The decision to hold fresh elections to the Delhi assembly is undeniably a triumph of public morality. For nearly six months, ever since Narendra Modi became Prime Minister, the Bharatiya Janata Party had persevered with its attempt to cobble together a majority in the Delhi assembly. That it failed to achieve this goal suggests the advent of a new political culture.
Spy cameras and surreptitiously taped telephonic conversations told us about the concerted efforts to wean away MLAs from rival formations and make up the numbers the BJP needed to touch the majority mark. There were offers of money and plum posts. Rival MLAs were told that if there was an early election, they would be swamped by the Modi wave.
To these threats and blandishments, it was assumed the 27 MLAs of the Aam Aadmi Party would be the most vulnerable, all of whom were elected for the first time despite their own low expectations. Perhaps the BJP thought that these AAP legislators would be quite likely to choose to cash in on their good fortune to make their crores, uncertain as they had to be of defying the Modi mania on their second outing.
Some of them may have been tempted but ultimately, they did not desert the party. It tells us that the AAP’s decision to choose as candidates who did not have criminal or corrupt pasts, despite the all-round cynicism, did result in political behaviour that was becoming of every healthy democracy.
Morality play
It is true the AAP deftly turned the last Delhi assembly election into a morality play, promising to provide an alternative to the mainstream political culture. No doubt, this theme will persist in the forthcoming assembly elections as well, but it will also have to vie for importance with the issue of governance in the public consciousness. In this sense, the Delhi assembly election will test Modi’s popularity and the durability of his message, as it will AAP leader Arvind Kejriwal’s.
Following the BJP’s triumph in the Lok Sabha elections, the party has hit upon what you can call the Modi model of winning the states, successfully implemented in Maharashtra and Haryana. The defining features of this model include, one, having Modi carpet-bomb the states with rallies during the election campaign. Two, refrain from choosing a state-level BJP leader to become the party’s face or the chief ministerial candidate. This ensures the electoral battle in the state becomes a battle of personalities, where Modi’s popularity is pitted against that of the state leaders of other parties.
Three, Modi works the crowds saying the state would benefit if it were to vote the BJP as it is he who is also ruling the Centre. This claim leaves the people to imagine its meanings – that their state will not be discriminated against; that, as the self-avowed governance expert, he would lend his expertise to their chief minister; that good governance in the state complements the prime minister’s efforts at the national level. Four, Modi then attacks the Congress, laying bare its seemingly poor governance record which, he says, is manifest in the charges of corruption pending against its governments.
Limitations of the model
But the BJP seems not to have been too certain of successfully implementing this model in Delhi. Otherwise, it wouldn’t have otherwise endeavoured to lure MLAs of rival formations to cobble a majority. This is because the BJP’s principal rival in Delhi isn’t the Congress but AAP, thus rendering irrelevant Modi’s swipes at the “party of dynasts and corrupt leaders”.
In fact, should the BJP harp on the corruption issue, it would only benefit Kejriwal, whose 49 days as chief minister did reform police behaviour, curb the water mafia, and drive out touts from the offices managing civic amenities. It’s because of this achievement both anecdotal accounts and poll surveys show the AAP to have gained, and consolidated its base among the lower classes, regardless of their religious or caste identities.
The other reason for the BJP’s lack of confidence about Delhi arises from the popularity of Kejriwal. He is no Bhupinder Singh Hooda or Prithviraj Chavan, maligned as corrupt or ineffectual. And though not comparable to Modi, Kejriwal commands a certain national stature. The BJP feared that the Delhi electorate, therefore, might not fall for the line of having the same party ruling the state and the Centre, thus prompting the saffron brigade to acquire a majority through means other than elections.
Governance is key
Nevertheless, governance will remain an issue in the Delhi election campaign. On this count Kejriwal will be pressed to explain his resignation from the post of chief minister, perceived to have been premature and motivated at freeing himself from responsibilities to participate in the national election. He has apologised profusely for this mistake, but many, particularly those in the middle class, have bought the media analyses to remain unforgiving of him. Obviously, this point Modi will exploit in his customary mocking style.
The differences between the political terrain of Delhi and that of Haryana and Maharashtra suggest the battle for the Capital will be markedly dissimilar from the latter two states. Should the BJP triumph, Modi’s next stern test will be postponed till the next year’s election in Bihar, likely as he is to win Jharkand for the party this year. But a loss in Delhi, or even a fractured mandate, would take away the aura of invincibility around Modi, who has yet to lose an election he has spearheaded since 2002. This could weaken his cultish following just a bit , and mount pressure on him to do more than merely rely on his formidable communication skills and manipulation of his public image.
By contrast, a victory for AAP could blow life into the party and the dreams it held out for many who now believe those are gasping to survive in the altered political context. Even the worst-case scenario places AAP second, but even when placed in this slot, the number of seats separating it from the BJP will indicate whether it can still fight another day. This is particularly so in Punjab, where it polled 25% of votes in the Lok Sabha elections and which will have assembly polls in 2017.
The shape of the future
The Delhi assembly elections will also influence the shape of the future in two significant ways. One, a BJP victory will embolden the party to pursue the tactics of communally polarising the electorate before every election. It did this in Uttar Pradesh before the Lok Sabha election, followed it with its so-called Love Jihad campaign before the bypolls in that state, raked up the issue of cow slaughter in Haryana, and triggered communal tension in the Trilokpuri and Bawana assembly segments of Delhi. In fact, the BJP-sponsored communal mobilisation has become such a ubiquitous feature before every election that the Trilokpuri incident was interpreted as an intimation of the party favouring a fresh in Delhi over splitting rival outfits.
Two, should the BJP triumph in Delhi, it would fan the insecurities of Muslims, not only in Delhi, but around the country. It will inevitably inspire the rightwing Muslim leaders and clerics with political pretensions to become communally strident in their opposition to the BJP, hoping to court their community members who have largely shied away from voting Muslim parties. The recent shenanigans of the Imam of Delhi’s Jama Masjid provides a glimpse of a grim future ahead.
The Delhi election will also provide a measure of whether political volunteerism retains the intensity of the last Delhi election, obviously not to the same measure, but at least significantly comparable to it. This volunteerism, to a great extent, was sparked off because of the hope AAP held out for restoring to Indian democracy its ideals – such as shunning money and muscle power, political families, and the politics of identity. Whether they show the same enthusiasm will be a test of their belief in the possibility of forging an alternative to the mainstream politics. The assembly election will also test those who occupy the anti-BJP, anti-Congress space, whether their spirit has been dampened because of the Modi mania, whether their hopes are crushed.
Ajaz Ashraf is a journalist from Delhi. His book The Hour Before Dawn will be published by HarperCollins in December.
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Spy cameras and surreptitiously taped telephonic conversations told us about the concerted efforts to wean away MLAs from rival formations and make up the numbers the BJP needed to touch the majority mark. There were offers of money and plum posts. Rival MLAs were told that if there was an early election, they would be swamped by the Modi wave.
To these threats and blandishments, it was assumed the 27 MLAs of the Aam Aadmi Party would be the most vulnerable, all of whom were elected for the first time despite their own low expectations. Perhaps the BJP thought that these AAP legislators would be quite likely to choose to cash in on their good fortune to make their crores, uncertain as they had to be of defying the Modi mania on their second outing.
Some of them may have been tempted but ultimately, they did not desert the party. It tells us that the AAP’s decision to choose as candidates who did not have criminal or corrupt pasts, despite the all-round cynicism, did result in political behaviour that was becoming of every healthy democracy.
Morality play
It is true the AAP deftly turned the last Delhi assembly election into a morality play, promising to provide an alternative to the mainstream political culture. No doubt, this theme will persist in the forthcoming assembly elections as well, but it will also have to vie for importance with the issue of governance in the public consciousness. In this sense, the Delhi assembly election will test Modi’s popularity and the durability of his message, as it will AAP leader Arvind Kejriwal’s.
Following the BJP’s triumph in the Lok Sabha elections, the party has hit upon what you can call the Modi model of winning the states, successfully implemented in Maharashtra and Haryana. The defining features of this model include, one, having Modi carpet-bomb the states with rallies during the election campaign. Two, refrain from choosing a state-level BJP leader to become the party’s face or the chief ministerial candidate. This ensures the electoral battle in the state becomes a battle of personalities, where Modi’s popularity is pitted against that of the state leaders of other parties.
Three, Modi works the crowds saying the state would benefit if it were to vote the BJP as it is he who is also ruling the Centre. This claim leaves the people to imagine its meanings – that their state will not be discriminated against; that, as the self-avowed governance expert, he would lend his expertise to their chief minister; that good governance in the state complements the prime minister’s efforts at the national level. Four, Modi then attacks the Congress, laying bare its seemingly poor governance record which, he says, is manifest in the charges of corruption pending against its governments.
Limitations of the model
But the BJP seems not to have been too certain of successfully implementing this model in Delhi. Otherwise, it wouldn’t have otherwise endeavoured to lure MLAs of rival formations to cobble a majority. This is because the BJP’s principal rival in Delhi isn’t the Congress but AAP, thus rendering irrelevant Modi’s swipes at the “party of dynasts and corrupt leaders”.
In fact, should the BJP harp on the corruption issue, it would only benefit Kejriwal, whose 49 days as chief minister did reform police behaviour, curb the water mafia, and drive out touts from the offices managing civic amenities. It’s because of this achievement both anecdotal accounts and poll surveys show the AAP to have gained, and consolidated its base among the lower classes, regardless of their religious or caste identities.
The other reason for the BJP’s lack of confidence about Delhi arises from the popularity of Kejriwal. He is no Bhupinder Singh Hooda or Prithviraj Chavan, maligned as corrupt or ineffectual. And though not comparable to Modi, Kejriwal commands a certain national stature. The BJP feared that the Delhi electorate, therefore, might not fall for the line of having the same party ruling the state and the Centre, thus prompting the saffron brigade to acquire a majority through means other than elections.
Governance is key
Nevertheless, governance will remain an issue in the Delhi election campaign. On this count Kejriwal will be pressed to explain his resignation from the post of chief minister, perceived to have been premature and motivated at freeing himself from responsibilities to participate in the national election. He has apologised profusely for this mistake, but many, particularly those in the middle class, have bought the media analyses to remain unforgiving of him. Obviously, this point Modi will exploit in his customary mocking style.
The differences between the political terrain of Delhi and that of Haryana and Maharashtra suggest the battle for the Capital will be markedly dissimilar from the latter two states. Should the BJP triumph, Modi’s next stern test will be postponed till the next year’s election in Bihar, likely as he is to win Jharkand for the party this year. But a loss in Delhi, or even a fractured mandate, would take away the aura of invincibility around Modi, who has yet to lose an election he has spearheaded since 2002. This could weaken his cultish following just a bit , and mount pressure on him to do more than merely rely on his formidable communication skills and manipulation of his public image.
By contrast, a victory for AAP could blow life into the party and the dreams it held out for many who now believe those are gasping to survive in the altered political context. Even the worst-case scenario places AAP second, but even when placed in this slot, the number of seats separating it from the BJP will indicate whether it can still fight another day. This is particularly so in Punjab, where it polled 25% of votes in the Lok Sabha elections and which will have assembly polls in 2017.
The shape of the future
The Delhi assembly elections will also influence the shape of the future in two significant ways. One, a BJP victory will embolden the party to pursue the tactics of communally polarising the electorate before every election. It did this in Uttar Pradesh before the Lok Sabha election, followed it with its so-called Love Jihad campaign before the bypolls in that state, raked up the issue of cow slaughter in Haryana, and triggered communal tension in the Trilokpuri and Bawana assembly segments of Delhi. In fact, the BJP-sponsored communal mobilisation has become such a ubiquitous feature before every election that the Trilokpuri incident was interpreted as an intimation of the party favouring a fresh in Delhi over splitting rival outfits.
Two, should the BJP triumph in Delhi, it would fan the insecurities of Muslims, not only in Delhi, but around the country. It will inevitably inspire the rightwing Muslim leaders and clerics with political pretensions to become communally strident in their opposition to the BJP, hoping to court their community members who have largely shied away from voting Muslim parties. The recent shenanigans of the Imam of Delhi’s Jama Masjid provides a glimpse of a grim future ahead.
The Delhi election will also provide a measure of whether political volunteerism retains the intensity of the last Delhi election, obviously not to the same measure, but at least significantly comparable to it. This volunteerism, to a great extent, was sparked off because of the hope AAP held out for restoring to Indian democracy its ideals – such as shunning money and muscle power, political families, and the politics of identity. Whether they show the same enthusiasm will be a test of their belief in the possibility of forging an alternative to the mainstream politics. The assembly election will also test those who occupy the anti-BJP, anti-Congress space, whether their spirit has been dampened because of the Modi mania, whether their hopes are crushed.
Ajaz Ashraf is a journalist from Delhi. His book The Hour Before Dawn will be published by HarperCollins in December.
