The Supreme Court’s 414-page judgement in the State of Tamil Nadu versus Governor of Tamil Nadu case pronounced on April 8 is the most consequential judicial intervention in federal relations in recent Indian constitutional history.
By imposing specific timelines on gubernatorial action, an area in which the Constitution has remained conspicuously silent, the court has fundamentally reshaped the boundaries of federalism, the separation of powers and constitutional governance.
Justice JB Pardiwala framed the decision as enforcing the original design of the Constitution rather than rewriting it.
But this judgement also raises profound questions about the separation of powers and “juristocracy”, which legal scholar Ran Hirschl describes as a situation in which the judiciary wields disproportionate authority, effectively usurping power from the political executive.
Constitutional impasse
The case emerged from an extraordinary situation where the Tamil Nadu governor delayed action on several bills passed by the state legislature. This amounted to a “pocket veto”. After the Supreme Court in November 2023 issued the governor notice on the state government’s complaint that 12 bills had been held up, some since January 2020, the governor abruptly withheld assent from 10 of these bills.
The Legislative Assembly passed these bills again without significant amendments. Rather than granting assent, as required by the first proviso to Article 200 of the Constitution, the governor reserved these bills for the consideration of the President. This remains pending.
Article 200 gives governors three options when presented with a bill: grant assent, withhold assent and return it with recommendations, or reserve it for Presidential consideration.
If a governor withholds assent, the first proviso stipulates that the bill be returned “as soon as possible” with recommended amendments. Should the legislature pass the bill again (with or without modifications), the governor shall not withhold assent.
However, the ambiguity in the phrase “as soon as possible” created a constitutional silence that some governors have exploited to indefinitely delay assent to bills, particularly in states that the Bharatiya Janata Party does not rule.
Supreme Court judgement
In its judgement, the Supreme Court invoked its power to “pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice” to impose explicit timelines on gubernatorial action.
It said that if the governor decides to withhold assent or reserve the bill for the president, such action must be taken within one month on the aid and advice of the council of ministers.
If the governor withholds assent contrary to the advice of the council of ministers, the bill must be returned to the legislature within three months.
If the governor reserves the bill for the president, again contrary to advice, this too must be done within three months.
If a bill is re-passed and presented by the legislature again, the governor must grant assent within one month.
Most remarkably, the court declared that the 10 disputed bills were “deemed to have received the governor’s assent” upon being re-presentated. This extraordinary remedy is anchored in Article 142, which is the power of the Supreme Court “to do complete justice”.
Towards juristocracy?
Though Justice Pardiwala argued that indefinite non-action constitutes a subversion of the Constitution, the court’s “deemed assent” remedy goes beyond mere guidance. It effectively replaces the governor’s constitutional prerogative.
Article 142, which relates to the enforcement of Supreme Court decrees and orders, has historically served as a constitutional safety valve for exceptional circumstances. But using it to fill in constitutional silences signals a troubling expansion.
Laying down timelines has not consistently worked against authoritarian regimes at the Union level. For instance, in December 2023, when the Supreme Court directed the union government to restore Jammu and Kashmir to full statehood “at the earliest and as soon as possible,” that directive remained unimplemented.
Parallels exist with anti-defection cases like in 2020 involving the Manipur speaker. In that case, Keisham Meghachandra Singh versus Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly, the court imposed a three-month deadline on speakers to decide disqualification matters. The court recognised that indefinite inaction by a constitutional functionary can effectively frustrate a Constitutional objective.
However, as the Shiv Sena crisis of 2022 in Maharashtra demonstrated, judicially imposed deadlines do not always achieve their intended purpose. In this case, the speaker of the legislative assembly did not rule on anti-defection petitions until faced with contempt proceedings and a timeline. He ultimately decided in favour of the ruling party.
Events in Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra show that judicial timelines have not prevented governments being toppled through mass resignations or vertical splits orchestrated by the party in power at Union level.
Rebalancing of federal relations
By stipulating enforceable deadlines, the court has rebalanced federal relations in favour of state autonomy. The judgement ensures that democratically elected state governments are not indefinitely thwarted by a governor’s personal or politically motivated non-action.
The practice of reserving re-passed bills for presidential assent has been curtailed. It allows Opposition-ruled states to implement legislative agendas without fear of gubernatorial obstruction.
The ramifications extend beyond Tamil Nadu: the court’s “deemed assent” to the 10 bills and their notification by Tamil Nadu’s government on Saturday created a situation in which, for the first time in constitutional history, bills became acts without the governor’s assent while still pending Presidential consideration.
From Kerala to West Bengal, Politically charged bills can now move forward without being held up at Raj Bhavans or Rashtrapati Bhawan.
The framers of the Constitution envisioned India’s states as being laboratories of democracy. Centralising tendencies – embedded both in the Constitution’s text and in judicial practice – are being tested here.
Federalism debate
By holding governors to specific timelines, the court reaffirmed that India’s constitutional apparatus must respond promptly and transparently to the will of elected assemblies. This is the first time the Supreme Court has provided direct, substantive relief to a state in a dispute over federalism, essentially echoing timelines the Ministry of Home Affairs itself had circulated.
However, the debate over federalism and separation of powers is far from resolved. The issue might well be referred to a Constitutional bench. The court declared that failure to follow these timelines will subject the governor to judicial review. But how exactly this scrutiny would operate – contempt proceedings, removal recommendations, or another mechanism – remains unclear.
By imposing time-bound gubernatorial responses, the court has reinforced legislative autonomy and promised stricter judicial checks on obstructionist tactics. Yet it also raises enduring questions about the elasticity of Article 142, possible overreach and the fate of future Article 143 references, which specifies the power of the president to consult the Supreme Court.
By holding constitutional functionaries accountable to both democracy and temporal limits, the court has potentially recast India’s federal balance toward stronger state autonomy – an influence likely to reverberate as the nation’s constitutional evolution continues.
Surendra Kumar is an Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law at Ramaiah College of Law.
