Will Narendra Modi’s visit to the United Kingdom this week be a transformative moment that re-energises relations between the two countries, or will it simply be the 29th stopover of a globetrotting prime minister? The answer to this question essentially lies with Modi. After all, his British counterpart David Cameron has already made three visits to India and got little in return.
If Modi restricts his focus to the "visible drivers" of India’s approach towards the UK ‒ the 1.6 million strong but politically divided Indian diaspora, increasing trade and investment links (unveiling $ 15 billion worth of business deals is an important step), and showcasing his pet Make in India project ‒ the visit will fall in the latter category. Despite the economic and media impact, these initiatives will effectively account for little more than a thank you note for the help the Bharatiya Janata Party got from its supporters in the UK in the 2014 general elections.
However, the visit may lead to a transformative change if India engages in a serious, honest, and sustained dialogue with the UK on the "less visible stallers" or problem areas such as the situation in Afghanistan, among others. Dealing with differences is the biggest challenge these two countries face. If one looks closely, there are many points of convergence even on ostensibly fractious issues. All that is required is better communication, unhindered by historical baggage and mistrust.
A divided diaspora
Be they in celebration or in protest, there will surely be fireworks when Modi is in London this Diwali. Though a grand welcome event has been organised at the Wembley Stadium that nearly 70,000 people are expected to attend, the momentum of protests – some very innovative – is growing steadily.
A massive projection of Modi wielding a sword with an Om symbol (resembling a swastika) behind him and the slogan "Modi not welcome" splattered all over was recently seen at the Palace of Westminster. The Kashmiri and Khalistani lobbies are also working proactively to stage protest events wherever they can. The BJP’s comfortable defeat in Bihar has added weight to this growing criticism.
Not to forget, there is an equally strong million-plus Pakistani diaspora in the UK that is better politically organised, and exerts more influence in British politics than their Indian counterparts. When put in perspective, the influence of Indian diaspora in British political life remains limited. Clearly, diaspora is a double-edged sword, and the British Indian diaspora is particularly sharp on both counts.
Such divergent political narratives are not restricted to the diaspora communities alone. They cut across UK’s political spectrum too. The ruling Conservatives, for instance, will roll out the red carpet for Modi. Cameron has already undertaken three visits to India to attract business investment.
But the Labour Party under its fiery left-wing leader Jeremy Corbyn, with support from the Scottish National Party is urging the British government to raise the issue of human rights violations with Modi. In addition to Kashmir that tops the list on this aspect, the Indian governments decision to prevent Greenpeace activist Priya Pillai from visiting UK in January, banning the BBC documentary India’s Daughter, and the growing levels of intolerance in the country have undermined India’s democratic image.
With Britain’s own politics teetering on the extremes (visible in the rise of Corbyn and the staunchly right wing UK Independence Party) and a divided Indian diaspora, the reception that Modi is expected to receive will also be contested. The best way to approach these political frictions would be engage more and not less.
Stuck in Afghanistan
Despite having signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2005 under the Tony Blair government, the UK and India are far from being strategic partners. The Kashmir issue and the Afghan war are issues on which New Delhi and London don’t see eye to eye. In 2009, for instance, British foreign secretary David Miliband said that Kashmir is the source of most problems related to extremism in South Asia.
Miliband then went on to proclaim that the road to peace in Afghanistan was connected to Kashmir. Not surprisingly, India was angry. Miliband’s statement cemented the perception that London was favourably biased towards Pakistan. The 2010 London Conference on Afghanistan that baptised the reconciliation process with the Afghan Taliban – an idea that deeply concerned the Indian establishment – was seen as a sell out to Pakistan.
Britain wanted Kabul and the Afghan Taliban to launch a dialogue without any preconditions. For India, this was a non-starter. Any such talks – as proven recently – would be sabotaged by Pakistan worried New Delhi. From an Indian perspective, the only format of reconciliation that would work was one where Kabul set the terms, not Pakistan.
To top it all, London’s persistent questioning about the role of Indian consulates in Afghanistan and their alleged anti-Pakistan activities only added to India’s consternation. Not surprisingly, the UK is one of the most mistrusted coalition members in Afghanistan among Indian officialdom. Even Cameron’s delicate handling of this issue during his visit to New Delhi in 2010 and afterwards did little to change India’s mind.
Conceptual Differences
The UK’s approach towards Afghanistan emerges from its experiences in Northern Ireland. Talking without preconditions (despite it being a lengthy and frustrating process), according to British negotiators, is a strategy that works. According to India, which itself has a rich history of separatism and insurgency, there is no possibility of reconciliation if a militant group refuses to accept that the Constitution of India reigns supreme. Such an approach has kept India together.
These conceptual differences can only be ironed out via sustained dialogue, not anger-filled radio silences. That India made an unconditional offer to Pakistan (during the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government) to undertake surprise checks on Indian consulates in Afghanistan, and agreed to offer detailed read outs to Islamabad on what Indian officials did in Afghanistan is a fact few appreciate in London. Active articulation of India’s stand on Afghanistan in UK, thus, could be a start. Pakistan, for instance, has mastered that art.
There are many other areas such as climate change, exploring better work opportunities for Indian students in UK, defence partnership, and trade and investments, which require deeper engagement and dialogue. UK wants to deal with India as a rising power. But that is not possible if India continues to snub London despite strong historical and cultural ties. A dialogue is needed simply to empathise with each other’s sensitivities, to develop strategic parity, and most importantly, to reimagine India-UK relations beyond current cynicism.
Avinash Paliwal is a Defence Academy Postdoctoral Fellow at King’s College London.
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If Modi restricts his focus to the "visible drivers" of India’s approach towards the UK ‒ the 1.6 million strong but politically divided Indian diaspora, increasing trade and investment links (unveiling $ 15 billion worth of business deals is an important step), and showcasing his pet Make in India project ‒ the visit will fall in the latter category. Despite the economic and media impact, these initiatives will effectively account for little more than a thank you note for the help the Bharatiya Janata Party got from its supporters in the UK in the 2014 general elections.
However, the visit may lead to a transformative change if India engages in a serious, honest, and sustained dialogue with the UK on the "less visible stallers" or problem areas such as the situation in Afghanistan, among others. Dealing with differences is the biggest challenge these two countries face. If one looks closely, there are many points of convergence even on ostensibly fractious issues. All that is required is better communication, unhindered by historical baggage and mistrust.
A divided diaspora
Be they in celebration or in protest, there will surely be fireworks when Modi is in London this Diwali. Though a grand welcome event has been organised at the Wembley Stadium that nearly 70,000 people are expected to attend, the momentum of protests – some very innovative – is growing steadily.
A massive projection of Modi wielding a sword with an Om symbol (resembling a swastika) behind him and the slogan "Modi not welcome" splattered all over was recently seen at the Palace of Westminster. The Kashmiri and Khalistani lobbies are also working proactively to stage protest events wherever they can. The BJP’s comfortable defeat in Bihar has added weight to this growing criticism.
Not to forget, there is an equally strong million-plus Pakistani diaspora in the UK that is better politically organised, and exerts more influence in British politics than their Indian counterparts. When put in perspective, the influence of Indian diaspora in British political life remains limited. Clearly, diaspora is a double-edged sword, and the British Indian diaspora is particularly sharp on both counts.
Such divergent political narratives are not restricted to the diaspora communities alone. They cut across UK’s political spectrum too. The ruling Conservatives, for instance, will roll out the red carpet for Modi. Cameron has already undertaken three visits to India to attract business investment.
But the Labour Party under its fiery left-wing leader Jeremy Corbyn, with support from the Scottish National Party is urging the British government to raise the issue of human rights violations with Modi. In addition to Kashmir that tops the list on this aspect, the Indian governments decision to prevent Greenpeace activist Priya Pillai from visiting UK in January, banning the BBC documentary India’s Daughter, and the growing levels of intolerance in the country have undermined India’s democratic image.
With Britain’s own politics teetering on the extremes (visible in the rise of Corbyn and the staunchly right wing UK Independence Party) and a divided Indian diaspora, the reception that Modi is expected to receive will also be contested. The best way to approach these political frictions would be engage more and not less.
Stuck in Afghanistan
Despite having signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2005 under the Tony Blair government, the UK and India are far from being strategic partners. The Kashmir issue and the Afghan war are issues on which New Delhi and London don’t see eye to eye. In 2009, for instance, British foreign secretary David Miliband said that Kashmir is the source of most problems related to extremism in South Asia.
Miliband then went on to proclaim that the road to peace in Afghanistan was connected to Kashmir. Not surprisingly, India was angry. Miliband’s statement cemented the perception that London was favourably biased towards Pakistan. The 2010 London Conference on Afghanistan that baptised the reconciliation process with the Afghan Taliban – an idea that deeply concerned the Indian establishment – was seen as a sell out to Pakistan.
Britain wanted Kabul and the Afghan Taliban to launch a dialogue without any preconditions. For India, this was a non-starter. Any such talks – as proven recently – would be sabotaged by Pakistan worried New Delhi. From an Indian perspective, the only format of reconciliation that would work was one where Kabul set the terms, not Pakistan.
To top it all, London’s persistent questioning about the role of Indian consulates in Afghanistan and their alleged anti-Pakistan activities only added to India’s consternation. Not surprisingly, the UK is one of the most mistrusted coalition members in Afghanistan among Indian officialdom. Even Cameron’s delicate handling of this issue during his visit to New Delhi in 2010 and afterwards did little to change India’s mind.
Conceptual Differences
The UK’s approach towards Afghanistan emerges from its experiences in Northern Ireland. Talking without preconditions (despite it being a lengthy and frustrating process), according to British negotiators, is a strategy that works. According to India, which itself has a rich history of separatism and insurgency, there is no possibility of reconciliation if a militant group refuses to accept that the Constitution of India reigns supreme. Such an approach has kept India together.
These conceptual differences can only be ironed out via sustained dialogue, not anger-filled radio silences. That India made an unconditional offer to Pakistan (during the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government) to undertake surprise checks on Indian consulates in Afghanistan, and agreed to offer detailed read outs to Islamabad on what Indian officials did in Afghanistan is a fact few appreciate in London. Active articulation of India’s stand on Afghanistan in UK, thus, could be a start. Pakistan, for instance, has mastered that art.
There are many other areas such as climate change, exploring better work opportunities for Indian students in UK, defence partnership, and trade and investments, which require deeper engagement and dialogue. UK wants to deal with India as a rising power. But that is not possible if India continues to snub London despite strong historical and cultural ties. A dialogue is needed simply to empathise with each other’s sensitivities, to develop strategic parity, and most importantly, to reimagine India-UK relations beyond current cynicism.
Avinash Paliwal is a Defence Academy Postdoctoral Fellow at King’s College London.