Brigadier Behram Master, Commander 191 Indian Infantry Brigade, was in the hill sector at Dewa, giving orders to his “O” Group when a Pakistani helicopter spotted them and asked for artillery fire on the Indians. An artillery round landed on an ammunition dump located within the post and the resultant explosion killed the brigadier and several of his officers. Dewa was a post that overlooked the Chhamb plains. This occurred on 15 August 1965 at 1000 hours. War had not been declared, but such issues did not matter to the Pakistan Army. The Indians were not aware that the artillery shelling on that day was but a prelude for something much bigger.
Chhamb had been a battleground between India and Pakistan in the Indo-Pak war of 1947-48 and would figure in most of the wars fought between the two countries thereafter. Chhamb is strategically important to both India and Pakistan and that is why it has been a common denominator of all the wars we have fought with Pakistan – except Kargil.
Chhamb can be used as a launch pad by India to access important strategic objectives in Pakistan. The Marala Headworks lie within striking distance from the international border (IB) as well as from the Cease-Fire Line, both of which lie ahead of Chhamb. There is also Hardinge Bridge, over the Chenab River, which if destroyed or even damaged, can choke the Strike Forces of the Pakistan Army and prevent them from carrying out their assigned roles in areas of vital importance to their security. The area west of Chhamb is an ideal tank country, with plenty of scope for manoeuvre for mobile forces.
For Pakistan, Chhamb is important because it provides a base for an approach to Akhnur, the capture of which could threaten the lifeline to Rajouri, Naushera and Poonch and thereafter the alternate route to the Srinagar Valley via the Pir Panjal. The capture of Akhnur would also threaten Jammu, a town of strategic and political importance to India.
The ground on our side of the border in Chhamb is in the shape of an inverted triangle with the base of the triangle on the Munawar Tawi River with the area narrowing down to its apex resting on the Akhnur Bridge. The two sides of this isosceles triangle are the Chenab River on one side and the Kalidhar hills on the other, which give protection to the flanks of any attacking force. Whereas the ground configuration is good for an offensive, the defence, if properly planned, is equally good for a strong defensive battle.
Our forces holding Chhamb consisted of just one infantry brigade with one of its battalions in the hill sector on the Kalidhar Ridge and three battalions in the plains. For armour, it had just one squadron of light AMX tanks from 20 Lancers, and a field regiment and a medium battery for artillery support.
It is strange that notwithstanding the strategic importance of the Chhamb Sector, not enough significance was given to the planning of its defence in the Indian Army’s overall strategic plan in 1965. This, despite the war games held in 195-57 and 1958-59 and in subsequent discussions held at Headquarters Western Command Shimla, which highlighted the vulnerability of Chhamb and its strategic importance. Although the Army Commander, Lt Gen. Harbakhsh Singh, subsequently accepted that the capture of Chhamb could be an objective, the Corps Commander Lt Gen. KC Katoch obdurately felt otherwise. Pakistan, on the other hand, appreciated the vital and strategic importance of Akhnur and allocated a formidable offensive force of an infantry division that included two infantry brigades in the assault role and one in the holding role, with another infantry division in reserve, two armoured regiments, two medium artillery regiments, three field regiments, two batteries of heavy artillery, one locating regiment, one locating battery and one light antiaircraft battery.
Pakistan’s offensive plan for the capture of Akhnur was code-named Operation Grand Slam.
Our intelligence agencies finally began to wake up to the enemy force build-up opposite Chhamb. All earlier information received from them focused on Operation Gibraltar. The first intelligence report relating to Chhamb was received on 14 August. It reported, for the first time, that enemy forces had concentrated at Moel. This was immediately followed up with a report indicating the move of a squadron of tanks to Mattewala opposite Chhamb. During this time, the infiltrators had attacked the police station at Palanwala. Mahar chased and captured fourteen of them and killed four.
191 Infantry Brigade was at this time without a Brigade Commander. Finally, Brig. Manmohan Singh, who was commanding a brigade in 26 Infantry Division, was moved to take over 191 Infantry. Being new to his task, he had little or no knowledge of the brigade. HQ 10 Infantry Division was, at this time, under raising in Bangalore and Belgaum. It was now tasked to move to J & K to take over 191 and 80 Infantry Brigades in the Chhamb and Jhangar Sectors. When Pakistan launched Operation Grand Slam on 1 September 1965, Maj. Gen. DB Chopra, GOC 10 Infantry Division was on his first visit to 80 Infantry Brigade at Jhangar to begin to learn the contours of his command. He was immediately ordered to assume command of the Chhamb-Jaurian Sector, although according to previous orders, 191 Infantry Brigade was to come under the command of 10 Infantry Division only by 15 September 1965. The Pakistan Army, however, was many steps ahead of the Indian Army and launched its offensive on 1 September, giving no time for 10 Infantry Division to get its act together.
This was the shabby manner in which the defence of the Chhamb battle of 1965 was planned and organized. Worse still, units of medium artillery allotted to 191 Infantry Brigade were taken away by XV Corps and allotted to the Poonch Sector.
Excerpted with permission from 1965, Courage Unleashed: Short Stories of the Indo-Pak War, Ian Cardozo, Penguin India.
