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The United States presidential election is heating up with Democratic Party candidate Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump, who represents the Republican Party, standing neck-and-neck in the latest opinion polls.

The polling will take place on November 5 and the counting of votes will begin immediately after voting concludes.

In an election that could possibly end in a photo finish, the 5.2 million persons of Indian origin residing in the United States, who now make up the country’s second-largest immigrant group, are expected to play a crucial role.

In its “Indian Americans at the Ballot Box” survey report released on October 28, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace found that Indian Americans continue to overwhelmingly support the Democratic Party. About 61% of the voters from the community said that they plan to cast ballots in favour of Harris, the survey showed.

However, there is more to these numbers. The Washington-based think tank also captured in its survey a slight shift of the Indian American community towards the Republican Party.

To better understand these changes, Scroll interviewed Milan Vaishnav, one of the authors of the report and the director of the organisation’s South Asia Program.

You’ve found that while the Indian American community still overwhelmingly backs the Democratic Party, there has been a modest shift of the community towards the Republican Party? What explains this shift? Is this shift based on ideological affinity or the community’s increased socio-economic status in American society?

There are two ways of looking at this. The first is party identification. Compared to data we collected in 2020, the share of Indian Americans identifying as Democrats in 2024 declined from 66% to 57%, while the share of Republican identifiers grew from 18% to 27%. The share of true independents – around 14% – remains largely unchanged. We see a similar shift when it comes to voting intentions. In 2020, 68% of Indian Americans backed the Democratic nominee Joe Biden while 22% favoured Republican incumbent Donald Trump. In 2024, this roughly 70:20 split has become something more like 60:30.

While it is tough to say, I think this is driven by more than rising incomes. We are seeing a deterioration in racial/ethnic minority votes for the Democrats across the board, although the extent of this erosion is hotly contested. Survey after survey show that this drift, even if modest, is likely explained by concerns about inflation, the state of the economy, illegal immigration, and a sense that the Democratic Party has been too focused on identity politics.

Despite this slight shift towards the Republican Party, the share of Indian Americans who self-identify on the ideological Left has grown, according to your report. Why is that?

In 2024, 55% of Indian Americans situate themselves on the left side of the ideological spectrum. That share stood at 47% four years ago.

I think the change can be explained, in part, by Trump himself.

Trump is a uniquely ideologically flexible candidate. While he espouses deeply conservative positions on some issues, like taxes or immigration, he advocates for trade policies that many on the left have long been clamouring for. He does not fit neatly with our standard, unidimensional left-right spectrum.

Is the growing support of the Indian American community for the Republican Party mainly driven by Trump’s candidature or is it a more general shift that isn’t linked to the Grand Old Party’s candidates and leadership?

It is always difficult to disentangle. But our sense is that there are structural barriers that create a wedge between Indian Americans and the Republican Party. Many of the latter’s policies are simply out of sync with the preferences of the median Indian American.

But Trump, it appears, has a unique appeal in some quarters – he projects himself as a strong leader, he rates better on the economy in most surveys, and he is tough on illegal immigration. What we’re seeing across surveys is that many immigrants who came to the United States legally are upset at the prospect of those coming to the United States by breaking the law.

Your survey found that younger Indian American men, especially those born in the United States, appear more positively disposed towards Trump. What are the reasons behind this?

Indeed, the bulk of the rightward drift among Indian Americans can be explained by shifting preferences among men, especially those under the age of 40 and those born in the United States, as opposed to naturalised citizens. A yawning gender gap has become a hallmark of this election; across communities, women are far more enthusiastic about Harris while men are more sceptical.

But this gap has never been apparent within the Indian American community; we are seeing it for the first time in 2024.

Our survey cannot definitively say why this is happening, but at least three hypotheses have been advanced and all three could be working in tandem.

First, many young men appear alienated or disenchanted with the status quo, and they are eager for change. They are frustrated by a whole host of issues, including limits to upward mobility.

Second, we cannot rule out the possibility of misogyny, plain and simple. Qualitative evidence suggests many younger men are sceptical about voting for a female presidential candidate.

Third, there is the question of political socialisation. Younger men in the United States may be getting their information from more conservative sources or influencers that are directly speaking to them and their anxieties. Conservative podcast culture, for instance, has been a hot topic this election.

Indian Americans who identify themselves as Democrats have cited the Republican Party’s intolerance of minorities, the stance on abortion and ties to evangelicalism as key reasons for them not identifying with the Grand Old Party. So what explains the slight shift of the community, especially in the younger age group, towards the Republican Party despite the support of white supremacists and racist elements that Donald Trump enjoys?

It seems like a contradiction, but perhaps it is not. One of the most important issues cited by Indian Americans this election is the question of abortion and reproductive rights. But this is an issue that animates women and Democratic leaners. Men, especially younger men, are less concerned about this. On immigration, many people feel Trump is concerned principally with illegal immigration and this aligns with their views. In fact, when we asked people who don’t identify as Democrats why they do not, the most popular response (voiced by 27% of people in this category) is that the Democratic Party is too weak on illegal immigration.

My own personal view, and this is backed up by media reporting, is that Trump – if elected – could take steps to curb legal as well as illegal immigration. But it is the latter which gets highlighted most prominently on the campaign trail.

Finally, there’s a “reality television” entertainment quality with Trump that resonates with some people – they are attracted to his ability and willingness to “disrupt” the status quo.

Indian Americans are viewing prominent Republican leaders from the community such as Vivek Ramaswamy, Nikki Haley and Usha Vance (the wife of Trump’s running mate JD Vance) unfavourably, your findings show. Why is that?

This was very revealing to us. It is notable that Ramaswamy, Haley and Usha Vance – in the aggregate – are rated most positively than either JD Vance or Trump. But their ratings remain below 50 on a 0-100 scale (while Harris, Tim Walz and the Democratic Party as a whole sit north of 50).

What this suggests is that co-ethnicity might have its limits. Existing research suggests that Indian Americans are especially motivated to vote for their own, even more so than the average Asian American. But the policy positions of this particular iteration of the Republican Party might be a bridge too far for the majority of the community.