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Ahead of the Maharashtra Assembly elections next week, veteran journalist and analyst Girish Kuber in an interview with Smitha Nair breaks down the Bharatiya Janata Party’s tactics as it aims to regain ground in the state after its poor performance in the Lok Sabha elections.
These include leveraging caste politics, securing support from its parent organisation, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, and deploying last-minute welfare schemes like the Ladki Bahin Yojna cash transfer scheme for women.
The BJP is fighting the elections as part of the Mahayuti alliance, along with the Eknath Shinde faction of the Shiv Sena and the Ajit Pawar faction of the Nationalist Congress Party.
Kuber also identifies internal challenges within the Opposition Maha Vikas Aghadi alliance, particularly tensions between the Congress and the faction of the Shiv Sena led by Uddhav Thavkeray. In addition, he discusses the pivotal yet constrained role of Sharad Pawar, who leads a faction of the Nationalist Congress Party, the third member of the alliance, in one of the most complex electoral battles ever witnessed in the country.
Have the Bharatiya Janata Party and its allies addressed the reasons for their poor showing in the Lok Sabha polls?
Some things have worked in their favour and others they have managed to their advantage. The most crucial factor was the delay in holding the Assembly elections, which gave the Mahayuti government time to implement welfare schemes like the Ladki Bahin Yojana. This has helped from the largesse point of view, without which there was every chance that the BJP would suffer again.
The difference in the number of votes polled by the Mahayuti alliance and the Maha Vikas Aghadi in the Lok Sabha election was only a few lakh. The support that welfare schemes have earned the government could make a difference of a few lakh votes and significantly affect the outcome.
A significant move, though subtle, was the sub-classification of Scheduled Castes [allowing the state to reserve seats for specific sub-groups within the quotas earmarked for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes based on the sub-group’s more backward or disadvantaged status], which has largely flown under the radar. Just a day before the election announcement, an order was issued to split the SC category into Hindu and non-Hindu Dalits, or neo-Buddhists.
While it’s too early to tell if this will benefit the Mahayuti alliance, the strategy appears to have been executed cleverly. It has effectively neutralised, at least to some extent, the political narrative that dominated the parliamentary elections [that the BJP intended to change the Constitution and change the reservations policy]. Also, on paper it appears they are successful in creating a wedge between Marathas and OBCs.
How exactly could the Ladki Bahin Yojana be a game-changer?
The real credit for the game-changing impact goes to the Election Commission for delaying the Assembly elections, which allowed the state to transfer four to five months of instalments under the Ladki Bahin Scheme to women’s bank accounts. This has helped them in urban areas.
I doubt it has had the same effect in rural regions, where issues like the soyabean and cotton crises persist. The BJP has consistently shown a lack of serious agricultural economic understanding and decision-making, which remains a major concern in rural Maharashtra.
After the Lok Sabha election, you said that the Mahayuti alliance’s ambivalent attitude toward Maratha reservation angered both the Marathas and the Other Backward Castes. Has the situation changed in the last five months?
The Maratha reservation issue has remained largely unchanged since the parliamentary elections. Since August last year, Marathas have been agitating to be included in the reservation quota under the Other Backward Classes category. However, the BJP has made a concerted effort to mobilise the OBCs and create a divide between them and the Marathas. As a result, Maratha opposition to the BJP has lost some of its intensity since the Lok Sabha polls.
The BJP’s successful strategy in Haryana, which involved dividing communities between “us” and “them”, seems to have emboldened them to play the same game here. Now, it’s OBCs versus Marathas. With OBCs making up about 33% of the population and the BJP traditionally holding strong OBC support, only the election results will tell whether this strategy will succeed. However, I no longer see the sharp Maratha edge against the BJP that was evident earlier.
How has the BJP achieved this?
Over the past seven to eight months, the BJP has been strategically mobilising OBC communities across Maharashtra. They organised more than 300 meetings with various OBC groups and brought them into the fold with promises of benefits. One of the other initiatives was the creation of hostels for working women in districts, which, though not immediately visible, will have an impact down the line. These efforts seem to have helped the BJP loosen the Marathas’ stronghold over the caste issue.
The Maha Vikas Aghadi enjoyed the support of Dalits and Muslims in the general election. Is that still the case?
As I mentioned earlier, the BJP has strategically entered the politics of dividing Dalits into Hindu Dalits and those who have embraced Buddhism. What they are particularly concerned about is the potential for Marathas, Dalits, and Muslims to come together, as they did in the parliamentary elections. This is why they are trying to drive a wedge between Dalit communities.
Muslims, of course, have traditionally not been BJP supporters, which is why we’ve seen targeted comments from figures like Yogi Adityanath with his “batenge toh katege” [If we are divided, we will perish] rhetoric and the PM’s “ek hai toh safe hai” [If we are united, we will be safe] slogan – both aimed at consolidating Hindu votes.
What, if any, has the role of the RSS been in this ground game?
The RSS has stepped in after realising that Eknath Shinde and Ajit Pawar have become liabilities to the traditional BJP vote bank. They are now fully backing the BJP, but with a condition: if the Mahayuti has a chance to govern, it must be a BJP leader and not Shinde or Pawar at the helm. The RSS is actively reaching out to people, as seen in events like the Brahmin Mela in Thane on Friday, which is being held in support of the BJP.
This kind of direct outreach was absent during the parliamentary elections. However, it’s important to note that this support from the RSS is exclusively for the BJP and not the alliance as a whole.
How do you see the MVA’s preparations and Sharad Pawar’s role in this Assembly campaign?
If it had been left to Sharad Pawar, things would have been much smoother for the Maha Vikas Aghadi. The ongoing tussle between Congress and Shiv Sena (UBT) over seat-sharing has played out in the open and this could have a significant impact on the MVA's chances. Uddhav Thackeray’s public criticism of the Congress, something Sharad Pawar had hoped to avoid, only added fuel to the fire.
Just a day before, Thackeray openly criticised Praniti Shinde, the Congress’ MP from Solapur. Thackeray should have handled this privately but he chose to air it publicly. If MVA loses, this rift could be one of the reasons. In the MVA, the Shiv Sena (UBT) seems to be the weakest link while in the Mahayuti it is Ajit Pawar.
What about the Congress’ campaign and strategy?
During the Lok Sabha elections, Congress had a smart caste strategy, particularly in Vidarbha. The Bharat Jodo Yatra and the broader national narrative also played in their favour. I believe Congress still holds an edge in Vidarbha for the assembly polls as well.
Smitha Nair is a reporter in Mumbai.
