Bangladesh is witnessing an unprecedented countrywide protest movement, led primarily by students. The scale of this movement is almost comparable to the 1969 movement in erstwhile East Pakistan, also led by the students, against the Pakistan dictatorial regime.

At the time of writing this, unconfirmed reports suggest that between 40 to 105 people, mostly students and young people, have been killed and thousands are severely injured in the brutal countermeasures of the government police. To thwart the protestors, Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government has imposed a nationwide curfew and deployed the army. As of now, Bangladesh is effectively cut-off from the rest of the world.

What are the students protesting against?

The protests are for the abolition of the quota system. This is the reservation of a certain proportion of government positions for women, the disabled, minorities and the successors of 1971 Liberation War freedom fighters. The bone of contention is the last group, which accounts for the largest reservation of 30% of all government jobs. The protesters claim with justification that this reservation is a way of recruiting Awami League supporters to government positions and rewarding loyal supporters.

The quota system is under judicial review after it was originally abolished in 2018 after a first round of protests, but reinstated in June. It is scheduled to be reviewed by Supreme Court in a few months. So why do the protesters not hold their fire?

First, because the Supreme Court, alongside the entire judicial system, is under the thumb of the ruling party. An amendment to the constitution in 2012 ensured that the judicial system is beholden to parliament, which is controlled by Awami League, and not an equal state power. The protesters suspect that Awami League will not and cannot permanently abolish the quota for its loyalists. It would not be in the party’s pragmatic interest nor in its assumed role as sole legitimate heir to the legacy of the 1971 struggle for independence.

However, the protests are this massive and widespread also because they transcend the limits of immediacy. They are protests against an autocratic and increasingly corrupt government. There has not been a real election in Bangladesh since 2008 and all subsequent vote exercises have been without any real opposition. Both administration and the police worked tirelessly in favour of the ruling disposition before each vote, to the extent that the country’s democratic credentials are no more.

Famously, the country is characterised as a “hybrid regime”. More disconcertedly, after 15 years in power, the ruling Awami League is seen as corrupt, complacent, self-serving, and unresponsive. The current round of protests is against a political party that has usurped political power in the country.

This is also why the rulers take the protests so seriously. Tens of thousands of students have been out in the streets, blocking traffic, shouting slogans, for days and weeks by now. Few universities are excluded, not even the usually quiescent private ones. The government’s response was initially hesitant but with the increase in numbers of protesters the mood has changed. Universities have now been closed, internet cut, news outlets blocked and the police deployed in full riot-gear with teargas and rubber bullets.

The protests should not be viewed as an isolated incident. They are part of a series of protests that have erupted on an irregular basis over the last ten years or so. These were all single-issue protest, like the current one, but they were also understood by all involved including the ruling party as broad protests against the government.

There are strong similarities with contemporary movements elsewhere, including the Milk Tea Alliance protests in Thailand, Hong Kong, Burma and Taiwan, the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, and the Occupy movements in the United States. These were all relatively spontaneous and driven by social media. They were single-issue movements that fed on much broader dissatisfaction.

In Bangladesh the movements include the Shahbag movement in 2013, the movement against VAT on education in 2015, the road safety movement and the first phase of the quota movement, both in 2018, and the protests against rising costs of living in 2023.

All demonstrated three major patterns. First, they employed a narrative that aroused sympathy deep into social groups that the ruling party depended; they forced open a space for voice in which to criticize the government and debate its merits; and they used these spaces to criticize the government indirectly.

These protests may also be seen in a larger context of general dissatisfaction with the rulers in Bangladesh. Electoral participation and trust in the government are both very low despite years of decent economic growth and major investments in infrastructure. The protests indicate that such measures are not sufficient to ensure citizen approval of the rulers or to silence the popular demand to be heard and counted.

What might this protest hold for the future of Bangladesh politics?

In the immediate term, it is unlikely that the Sheikh Hasina regime will fall. It is a well-entrenched coalition of forces that include the large organisation of Awami League, the army, the police, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary. These are all forces beholden to Hasina. The protesters have gained much sympathy among substantial sections of the population, but probably not sufficient enough to create a full-scale revolution. Also, there is no real alternative prime ministerial candidate for the moment.

In the mid to long term, the regime’s image is badly damaged. It was never entirely good, but at least it could claim to pursuing policies that aimed at growth and stability. Now it comes across as more nakedly self-serving and intent on retaining power even at the cost of blood. This creates a more unstable situation in which added force is needed to keep future protests down.

Arild Engelsen Ruud is the Professor of South Asian Studies, University of Oslo, Norway. Niladri Chatterjee is a historian and researcher, University of Oslo, Norway.