The student-led protests that have swept Bangladesh since Sunday, and met violent reprisal, are the strongest indication yet that India should reconsider its long-standing policy towards its eastern neighbour.
India’s security-centric approach sees Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the ruling Awami League as stabilising allies against threats like a perceived Pakistan-backed dispensation. But this is increasingly at odds with the democratic aspirations of the Bangladeshi people, particularly its youth.
This position, while rooted in legitimate security concerns, risks undermining Bangladesh’s potential for genuine political liberty and diversity. It now threatens India’s long-term interests on its eastern border by alienating much of Bangladesh’s population at a time when Hasina’s political future seems increasingly precarious.
New Delhi’s myopic approach not only undermines the democratic aspirations of Bangladeshis but also potentially sows the seeds for instability and anti-India sentiment in a strategically vital neighbour, compromising the very security interests India seeks to protect.
India needs to reevaluate not only its security-centric view but also consider if the hawks have overly influenced Indian foreign policy, promoting a security lens that enables the Awami League and bypasses a nuanced view of Bangladesh.
It is well-known that the conservative Jamaat-e-Islami has never received more than 5% of the vote. It is simplistic to assert that Pakistan can significantly influence Bangladeshi society or its politics through financial means or the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence, the Bangladeshi intelligence arm.
So also the claim that the Bangladesh National Party, which includes numerous freedom fighters in its ranks, solely caters to anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani sentiment. The Bangladesh National Party seeks to establish a uniquely Bangladeshi identity, a mission that is both overtly promoted and subtly pursued.
Allegations that insurgents in India received support during the rule of the Bangladesh National Party three decades ago have contributed to New Delhi’s narrow perspective. However, it is crucial to note that insurgent activities were not exclusive to any single political era: they persisted during the Awami League’s regime between 1996 and 2001, partly as a response to India’s involvement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. This complex history calls for a more balanced assessment of Bangladesh’s internal dynamics.
Despite the palpable shift in Bangladesh’s political landscape, which is undoubtedly evident to Indian diplomatic and intelligence circles, the foreign policy hawks in New Delhi have stubbornly clung to a simplistic narrative. This reductionist viewpoint is largely a construction of Hasina’s regime – a narrative built on years of disinformation, historical distortion, and manipulative rhetoric that has finally been unequivocally rejected by the youth-led uprising.
The tenacious adherence to this outdated perspective by India’s foreign policy establishment reflects a dangerous disconnect from the ground realities in Bangladesh. Hasina’s long-standing strategy of invoking the spirit of the Liberation struggle of 1971 and exaggerating the influence of external forces like Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence has lost its potency.
The young protesters’ bold appropriation of historically charged terms – evident in slogans like “I am razakar [collaborator], I am razakar, who said that, the autocrat” – signals a seismic shift in Bangladesh’s political discourse that Indian policymakers can ill afford to ignore.
As the student protests intensify in Bangladesh, Hasina’s regime faces a crisis of legitimacy. The government’s brutal crackdown, including 174 reported student deaths and widespread torture by security forces, has turned Hasina into a pariah, waging war against her own people. This violence, coupled with financial instability and growing opposition from the diaspora, signals the beginning of the regime’s end game.
The perception that India is Hasina’s primary backer has solidified among Bangladeshis, particularly young protesters. Their determination, fueled by the Bangladesh National Party’s failure to mount effective political resistance, has created a movement that refuses to back down. This puts India in a precarious position: continuing to support Hasina means running the risk of cementing a long-lasting hostility among Bangladeshis towards India.
No serious analyst is betting based on a timeline but it is clear that Hasina’s government cannot sustain its grip on power indefinitely. If India waits to change sides until Hasina’s fall becomes inevitable, it could be too late to salvage its reputation among the Bangladeshis.
Instead, a proactive, nuanced approach is imperative. India must pivot from supporting specific political entities to championing democratic processes and institutions. By aligning with the democratic aspirations of Bangladesh’s youth and embracing a comprehensive understanding of the political landscape, India can potentially salvage its relationship with its neighbor.
The window for such recalibration is rapidly closing.
Zia Hassan, an economist and political analyst, has written extensively on South Asian politics and economics for Al Jazeera, The Straits Times, The Hindu, and Scroll. His latest book, Mirage of Development (Unnayan Bivram), was banned by Bangladeshi authorities. His X handle is @ziahassanrupu2.
