The draft agreement and the transition
By the end of the second term of the UPA government and of Dr Manmohan Singh’s ten-year term, the draft agreement had been approved and was ready for signature. The draft was not made for a particular individual in office or a particular situation. It was meant to have an enduring value and be relevant for a long-term solution. However, this point was not publicly made because it is well known that any draft on the back channel, until signed, is not a settled agreement and can be modified or rejected.
Shahryar Khan, in fact, suggested a change during our last meeting. I explained that this was my last meeting with him on behalf of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who was not a candidate for the prime minister post in the next election. He would, therefore, get the response from the representative of the next prime minister of India. The official file contained all details of discussions together with a note by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that this could only be opened on the instructions of the next prime minister.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi
This book does not cover the period of Prime Minister Modi. However, before he assumed office, he asked me to meet him at Gujarat Bhawan. I met him on May 25, 2014. He was very gracious and keen to speak to me. Among those waiting outside were the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh Chandrababu Naidu, Foreign Secretary Sujata Singh and High Commissioner to Pakistan TCA Raghavan. Apparently, the chief minister was in a hurry to meet the prime minister, as a few notes were sent in to the new prime minister. I asked the prime minister whether I should return later, but he said no and carried on with our meeting.
His main query was regarding the visit of Nawaz Sharif for the swearing-in ceremony. I told him it was a good and positive action taken. I added that as far as I could recall Nawaz Sharif had last visited to attend the funeral of Rajiv Gandhi, and, as a result, he was coming to India after almost two decades. Sometime later, Prime Minister Modi again asked to see me in his office. This time he asked for my assessment on India–Pakistan relations and I briefed him on the back channel. There appeared to be an intent to continue the back-channel process.
The file on the subject had been reviewed. I was even once told that no major change was required. A distinguished diplomat was being considered to be appointed as special envoy by Prime Minister Modi. I was asked to meet him. However, when I checked with the PMO, I was told there had been a change in thought and I would be informed regarding the briefing. On April 20, 2017, a senior official of the PMO came to see me at my house. He said the prime minister wanted me to go to Pakistan to meet Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. I reiterated that such meetings are more valuable if the envoy has the public confidence of the prime minister.
However, on the 22nd I was told I would be given details of the points to be discussed and was asked to give my travel documents to enable me to travel to Pakistan. The same day, the senior official and I met Fali Nariman to refresh some points. The following day, I saw a news item that a leading Indian businessman, who was an emissary, had gone to meet PM Nawaz Sharif, in his personal plane. I rang the official, who appeared surprised at this development. I told him that under the circumstances, it would not be proper for two people to represent the prime minister for the same purpose. Clearly, the emissary had not coordinated his visit to Pakistan with the PMO. This was the last conversation I had on this subject.
Comments on the back channel
There was considerable speculation and reporting on the back channel in India, Pakistan, and internationally, especially in the earlier years. I am quoting from a few of them here.
Former foreign secretary of India, MK Rasgotra wrote in his book:
“Secret talks made considerable headway during Dr Manmohan Singh’s prime ministership, till Musharraf’s position weakened within Pakistan and even as a document was virtually ready for signing, he told Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that he was not able to carry the negotiations forward to a conclusion...Secret negotiations actually had led to agreement on many aspects of the Kashmir issue and there was a document ready for signatures. It was agreed, for example, that there would be no independence (azadi) for Kashmir and no change in the border (LoC), but there would be freedom of movement across it for Kashmiris of both sides.
There was no reference to UN resolutions, and India had agreed to reduction of military troops in Kashmir subject to Pakistan ensuring the end of hostilities and terrorism (a vitally important condition). Finally, a joint mechanism of the two Kashmirs, for socio-economic subjects only, and autonomy for J&K, like all other Indian states, was also agreed on. It was Pakistan, not India, that balked at proceeding to a positive conclusion of the negotiations. While President Musharraf was also the army chief, his deputy general, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and the ISI were on board, but as soon as Musharraf shed his role as head of the Pakistani army, the new army chief, General Kayani, withdrew his support compelling Musharraf to abandon the agreement.”
Conclusion
As I look back on nearly a decade of negotiations, especially the first phase, I can think of three ingredients for the success of back- channel negotiations.
- Mutual trust and understanding between negotiators, as also the ability to understand the mind of the interlocutor.
- Access of negotiators to, and complete confidence of, the top leadership, which enables quick responses, detailed homework and complete confidentiality.
- Discussions are more open than in official channels as there is no written record of discussions.
Since Independence, there have been several initiatives and moments of hope of a settlement between India and Pakistan. This one, perhaps, came the closest. Several factors aligned themselves to create the circumstances that were conducive to the process. Dr Manmohan Singh’s determination, wisdom and patience were key drivers. The process drew strength from the fact that it built upon the initiative that Dr Singh’s predecessor, PM Vajpayee, had launched. As it also happens, developments external to the process can close the window of opportunity – at least temporarily.
We would never know – at least not now – what would have followed the signing of the agreement and if it would have endured over time. It is possible that it would have turned the course of history for our two countries and the region. That possibility still exists and the principles and the text of the draft agreement are still there to be taken up whenever the two sides feel the need to resume the process. Or, they can start afresh with new guidelines and parameters, but with the same objective – to seek permanent peace between two neighbours.
Excerpted with permission from In Pursuit of Peace: India-Pakistan Relations Under Six Prime Ministers, Satinder Kumar Lambah, Penguin India.
