The surrender of the militants in 1993 punctured the early bluster of the Hurriyat spokesperson Abdul Ghani Lone, who said, “If armed forces storm the shrine, we will win. If they withdraw, we win.” He admitted later that “the end of the episode was not according to the wishes of the Hurriyat conference”. We knew that televising the militants’ surrender would create dissent, and predictably, the bickering soon began. The Jamait-ul-Mujahideen told local newspapers that the Hurriyat’s “coffin sellers” had let the people of Kashmir down, and the Hizbul Mujahideen said, “We gave them guns to use rather than surrender.” I observed many personal jeers and sneers in local circles about the militants’ cowardice in surrender, their inability to live up to their lofty talk, and for coming out at night with their hands above their heads. As my friend Sati Sahni wrote, “Hazratbal was a god-sent opportunity for the Hurriyat leadership, but the lack of imagination, factional rivalry, inept reflexes and incorrect appreciation of the situation meant they failed to capitalise on it.” Pakistan clearly agreed, as their proxies soon killed Hurriyat leader Abdul Ghani Lone.
The 1993 surrender marked a pivotal moment, with the ISI accelerating resources towards pro-Pakistan and pro-Islamic organisations with directions to assassinate JKLF leaders like Idrees Khan and Farooq Ahmad Wani. It also created discord between Amanullah Khan in Pakistan and Yasin Malik in Kashmir, which simmered for nearly two years. Events reached a tipping point on 21 September 1995 when Amanullah Khan ousted Yasin Malik as the president of the JKLF because he had “damaged the Azadi Movement at the behest of the Indian government and had not complied with directives from the high command…he is only interested in the chief ministership.”
The UK wing of the JKLF responded by ousting Amanullah because “he has been indulging in an opportunist, undemocratic, and dictatorial style of functioning. He has been making financial gains in the name of Kashmir and compromising the position of the JKLF at the behest of his masters.” Yasin Malik rejoined the Hurriyat and Abdul Ghani Lone welcomed him, saying, “The emergence of Malik as the JKLF supremo under the aegis of Hurriyat has restored the independence movement to a sound footing.”
Amanullah Khan responded by appointing Shabir Siddiqui as the JKLF president in Kashmir, “General” Basharat Raza Khan as chief military commander, and Salman Yavar “Nikka Bhai” as deputy chief commander. The presence of Shabir’s family’s schools in Budgam led to friction with the Jamaat-e-Islami over their demands for him to close his educational ventures. Choosing defiance, Shabir aligned himself with the JKLF. In February 1996, Shabir called a press conference suggesting that 95 per cent of ordinary Kashmiris wanted independence and said, “I call upon people to strengthen their militant activities…only an armed struggle can deliver freedom to the people of Kashmir. We won’t ever lay down our weapons. We are soldiers of Allah and will fight to the last drop of our blood. Our quam will bleed security forces till they surrender to our demand of Azadi. We will not rest, nor will we allow them to rest.” He soon held another press conference to rant against Malik and Hurriyat for their “failure to represent the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir”. He also promised that “We are soldiers of Allah and will bleed Indian security forces till they surrender to our demands.”
We would have let this slide, but our intelligence team had intercepted communications between Shabir, Basharat and Amanullah Khan discussing Hazratbal, and this felt like a bad omen. I met with my colleagues AK Suri and PS Gill to bolster security around both the shrine and the new JKLF office established across the shrine in a building that was previously the shrine’s library. The leadership duo had complementary skills; Shabir was articulate and cautious while Basharat was aggressive and violent. Basharat’s tactics – kidnapping faculty members from the Regional Engineering College, extorting local merchants and harassing women – created an ill will that proved valuable during our siege.
After the morning namaz on 24 March 1996, Basharat and Shabir led a JKLF group to the main gate of Hazratbal. Shabir had told his men he did not expect much resistance from the J&K Police but told them to shoot to kill if they resisted. When they tried to enter the mosque armed, a J&K Police officer barred their entry. In response, Basharat fatally shot the officer at close range, and charged into the mosque with his henchmen. In the ensuing two-hour confrontation, our courageous policemen eliminated nine militants, including Basharat, his deputy Nikka Bhai, Srinagar district commander Dilawar, Baramulla commander Tipu, Budgam commander Waseem, and four others. We lost two valiant police officers that day.
The siege of 1996 triggered a different response from J&K Police in 1993. We immediately threw a cordon around the shrine and met with Governor General Rao to decide strategy. Unlike in the previous siege, we took the primary responsibility for resolving the standoff. The priorities were the same as they were in 1993 – no damage to the shrine, free the hostages unhurt and ensure the sanctum sanctorum was safe. The recent memory of Mast Gul burning the Charar-e-Sharief shrine worried us, but we found comfort in Shabir’s dislike for Pakistan and Wahhabism.
Inside the mosque, Shabir was recovering from the shock of police resistance that had left nine of his best men dead, but soon he began carrying out Amanullah Khan’s instructions to use saws, hammers and fire to break open the safe. They tried all night but failed. We sent Moulvi Bashir-ud-din to Hazratbal to speak to Shabir, and their demands echoed what JKLF had asked for three years earlier: the removal of security forces from Kashmir, tripartite talks between the JKLF, India and Pakistan, and safe passage for the group with their arms.
The next day, AK Suri began negotiations with the militants at the shrine’s entrance. The police offered safe passage without arms and let Shabir know that arranging tripartite talks required the central government’s permission, which would take time. Shabir soon held a press conference saying there would be no prayers at the shrine until the government met his demands. As in any hostage situation, we tried to prolong the negotiations while developing alternative solutions. The J&K Police now had a trained SOG, vital intelligence and local support.
So, we modified our negotiations to get the terrorists out of the shrine by offering them a security-free corridor to move back to their office. We sweetened this offer with vague inducements of prioritizing the JKLF over other organisations in future political and peace talks. Shabir’s team members were hesitant to vacate the dargah, but Shabir prevailed. On the fourth day of the siege (27 March), the JKLF terrorists, a few women and children made their way from the main building (where the sanctum sanctorum was) and moved right across the street to an abandoned library, which was also a part of the dargah complex. A team, which included Suri and members of the shrine trust, entered the dargah and confirmed the vault was damaged but unopened.
This change of location felt like an opportunity. We asked Farooq Khan (the head of the SOG) to present some options for an assault. This attack reminded me of one of my favourite lines in George Bernard Shaw’s Arms and the Man, which reads, “Soldiering is the art of attacking mercilessly whenever you are strong. Take the enemy at a disadvantage and never fight him on equal terms.” Farooq deserves credit for the immaculate planning and execution of the operation; he was the right man at the right time with the right strategy and team. The SOG was already familiar with the layout of the shrine complex and the area around it; they soon surveyed the bylanes and sent some team members in civilian clothes inside the shrine to conduct a recce.
Excerpted with permission from Kashmir Under 370: A Personal History by J&K’s Former Director General of Police, Mahendra Sabharwal and Manish Sabharwal, Juggernaut.
