In February 1954, President Chiang Kai-shek’s government proposed a bilateral defence treaty with the Americans. At this point in time, the United States was preoccupied with the Korean crisis and the worsening situation in Indochina. Although the PRC had, from time to time, declared its intention to take Taiwan back, the Americans did not expect any imminent Chinese action. The primary US concern was, in fact, that Chiang should not be allowed to drag the Americans into a conflict with China since he still harboured dreams of regaining the mainland through military means.
Within the State Department, the bureau in charge of South Asia observed that such a treaty might drive India closer to China, but the Far East department felt that any possible Indian reaction could not be an overriding consideration. Since the US chose not to pursue the security treaty at that time, these internal debates were of little immediate consequence. The Americans were busy with the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina, which was from late April to July 1954. This has been discussed in detail in the previous chapter, but it does bear repeating that both Britain and China felt they had come out on top as compared with the United States. Humphrey Trevelyan, the British representative in Beijing who had also participated in the Geneva Conference, summed it up thus in a letter to Anthony Eden: “In spite of the United States government’s reservations, the Chinese communists were treated in Geneva as representative of the only real Chinese government . . .”
After the Geneva Conference, Britain prepared to use its new relationship with China to consolidate ties and, therefore, on June 17, 1954, announced its intention to formalise its diplomatic representation in Beijing. It viewed it as a possible new beginning to advance British commercial interests. The Chinese too hoped that better Anglo-Chinese relations might lead to normalisation of relations with other Western countries.
At the end of July 1954, as the situation in Indochina was easing off, a new situation began to develop in the Taiwan Strait. Eisenhower and his closest advisors were discussing intelligence reports indicating that the Chinese were amassing forces along the coast with the intention, possibly, of seizing the small offshore islands that were under Taiwanese control. They were not entirely wrong in their assessment. In late June 1954, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party instructed Zhou Enlai to prepare for a struggle against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek after the Geneva Conference.
The Chinese felt that the US was unlikely to passively accept the diplomatic setback at the Geneva Conference on Indochina, and would create tensions by using Taiwan to blockade China. They also had information on the proposed US-Taiwan (Republic of China) defence treaty. They, consequently, decided that their struggle against the Americans should take the form of both a political campaign to emphasize their determination to “liberate” Taiwan and also in a form of military action by enhancing naval and air attacks against Chiang’s forces in the coastal areas. The Soviet Union (Premier Georgy Malenkov) was briefed about these plans.
The festering differences between the US and Britain over China came to a head when, on July 23, 1954, China shot down a Cathay Pacific passenger airliner near Hainan Island (China admitted that it was shot down by mistake and offered to pay the compensation claim of Sterling 3,67,000). Three of the dead were Americans. The US took this attack as a sign of aggressive Chinese intent and was unhappy with the way in which Britain handled this matter.
Eisenhower asked Dulles to send a “stiff note” to Foreign Secretary Eden, making it clear that the US would take a tough line since American citizens had been killed, and that it expected the British government to follow suit. The British government, far from stiffening its attitude towards China, was actively engaged in building the relationship in the hopes of securing commercial advantage. Hence, when the first Taiwan Strait crisis started a month later, Anglo-American relations were already under some degree of stress over the China policy.
The crisis started on September 3, 1954. China initiated heavy artillery bombardment against the island of Quemoy (Jinmen). The Eisenhower administration discussed how the US should respond, and the President’s first concern was to enquire of his officials whether an American response might drive a wedge between the US and its principal allies, especially Britain. After the British and French had visibly broken ranks at Geneva, leaving the Americans isolated, he wanted to ensure that the West maintained a united front in this crisis. He thought to ask Churchill as to where the United Kingdom would stand if the Americans engaged in military action against China over the offshore islands.
Dulles and Eden met in London on September 17. Eden told Dulles that Britain was worried about the crisis escalating into a war. He emphasised that, so far as Britain was concerned, war over the defence of Formosa was one thing, but conflict over Quemoy (Jinmen) and the other offshore islands was an entirely different matter. The British Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to Eden, were of the view that Quemoy was neither defensible nor essential to the defence of Formosa itself. Dulles told Eden in turn that the Americans held the opposite view.
Dulles subsequently telephoned Eisenhower to say that Britain was being noncommittal. The two foreign ministers had a further talk on September 27, at which Eden clarified that, so far as Britain was concerned, it considered the status of the offshore islands to be different from those of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores (Penghu Islands), in as much as Britain regarded the offshore islands as belonging to the PRC. With such a fundamental divergence between them on the ownership as well as the military significance of the offshore islands, Dulles and Eden realized they needed to find common ground. Dulles suggested that the Taiwan Strait crisis should be taken to the UN, and eventually, both agreed to this idea with the objective of getting the two parties (the PRC and Chiang Kai-shek) to cease fire.
If the UN succeeds in doing so, it would solidify the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, with Chinese consent, such that there would de facto be two Chinas. This suited both, the British, because it eased tensions in the Far East, and the Americans because it preserved their control over the entire island chain from Japan to the Philippines which, in their strategic view, was essential for the containment of the communists. Eden proposed to bring it to the UN with the help of New Zealand, which was a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in order to give it greater credence, and to make it more acceptable for the Chinese. Eden thought that the plan’s only chance of success was if China was invited to present its own case to the UN. The final decision to go ahead was taken on September 29 in Eden’s apartment in London. It was called Operation “ORACLE”.
The differences between the two Western allies over the actual status of the offshore islands still remained unresolved, but at least they had a common action plan. The British representatives in Beijing and Moscow were asked to brief their hosts and underscore that ORACLE (this was a secret code name and was never used when the British talked with Moscow and Beijing) was a serious and sincere attempt to stop a larger conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
Excerpted with permission from Crosswinds: Nehru, Zhou and the Anglo-American Competition over China, Vijay Gokhale, Penguin India.
