Upon assuming power in 2004, the United Progressive Alliance dismissed four governors who were deemed too close to the Bharatiya Janata Party or the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. A former BJP MP, BP Singhal, challenged that decision in court. Attorney General Goolam Vahanvati argued that the government had committed no wrong by removing governors who were no longer in sync with the electoral mandate. Yet the Supreme Court ruled in 2010 that “valid and compelling reasons” were needed for them to be removed.
It is perhaps because of this judgment – which said there had to be demonstrable misbehavior, impropriety or incapacity for the governor to be sacked – that the current Union government has chosen to ask some governors to resign rather than dismissing them.
Earlier this week, Union home secretary Anil Goswami reportedly contacted seven governors to pass on the central government’s indication that they should put in their papers. The Centre seems to have a carefully calibrated policy towards its targets: it has gone after governors with more than six months of their tenures left, especially those seen as appointments of the previous government or otherwise close to the Congress or Gandhi family.
BL Joshi, the governor of Uttar Pradesh, resigned on Tuesday. The same day, Rajasthan governor Margaret Alva paid what was termed a "courtesy visit" on prime minister Narendra Modi.
This is not unprecedented. The governor of a state is rather like the President at the Centre, a position with great authority. If President's Rule is invoked, the governor holds all executive powers. The promise of overbearing power held by the governor’s office has always led to tensions when a new government takes charge at the Centre.
So its not a surprise that the pronouncements in the Singhal case were by no means the first court ruling regarding the office of governor.
The Doctrine of Presidential Pleasure
In 1979, a bench of five Supreme Court judges deliberated upon the criteria of gubernatorial eligibility. The appointment of Raghulal Tilak as governor of Rajasthan was under challenge.
The Court ruled that since a governor is appointed by the President, he is a Constitutional functionary, not an employee or servant of the government of India. Only when a governor loses the confidence of the President can he be removed. Enjoying the confidence of the President – termed the doctrine of “Presidential Pleasure” – is contingent upon certain conditions. The most important is that the President doesn’t have a free hand. He is bound to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers. This leaves a clear route for central governments to follow to remove governors undesirable to them.
Out of Commissions
In 1988, the Sarkaria Commission, which was set up to examine the relationship and effective balance of power between Centre and state, argued that the Governor is the “linchpin of the constitutional apparatus of a state”. It stated that making this office susceptible to political calculations would prevent the governor from carrying out her functions with impartiality and probity.
The National Committee to Review the Working of the Constitution, set up by the National Democratic Alliance regime in 2000, was emphatic in its demand that governors should be protected from arbitrary action and political vendetta. It sought to remind governments to come of the sanctity of the five-year-tenure, and voiced its agreement with the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendations.
In 2005, when petitioner Rameshwar Prasad went to court against Governor Buta Singh’s dismissal of the Nitish Kumar government, the majority of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court asserted at considerable length that the constitutional authority and position of the governor must be insulated from political partisanship.
Though the Congress has a lot to answer for in this disregard for Constitutional authority, the BJP played the same game immediately upon assuming power in 1998, when their coalition government removed seven governors.
Imperialist agent
In the years just before Independence, when the British began holding limited elections in India, the governors appointed to the provinces were seen as agents of the colonial authority. It is worth remembering that the Congress were staunch opponents of governors in their provinces, believing it a weapon of colonial authority against a popularly-elected government, and declared it would be abolished in independent India. It was only in the final stage of drafting the Constitution of India that the present relationship was established.
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It is perhaps because of this judgment – which said there had to be demonstrable misbehavior, impropriety or incapacity for the governor to be sacked – that the current Union government has chosen to ask some governors to resign rather than dismissing them.
Earlier this week, Union home secretary Anil Goswami reportedly contacted seven governors to pass on the central government’s indication that they should put in their papers. The Centre seems to have a carefully calibrated policy towards its targets: it has gone after governors with more than six months of their tenures left, especially those seen as appointments of the previous government or otherwise close to the Congress or Gandhi family.
BL Joshi, the governor of Uttar Pradesh, resigned on Tuesday. The same day, Rajasthan governor Margaret Alva paid what was termed a "courtesy visit" on prime minister Narendra Modi.
This is not unprecedented. The governor of a state is rather like the President at the Centre, a position with great authority. If President's Rule is invoked, the governor holds all executive powers. The promise of overbearing power held by the governor’s office has always led to tensions when a new government takes charge at the Centre.
So its not a surprise that the pronouncements in the Singhal case were by no means the first court ruling regarding the office of governor.
The Doctrine of Presidential Pleasure
In 1979, a bench of five Supreme Court judges deliberated upon the criteria of gubernatorial eligibility. The appointment of Raghulal Tilak as governor of Rajasthan was under challenge.
The Court ruled that since a governor is appointed by the President, he is a Constitutional functionary, not an employee or servant of the government of India. Only when a governor loses the confidence of the President can he be removed. Enjoying the confidence of the President – termed the doctrine of “Presidential Pleasure” – is contingent upon certain conditions. The most important is that the President doesn’t have a free hand. He is bound to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers. This leaves a clear route for central governments to follow to remove governors undesirable to them.
Out of Commissions
In 1988, the Sarkaria Commission, which was set up to examine the relationship and effective balance of power between Centre and state, argued that the Governor is the “linchpin of the constitutional apparatus of a state”. It stated that making this office susceptible to political calculations would prevent the governor from carrying out her functions with impartiality and probity.
The National Committee to Review the Working of the Constitution, set up by the National Democratic Alliance regime in 2000, was emphatic in its demand that governors should be protected from arbitrary action and political vendetta. It sought to remind governments to come of the sanctity of the five-year-tenure, and voiced its agreement with the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendations.
In 2005, when petitioner Rameshwar Prasad went to court against Governor Buta Singh’s dismissal of the Nitish Kumar government, the majority of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court asserted at considerable length that the constitutional authority and position of the governor must be insulated from political partisanship.
Though the Congress has a lot to answer for in this disregard for Constitutional authority, the BJP played the same game immediately upon assuming power in 1998, when their coalition government removed seven governors.
Imperialist agent
In the years just before Independence, when the British began holding limited elections in India, the governors appointed to the provinces were seen as agents of the colonial authority. It is worth remembering that the Congress were staunch opponents of governors in their provinces, believing it a weapon of colonial authority against a popularly-elected government, and declared it would be abolished in independent India. It was only in the final stage of drafting the Constitution of India that the present relationship was established.
