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Historian William Dalrymple caused a flutter last week by appearing to blame Indian historians for the rise of what he called “WhatsApp history” in India – fake narratives masquerading as history that are often spread to push political narratives, especially Hindutva.
“My personal bugbear is that the study of history in academia entered a long phase from about the ’50s through to the beginning of the present century, where academics only talked to themselves, and often did so in deliberately obscure language of the Subaltern Studies Collective and so on…” he said. “As a result, you’ve got the growth of ‘WhatsApp history’ and ‘WhatsApp University.’ It was the failure of Indian academics to reach out to general audiences.”
While Dalrymple’s criticism of India’s historians created a controversy, what is uncontested is the rise of “WhatsApp history”. One of the starkest cultural consequences of the mass accessibility of the internet in India is the proliferation of fake history.
Much of this has been crucial to the rise of Hindutva. Dalrymple notes that this pseudo history has seduced many into believing that plastic surgery existed in ancient India, that the Mahabharata contains references to atomic bombs and the Ramayana to sky vehicles like helicopters.
But much more politically relevant is the portrayal of the Muslim kings and emperors of mediaeval India as tyrants who, though a small minority, were engaged in constant religious warfare with the country’s vast Hindu majority.
Dalrymple is not entirely wrong for identifying the “failure of Indian academics to reach out to general audiences”. Part of the reason “WhatsApp history” has been so successful is that well-researched academic history has never been well disseminated. It was always confined to a small circle of historians.
Accessing this for ordinary readers was difficult, if not impossible. Besides, just going by the arcane language register in which so much of academic history is written, its lack of popular appeal is clearly a matter of design.
However, what Dalrymple perhaps misses is that only blaming historians is unfair. The rise of WhatsApp history is a mass phenomenon, propelled by powerful political, social and technological forces. There is a reason, for example, that this did not happen in the Nehruvian era: clearly, the politics of the age did not favour this sort of fake history, preferring research-backed academic narratives instead.
India’s Hindutva movement has put a lot of time, effort and money into pushing its own skewed narratives. Sure, if academic historians had been more engaged with the public, they could have helped counter this by a bit. But could they have reversed it? Unlikely.
That said, many historians have recognised the value of public outreach. Increasingly, more Indian academic historians are visible on social media, charging into the muddy scrum of political narratives. On Twitter, YouTube and even Instagram, users looking for research-backed history can often find enlightenment.
Does this mean these research-backed historians can beat or even match Hindutva “history”?
For now, that does not seem to be the case. The virality of “Whatsapp history” is difficult to beat, driven by deep pockets and the easy acceptance of ideas that reinforce prejudices.
But it is important that these historians are there, fighting the good fight. Politics is a long game and the only way to surely lose is to vacate the battleground. Hindutva ideologues understood this through the Nehru and Indira Gandhi eras, nurdling away in what was a difficult time for them.
Their opponents must take a leaf out of their book and mark their presence in the public sphere. This will ensure that while “WhatsApp history” might be dominant in today’s age, it will not become hegemonic and that counter narratives will always exist for ordinary folk to easily access.
