Bangladesh is experiencing a complex transitional period. The burst of optimism that followed the student-led July Revolution is showing signs of waning, revealing the daunting challenges of governance and maintaining social cohesion.
It has been over three months since Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, leader of the Awami League, fled the country amidst mass protests. The interim government, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, has been seen as a harbinger of reform and a potential architect of a more inclusive political and social order. This ignited hopes for democratic reforms and greater human rights protections.
However, as the post-revolution momentum fades, the nation has been grappling with persistent unrest, fiscal deficits and the task of fulfilling the aspirations for systemic change that ignited the uprising.
Addressing Bangladesh’s deeply entrenched socio-political and economic challenges requires the government to set realistic expectations and set its priorities. The lack of public confidence in institutions, exacerbated by decades of corruption and authoritarian governance, remains a critical barrier to stability. While it is impossible to immediately fix all the flaws in the system, the interim government must first focus on building political trust with citizens.
Restoring trust involves transparent governance, ensuring justice for victims of the recent violence and bringing the country’s diverse communities to the table to rebuild civic cohesion. The credibility of the caretaker government hinges on its ability to address these urgent needs while fostering inclusivity and accountability.
This is precisely where the Yunus government is falling short. Perhaps the most disconcerting ramification of this being the reinvigorated cases of atrocities being committed against the minorities in Bangladesh. In an earlier article, while condemning these attacks that ensued in the immediate aftermath of the July Revolution, we tried to analyse the possible reasons behind such heinous acts, proposing three interrelated and overlapping reasons.
Are these reasons still at play? Possibly yes. The persistent threats and assaults directed at minority groups continue unabated, several months later. These include more than 1,068 attacks on Hindus and other minorities and an arson attack on the Ramu Buddhist temple. In addition, Sufi shrines and Lalon fairs have also been vandalised by radicals. Most recently, the arrest of former ISKCON priest Chinmoy Krishna Das Brahmachari on charges of sedition has sparked widespread protests among Hindu minority groups in Bangladesh and also gained significant traction in India.
These incidents raise serious questions about the efficacy of the present government in Bangladesh. Here we propose the following plausible reasons behind the relative failure of the Yunus-led government to address this pressing issue.
First, the government’s failure to operationalise law enforcement agencies has led to a significant erosion of public trust in the police force. The brutal killings of protesting students and citizens during July and August have delegitimised the police, leaving many officers fearful of returning to duty amid a potential backlash.
This atmosphere of fear has been compounded by widespread vandalism, which has severely diminished the logistical capabilities of the police, with numerous stations attacked and vehicles destroyed.
While the military has been deployed to support the police, its role remains auxiliary, lacking the intention to enforce law and order independently. This precarious situation not only hampers effective governance but also exacerbates the cycle of violence and unrest, especially leaving the minority communities vulnerable and without adequate protection.
Second, the political landscape of Bangladesh right from the inception has revolved around the two political parties – the Awami League and the Bangladesh National Party. Since returning to power in 2009, Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League have systematically managed to sideline all her detractors and political oppositions, including the Bangladesh National Party, winning all the subsequent elections over the last decade.
With Hasina gone, and most of the Awami League leaders either in hiding or out of the country, Bangladesh is facing a political power vacuum. In this void, radical Islamist groups – previously banned, marginalised, or suppressed – are re-emerging, eager to assert their influence. These groups, while not necessarily robust in organisation, are adopting a more vocal position, sometimes overshadowing traditional opposition parties.
This development poses a significant challenge for the interim government, as these factions harness religious identity and extremist narratives to gain traction, potentially reshaping the political dynamics in Bangladesh.
What are the possible implications of these attacks for Bangladesh and South Asia?
The atrocities against minority communities in Bangladesh pose a significant threat to national cohesion and social stability. As violence escalates, it is poised to create a cycle of retaliation, deepening social divisions. The international community has begun to take notice, with human rights organisations calling for immediate intervention and increased scrutiny of Bangladesh’s human rights record.
However, the government’s dismissive stance toward external criticism raises concerns about its willingness to enact meaningful reforms.
If this trajectory continues, Bangladesh risks becoming a state where fear and mistrust prevail, undermining the very democratic principles that the July Revolution sought to establish. A society that fails to protect its minorities is at risk of fracturing, as disillusioned citizens may turn to radical ideologies in search of identity and belonging.
The potential for civil unrest cannot be underestimated, especially if minority groups feel increasingly marginalised and unsupported by the government.
Furthermore, the international ramifications of these domestic issues could be profound. As Bangladesh grapples with its internal crises, foreign investment and diplomatic relations may suffer. Countries that prioritise human rights in their foreign policy may impose sanctions or withdraw support, further isolating Bangladesh on the global stage. The implications of such actions could stifle economic growth, exacerbating poverty and instability.
More importantly, we have a major geo-political challenge at hand within the region. Since the student-led protest movement started in Bangladesh, Indian public opinion, and more importantly the news media, have overwhelmingly been negative, launching scathing remarks towards what they claim is an “Islamist takeover” of Bangladesh.
Extremism feeds extremism. The continuing threats and attacks on minorities in Bangladesh will exacerbate the already volatile situation in India, furthering the cause of Hindutva forces. The more India attempts to influence the internal affairs of Bangladesh, the more it emboldens the forces that seek to undermine the interim government and build stronger ties with China and Pakistan, bypassing India. This does not bode well for the region.
Niladri Chatterjee is a historian and researcher, Linnaeus University, Sweden. Zaad Mahmood is an associate professor in politics, Presidency University, India. Muhammad Asiful Basar is a PhD research fellow, University of Antwerp, Belgium. Mohammad Mozahidul Islam is a professor in history, Jahangirnagar University, Bangladesh.
