For just a moment on Saturday night, Germany were pretending that they were bad at spot-kicks. First they conceded one in regular time, and then, in the shootout, stars Thomas Muller, Mesut Ozil and Bastian Schweinsteiger all fluffed their attempts. Those were horrible penalties, but still Germany won.

Not for 40 years and 14 days, when Antonin Panenka chipped his penalty and two dissolved nations, West Germany and Czechoslovakia competed, has Germany lost a penalty shoot-out. But this victory had a different connotation for Joachim Löw’s Germany.

For Löw and his team, the quarter-final with Italy posed an existential dilemma: should the trainer of Die Mannschaft, a well-functioning side, adapt to Italy, on a high after dispatching Spain with fair ease? Löw’s conundrum was simple: could he out-engineer the Italians, who had conceded just a single goal in the tournament, a late strike from Ireland’s Robbie Brady?

That attempt could have been futile: Conte and Italy were masters of tactical ingenuity in their previous 360 minutes at Euro 2016. In a 3-5-2 formation, the Italians, with a Juventus rearguard, elevated defending to a fine art and hit opponents with blistering pace on the counter.

In the build up to Spain-Italy encounter, Barcelona legend Xavi pointed out how hard it is to play against 3-5-2. “When Italy need to come out with the ball, having three at the back and two wide players means they have five possible people to carry it out – which makes it difficult for Spain to press as they would like,” he said.

Beating Italy at their own game

In their previous knockout game, Germany had fielded a 4-2-3-1 formation. This time, on the official team sheet, neatly distributed about an hour before kick off by volunteers in the press box, Germany lined up in a 4-4-2 formation against Italy with Mesut Ozil on the left, Joshua Kimmich in front of Benedikt Howedes on the right and Thomas Muller in support of Mario Gomez.

As soon as the match got underway, however, Germany reverted to a 3-5-2 formation. Out of possession, that formation even turned into a 3-6-1. The first 45 minutes were a tactical delight, with five of the world’s best central defenders on the field and chances at a premium. The Germans nullified Italy with their own system in a tournament where teams with three-man defences have thrived – think semi-finalists Wales and courageous Northern Ireland.

Gomez and Muller got glimpses of the opponent's goal just before the interval, but Germany achieved their main aim of containing and stifling their opponents. Stefano Sturaro’s shot flew just past the woodwork. The Germans lacked incisiveness in the final third.

But their new formation was Löw’s timid admittance that he feared Italy. Historically, Italy has been Germany’s bogey team, dating back as far as the 1970 World Cup in Mexico when Franz Beckenbauer and Gerd Muller succumbed 4-3 to the Squadra Azzurra in a frantic overtime semi-final.

Löw’s tactical masterpiece

“For us, it’s no longer about a false nine or a real nine – it’s about getting into deep spaces [in the box],” said Low after Germany’s win against Slovakia. He supposedly relegated tactical deliberations as no longer a big deal, because everything had worked against Slovakia. The introduction of Gomez as number nine gave Germany purpose and poise, while Kimmich filled the troubled right-back position maturely. The Germans had been devastating. Even deep into the match, and with a comfortable lead, Bastian Schweinsteiger and his teammates pressed close to the Slovakian byline, relentless in their professionalism.

So, as the old adage goes – why change a winning team? At the last European Championship, Löw did just that. In the semi-finals, the midfield presence of Andrea Pirlo worried him and he sacrificed Marco Reus, ordering Kroos to mark the Italian virtuoso. Germany were eliminated and Löw took much of the blame. In Brazil, at the last World Cup, he shook up his team by bringing Phillip Lahm back to his preferred right-back position in the quarter-finals.

Against Italy, Germany went from containment in the first half to pro-activeness at the start of the second stanza. Finally, Löw's boys generated some pressure. In a role reversal, Gomez provided Ozil, storming through the middle, with a tap in. Germany had a deserved lead, but Jerome Boateng, with his flapping arms somewhere in between an obtrusive road sign and a failed ballet dancer, undid the advantage in the 78th minute. The versatile Leonardi Bonucci converted from the spot-kick.

The match descended into a thriller. Germany were too polite in overtime. They kept believing in that one moment of Italian inattentiveness, but it never came. From the 11-meter spot, the Germans confirmed Gary Lineker’s tenet that “Twenty-two men chase a ball for 90 minutes and at the end, the Germans always win.” Löw has, again, been vindicated.