Pakistan has finally launched its much-awaited military operation against militants of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in the troubled North Waziristan agency of the country's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. There was never any doubt that a military operation was the government's only option to root out terrorism. So why did it delay the operation for so long?
To begin with, politicians wanted to avoid the uncomfortable decision of fighting their own people and losing votes. But more important, the military has lacked the resolve to do take on the TTP. General Pervez Musharraf and General Ashfaq Kayani, who headed the Pakistan army for 14 years, believed in the doctrine of strategic depth, a policy that seeks to keep Pakistan's western border peaceful by ensuring that Kabul has an Islamabad-friendly government. That is why Pakistan created and supported the Afghan Taliban. As a consequence, the army's efforts to keep the TTP in check were characterised more by firefighting than substantial military action.
But General Raheel Sharif, who took over as army chief in November, has from the outset vowed to respond to every terrorist act with military action. Air strikes on militant hideouts became a norm and the new military commander was seen to be pushing his civilian bosses to agree to military action against the terrorists.
As military commanders know, executing the plan is only half the success of any military operation. The first half is actually getting there. The Taliban fights an ideological war, where the frontier is the hearts and minds of people. This ideological frontier was the creation of the Pakistani army. The commencement of the operation against the TTP suggests that the army has concluded that it can no longer guard this line.
The Taliban cannot dictate the type of Pakistan its citizens should live in. Neither is their version of Islam acceptable to a vast majority of Pakistanis. A responsible end to this war will come only if the army finally decides that it no longer accepts the notion of strategic depth and faces all its ideological opponents with equal force.
Addressing the National Assembly earlier this week, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced that the operation in Wazaristan, codenamed Zarb-e-Arb, would not end "till all terrorists are eliminated”. The people of Pakistan must rally around this mission. Winning this war will not be easy. Nobody is even clear at this stage about the definition of this war. It will be more than the successful culmination of tactical operations in the battlefield. It will take the entire nation this dreadful irregular war that is being fought across the country.
The blowback
The real worry that the security establishment now faces is the blowback from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in the country’s heartland. The spokesperson of the TTP has already threatened the government that its "response will be tough". They have threatened to burn Islamabad and Lahore, having already shown what they can do in Karachi with the audacious attack on its airport. Pakistan today is a war zone and the TTP will fight this war where it will hurt Pakistan the most.
Small groups of terrorists hidden in the country's cities will be the main part of the Taliban’s response force. They have the capacity to create the nightmare Pakistan dreads. It is against these likely militant actions in urban centres that Pakistan is least prepared. Pakistan's soft underbelly in the war on terror is its weak second-tier security apparatus.
Karachi, a city of over 25 million people, boasts a police force of only 35,000 men, mostly recruited by the ruling parties on mutually agreed-upon quotas without meeting minimum standards of competence. Highly unprofessional and corrupt, this is hardly a force that can be relied upon to put up a defence against the stealth techniques of the Taliban. According to a rough estimate, over 18,000 of these policemen are deployed to protect the city's VIPs.
Except the odd IED attack or small hit-and-run operation, the Taliban is unlikely to raise its head in FATA to meet the challenge of the Pakistan army. The army has enough troops on the ground to clear and the militants' nerve centers and vital tactical grounds. Even if the Afghanistan army does not shield its border and prevent the retreating terrorist from infiltrating, the Pakistan army will continue to flush out these terrorists towards the Afghan border.
The procrastination in the decision to launch a military operation by Pakistan’s military and civilian government gave the TTP tremendous military leverage. Now that the military operation has begun, there is no guarantee of success. But there is no better option.
The writer is a retired Lieutenant Colonel of the Pakistan Army and is currently pursuing PhD in civil-military relations at Karachi University.
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To begin with, politicians wanted to avoid the uncomfortable decision of fighting their own people and losing votes. But more important, the military has lacked the resolve to do take on the TTP. General Pervez Musharraf and General Ashfaq Kayani, who headed the Pakistan army for 14 years, believed in the doctrine of strategic depth, a policy that seeks to keep Pakistan's western border peaceful by ensuring that Kabul has an Islamabad-friendly government. That is why Pakistan created and supported the Afghan Taliban. As a consequence, the army's efforts to keep the TTP in check were characterised more by firefighting than substantial military action.
But General Raheel Sharif, who took over as army chief in November, has from the outset vowed to respond to every terrorist act with military action. Air strikes on militant hideouts became a norm and the new military commander was seen to be pushing his civilian bosses to agree to military action against the terrorists.
As military commanders know, executing the plan is only half the success of any military operation. The first half is actually getting there. The Taliban fights an ideological war, where the frontier is the hearts and minds of people. This ideological frontier was the creation of the Pakistani army. The commencement of the operation against the TTP suggests that the army has concluded that it can no longer guard this line.
The Taliban cannot dictate the type of Pakistan its citizens should live in. Neither is their version of Islam acceptable to a vast majority of Pakistanis. A responsible end to this war will come only if the army finally decides that it no longer accepts the notion of strategic depth and faces all its ideological opponents with equal force.
Addressing the National Assembly earlier this week, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced that the operation in Wazaristan, codenamed Zarb-e-Arb, would not end "till all terrorists are eliminated”. The people of Pakistan must rally around this mission. Winning this war will not be easy. Nobody is even clear at this stage about the definition of this war. It will be more than the successful culmination of tactical operations in the battlefield. It will take the entire nation this dreadful irregular war that is being fought across the country.
The blowback
The real worry that the security establishment now faces is the blowback from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in the country’s heartland. The spokesperson of the TTP has already threatened the government that its "response will be tough". They have threatened to burn Islamabad and Lahore, having already shown what they can do in Karachi with the audacious attack on its airport. Pakistan today is a war zone and the TTP will fight this war where it will hurt Pakistan the most.
Small groups of terrorists hidden in the country's cities will be the main part of the Taliban’s response force. They have the capacity to create the nightmare Pakistan dreads. It is against these likely militant actions in urban centres that Pakistan is least prepared. Pakistan's soft underbelly in the war on terror is its weak second-tier security apparatus.
Karachi, a city of over 25 million people, boasts a police force of only 35,000 men, mostly recruited by the ruling parties on mutually agreed-upon quotas without meeting minimum standards of competence. Highly unprofessional and corrupt, this is hardly a force that can be relied upon to put up a defence against the stealth techniques of the Taliban. According to a rough estimate, over 18,000 of these policemen are deployed to protect the city's VIPs.
Except the odd IED attack or small hit-and-run operation, the Taliban is unlikely to raise its head in FATA to meet the challenge of the Pakistan army. The army has enough troops on the ground to clear and the militants' nerve centers and vital tactical grounds. Even if the Afghanistan army does not shield its border and prevent the retreating terrorist from infiltrating, the Pakistan army will continue to flush out these terrorists towards the Afghan border.
The procrastination in the decision to launch a military operation by Pakistan’s military and civilian government gave the TTP tremendous military leverage. Now that the military operation has begun, there is no guarantee of success. But there is no better option.
The writer is a retired Lieutenant Colonel of the Pakistan Army and is currently pursuing PhD in civil-military relations at Karachi University.
