On March 2, a missile destroyed the bridge of a Bangladeshi cargo ship stranded at a port in Ukraine. The missile killed Hadisur Rahman, a 32-year-old engineer from southern Bangladesh.

Hours later, on the same day, Bangladesh’s representatives in New York abstained from the United Nations General Assembly vote to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Bangladesh’s foreign minister, AK Abul Momen, later explained that the country abstained because the government did not want to assign blame for the invasion. It is unlikely Dhaka would have changed its position had it known of Rahman’s death, and the origin of the missile, which remains unknown.

Bangladesh later voted in favour of a non-binding United Nations General Assembly motion to end the war in Ukraine. But the events, taken together, help illustrate the level of dissonance a foreign policy establishment will endure to be seen as non-aligned.

Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s invasion has now killed a Bangladeshi, wrecked a state-owned ship, raised fuel and wheat prices on Bangladeshis and called into question Russia’s most notable contribution to Bangladesh’s future: a nuclear power plant project.

Russian ambassador to Bangladesh, Aleksandr Mantytsky, is unrepentant.

Last week, Mantytsky issued a press statement, accusing Bangladeshi journalists of “bias, prejudice, and even hatred”, before detailing several conspiracies that he felt deserved more media attention.

Mantytsky detailed one conspiracy, which claims Ukraine has chemical and biological weapons, that several publications have traced back to QAnon, a cult that not only believes a satanic cabal of cannibalistic paedophiles exists but influences global politics too.

Dhaka’s non-alignment

Why does Dhaka put up with Mantytsky’s blatant disinformation? Dhaka has publicly scolded other ambassadors in the country for far less.

It is not because Russia is a major trade or investment partner. Russia’s trade with Bangladesh is marginal, while Russia’s investment does not rank within the top 20 sources of foreign direct investment for Bangladesh. And it is not because Russia protects Bangladesh’s interests.

Just look to Myanmar, where Russia sends its weapons, fueling the military’s violence against protesters and genocide against the Rohingya, aggravating a humanitarian disaster that has spilled into Bangladesh.

The reason Dhaka puts up with Russia is that it would like Bangladesh to appear non-aligned. And there is nothing wrong with that. But the trouble for Dhaka is that non-alignment has a lot more to do with how other governments perceive that choice, rather than the reason for the choice.

Non-alignment precludes the notion that Bangladesh will ever align with, or against, a larger power. It is not so simple, though – non-alignment is in the eye of the beholder. Dhaka cannot now credibly maintain normal relations with Russia. Dhaka cannot now, for example, pursue economic agreements with Russia, as it does with others. Sanctions mean that any effort to negotiate an infrastructure loan, or a trade deal, would be a waste of time and resources.

Dhaka will have to play dumb. Moscow will almost certainly protest. And Mantytsky will continue kicking off about “Russo-phobic hysteria from Western mainstream media.” He needs to convince Bangladesh’s representatives that they are not, in fact, non-aligned.

Catch-22 situation

Should Dhaka respond, and attempt to work around those sanctions for profit, as New Delhi, or sidestep the problem by reinvigorating diplomatic and defence ties, Dhaka would show the world that Bangladesh is a lot closer to Russia than non-alignment prescribes.

That would alienate countries that have been threatened by Putin’s aggression. Many of them, particularly in Europe, but also East Asia and North America, are among Bangladesh’s closest partners.

That all means that Bangladesh’s non-alignment has suffered a little death. No matter what Dhaka says, or does, it will not look like non-alignment to one side or the other. As Putin’s invasion has shown, conflicts between larger powers test smaller countries’ values and narrow their options abroad, all while increasing the level of expectation from larger powers.

These conditions will continue to intensify as Putin’s invasion descends into a quagmire. And it will only be a matter of time Beijing’s revisionism creates a similar dilemma for Bangladesh. Dhaka would be better off throwing a war criminal like Putin under the bus sooner rather than later.

In the meantime, a parable from the Confucian Analects applies.

“One said, ‘To requite injury with kindness, what do you think of that?’ The master replied, ‘With what then will you requite kindness? Requite injury with justice. Requite kindness with kindness’.”

This article first appeared in Dhaka Tribune.