campaign.
Corrective measures
Who then decides whether a state unit’s preparation for election is requisite? Obviously, the National Executive, or more pointedly, Kejriwal, who will need to campaign for a state unit in order for it to even have the hope of registering a good showing in Assembly polls. In other words, it makes sense to vote the horse which has won a race twice over (2013 and 2015 Delhi polls) rather than the one who has not ever.
Not only this, the Political Affairs Committee has made public its decisions of March 17, in a step which could be seen as conceding to the demands of Yadav and Bhushan to publish the minutes of the meetings of its bodies. Similarly, the National Executive could easily set right the gender imbalance manifest among its members.
Call these corrective measures or steps to neutralise Yadav and Bhushan or a face-saver for them to step down voluntarily from the National Executive. Whichever way you view AAP’s recent decisions, these have incorporated the Bhushan-Yadav faction’s agenda and consequently diminishes its appeal.
Considering the lay of the battlefield and their relative strengths, Yadav and Bhushan face tough odds in emerging victorious in a possible showdown in the National Council. The options before them are to accept a face-saver before March 28 or remain defiant, be defeated in the National Council and court irrelevance (or, from their perspective, political martyrdom). For a person as invested in electoral politics as Yadav, it might make sense to step down from the National Executive and, in return, oversee AAP’s Haryana unit and/or its kisan wing, which could acquire great salience because of the countrywide grumble over land acquisition.
The Kejriwal faction will find it hard to satisfy Bhushan, whose busy schedule of fighting court cases rules him out of 24/7 political activism. Perhaps he would be satisfied as long as certain mechanisms are incorporated in the party structure and, in addition, Yadav is made in-charge of Haryana. Or a new co-national convenor is appointed to oversee the party with Kejriwal. But the co-convenor cannot be one from the Bhushan-Yadav faction, such as Prof Anand Kumar, whose name many twitteratis have mooted.
If an agreement is not clinched between the two factions before March 28, it seems inevitable that a resolution would be moved in the National Council for dropping Bhushan and Yadav, unless, obviously, someone from their faction initiates a petition demanding the revision of the Political Affairs Committee’s decision of March 4. Judging from the relative strength of the two factions, they will most likely get excluded from the reconstituted National Executive, a prospect damaging to AAP in the short-term but which would also lead to their inevitable marginalisation in the party.
Reparable damage
But this could kick in the fourth scenario. The Bhushan-Yadav faction could split the party. AAP’s Constitution states, “Decisions regarding merger, split and dissolution shall be taken at a Plenary Session comprising of all office bearers, members of all organs at every level and Members of Parliament, State Legislature, Corporations and Panchayats.” The decision, to be effective, requires two-third votes of members present and voting.
Perhaps barring Haryana, it is debatable where else the Bhushan-Yadav could emerge as the dominant faction. Again, in the unlikely scenario of the Bhushan-Yadav faction winning the majority vote in the National Council, the Kejriwal faction could also opt to split the party. It will, for sure, take Delhi and Punjab, thus reducing the other AAP group to just an entity on paper.
Both Bhushan and Yadav could through their criticism scar AAP, besides citing examples of how or why certain decisions were taken during the days they too belonged to the inner circle. This could damage AAP’s image, but it might not be irreparable. Time will be AAP’s insulator – it has five long years to rule Delhi and, as we all know, stings lose their venom over an inordinately long period.
Ajaz Ashraf is a journalist from Delhi. His novel, The Hour Before Dawn, published by HarperCollins, is available in bookstores.
