China is obviously pleased with the election of Khadga Prashad Oli as the new prime minister of Nepal. A new political dispensation in Kathmandu augurs well for an intensification of bilateral cooperation with a brand new republic with constitutional rule.
Beijing knows it can depend on Oli to do everything possible to ensure that Nepal’s territory is not used by Tibetan exiles in India to infiltrate the Chinese region and destabilise it.
Beijing can draw comfort that it enjoys rapport with all the three major parties that comprise the new coalition that catapulted Oli to power, notwithstanding their mutual contradictions. Indeed, these contradictions need to be carefully managed but Oli is an experienced politician.
The Chinese diplomacy worked tenaciously to court all the three coalition constituents on parallel tracks – communists, Maoists and "royalists" – in a far-sighted approach to cast its net wide among the disparate political forces. Do not be surprised if China now reaches out to the Madhesi politicians as well – that is, if it hasn’t quietly done so already.
Indeed, China too counselled Nepal’s political parties to somehow bring the protracted eight-year period without a constitution to a speedy end, but it did not suggest what the constitution should contain. On balance, therefore, China has a head start over India with the Oli government.
Virtues of self-restraint
New Delhi disfavoured Oli’s election as prime minister and that Oli himself must be conscious of it. India’s main pocket of influence in mainstream politics, Nepali Congress, has been reduced to the opposition.
Beijing simply stood by watching the unseemly spectacle of the standoff between India and Nepal without fuelling it. In comparable circumstances in other regions, too, China has displayed the virtues of self-restraint. The western analysts predicted that China would "replace" Russia in Central Asia, but what has happened is a co-habitation whereby Beijing is pragmatic enough to respect Russian sensitivities and its legitimate interests even while developing bilateral cooperation with countries of the region and safeguarding its own vital interests in fighting the "three evils" – extremism, separatism and terrorism.
Looking ahead, there is really no need for China to have a zero sum mindset vis-à-vis India over Nepal. India’s hands are full, clawing its way back on the greasy pole in Kathmandu – and that is not going to be an easy thing to do, requiring much patience and tact and tenacity. That leaves China with a free hand to expand its "win-win" cooperation with Nepal.
Oli, 63, believed to be a hardliner in Nepali politics, has assured the Nepali people that he will strengthen bilateral ties with China and India, as a Xinhua commentary noted recently. In an earlier interview to the same paper, Oli had expressed his commitment to maintaining Nepal's long-standing one-China policy, saying Nepal will not allow any external forces in its territory to work against China's core interests.
This explains China’s comfort level with Oli’s leadership, knowing he will rebuff any Indian attempt to dictate to him the country’s China policies.
Time for introspection
To be sure, the Narendra Modi government has unwittingly created a dream wicket in Kathmandu for the Chinese diplomats. Perhaps, New Delhi can do with some serious introspection. Is there scope to work, instead of competing, with China, in Nepal?
Significantly, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s statement congratulating Oli’s election as prime minister emphasised the priorities of “new progress in national unity, stability and development” in Nepal.
Now, how can India take exception to such a prioritisation for Nepal? Doesn’t it bear an uncanny resemblance to what India too says it desires to see happening in Nepal?
Arguably, China also favours an inclusive political culture in Nepal, but it is smart enough not to articulate such preferences or try to abrasively shove them down the Nepali throat, since, as the foreign ministry spokesperson in Beijing put it, “China supports the country's efforts to maintain independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity”.
The big question is whether India and China’s interests in Nepal can be harmonised. Indeed, Nepal’s unity and integrity and its development can be a common concern for China and India.
Radical shift
A progressive outlook on India’s part will involve a radical shift in its thinking with regard to the development of its border states, making it a template of regional development.
Such a creative outlook can only strengthen regional security and stability, while also enhancing India’s "influence" in its neighbourhood.
What India’s futile standoff with Nepal ought to tell us is that the old tools of neighbourhood policy predicated on the unilateral assumptions of India’s regional dominance have become outdated and irrelevant in the contemporary setting.
Today, India is no doubt the preeminent power in its region, but that does not mean that it is also the dominant power. Indeed, Nepal is not an isolated case. The snub administered by the Maldives to the External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj earlier this week, telling India to back off from interfering in its domestic politics, should also be an eye-opener.
Equally, the manner in which India has drawn a red line restricting its behaviour toward Sri Lanka – abdicating its traditional role in the Tamil problem – shows that New Delhi can be a good learner if it is really left with no alternative by a tough neighbour. Actually, the new Sri Lankan leadership openly brags that Modi government is the ‘most Lanka-friendly Indian government’ that Colombo ever came across in history – meaning, in a chastened mood India has no more any desire to mediate the Tamil problem.
These strands – standoff with Nepal, Maldivian snub, backtracking vis-à-vis Colombo – should all be brought together and be made the input for a "new thinking" on regional cooperation adapted to the needs of the emergent world order.
But the fundamental issue here is that – be it Nepal, Maldives or Sri Lanka – the obsession with China’s growing influence in the region has warped the Indian mind and stifles its capacity for imaginative thinking, which in turn prevents Indian diplomacy from coming on its own to realise its full potential.
Without the China bee in the bonnet, the Indian foreign and security policy establishment wouldn’t have conducted itself with such clumsiness in Nepal.
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Beijing knows it can depend on Oli to do everything possible to ensure that Nepal’s territory is not used by Tibetan exiles in India to infiltrate the Chinese region and destabilise it.
Beijing can draw comfort that it enjoys rapport with all the three major parties that comprise the new coalition that catapulted Oli to power, notwithstanding their mutual contradictions. Indeed, these contradictions need to be carefully managed but Oli is an experienced politician.
The Chinese diplomacy worked tenaciously to court all the three coalition constituents on parallel tracks – communists, Maoists and "royalists" – in a far-sighted approach to cast its net wide among the disparate political forces. Do not be surprised if China now reaches out to the Madhesi politicians as well – that is, if it hasn’t quietly done so already.
Indeed, China too counselled Nepal’s political parties to somehow bring the protracted eight-year period without a constitution to a speedy end, but it did not suggest what the constitution should contain. On balance, therefore, China has a head start over India with the Oli government.
Virtues of self-restraint
New Delhi disfavoured Oli’s election as prime minister and that Oli himself must be conscious of it. India’s main pocket of influence in mainstream politics, Nepali Congress, has been reduced to the opposition.
Beijing simply stood by watching the unseemly spectacle of the standoff between India and Nepal without fuelling it. In comparable circumstances in other regions, too, China has displayed the virtues of self-restraint. The western analysts predicted that China would "replace" Russia in Central Asia, but what has happened is a co-habitation whereby Beijing is pragmatic enough to respect Russian sensitivities and its legitimate interests even while developing bilateral cooperation with countries of the region and safeguarding its own vital interests in fighting the "three evils" – extremism, separatism and terrorism.
Looking ahead, there is really no need for China to have a zero sum mindset vis-à-vis India over Nepal. India’s hands are full, clawing its way back on the greasy pole in Kathmandu – and that is not going to be an easy thing to do, requiring much patience and tact and tenacity. That leaves China with a free hand to expand its "win-win" cooperation with Nepal.
Oli, 63, believed to be a hardliner in Nepali politics, has assured the Nepali people that he will strengthen bilateral ties with China and India, as a Xinhua commentary noted recently. In an earlier interview to the same paper, Oli had expressed his commitment to maintaining Nepal's long-standing one-China policy, saying Nepal will not allow any external forces in its territory to work against China's core interests.
This explains China’s comfort level with Oli’s leadership, knowing he will rebuff any Indian attempt to dictate to him the country’s China policies.
Time for introspection
To be sure, the Narendra Modi government has unwittingly created a dream wicket in Kathmandu for the Chinese diplomats. Perhaps, New Delhi can do with some serious introspection. Is there scope to work, instead of competing, with China, in Nepal?
Significantly, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s statement congratulating Oli’s election as prime minister emphasised the priorities of “new progress in national unity, stability and development” in Nepal.
Now, how can India take exception to such a prioritisation for Nepal? Doesn’t it bear an uncanny resemblance to what India too says it desires to see happening in Nepal?
Arguably, China also favours an inclusive political culture in Nepal, but it is smart enough not to articulate such preferences or try to abrasively shove them down the Nepali throat, since, as the foreign ministry spokesperson in Beijing put it, “China supports the country's efforts to maintain independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity”.
The big question is whether India and China’s interests in Nepal can be harmonised. Indeed, Nepal’s unity and integrity and its development can be a common concern for China and India.
Radical shift
A progressive outlook on India’s part will involve a radical shift in its thinking with regard to the development of its border states, making it a template of regional development.
Such a creative outlook can only strengthen regional security and stability, while also enhancing India’s "influence" in its neighbourhood.
What India’s futile standoff with Nepal ought to tell us is that the old tools of neighbourhood policy predicated on the unilateral assumptions of India’s regional dominance have become outdated and irrelevant in the contemporary setting.
Today, India is no doubt the preeminent power in its region, but that does not mean that it is also the dominant power. Indeed, Nepal is not an isolated case. The snub administered by the Maldives to the External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj earlier this week, telling India to back off from interfering in its domestic politics, should also be an eye-opener.
Equally, the manner in which India has drawn a red line restricting its behaviour toward Sri Lanka – abdicating its traditional role in the Tamil problem – shows that New Delhi can be a good learner if it is really left with no alternative by a tough neighbour. Actually, the new Sri Lankan leadership openly brags that Modi government is the ‘most Lanka-friendly Indian government’ that Colombo ever came across in history – meaning, in a chastened mood India has no more any desire to mediate the Tamil problem.
These strands – standoff with Nepal, Maldivian snub, backtracking vis-à-vis Colombo – should all be brought together and be made the input for a "new thinking" on regional cooperation adapted to the needs of the emergent world order.
But the fundamental issue here is that – be it Nepal, Maldives or Sri Lanka – the obsession with China’s growing influence in the region has warped the Indian mind and stifles its capacity for imaginative thinking, which in turn prevents Indian diplomacy from coming on its own to realise its full potential.
Without the China bee in the bonnet, the Indian foreign and security policy establishment wouldn’t have conducted itself with such clumsiness in Nepal.