(The BJP leadership) must realise that India in 2016 is far too diverse and eccentric to be ruled unconditionally by a central authority. Even an absolute majority within the Parliament does not guarantee an unopposed one party rule. Both Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi commanded similar majorities, but discovered to their cost that individuals outside the Parliament could mount an even more effectual opposition.
Successful governance requires that on key issues broad social consensus be created among the general populace and the public opinion be changed in favour of a particular position. Therefore, building coalitions within and outside the parliament is a necessary part of effective governance. This calls for a degree of modesty and humility, which are essential conditions for coalition building and for creating a political consensus in a country as diverse as India.
Modi will have to choose between Mahatma Gandhi and Lal Bahadur Shastri on the one hand and the Nehru-Gandhi family, excluding Pandit Nehru himself who though firmly a member of the elite had impeccable democratic credentials, on the other.
The former two identified with the common Indian, maintained an understated and almost humble stance vis a vis opponents and yet remained firm in their resolve when the national cause was at stake. The latter prided themselves as the elite and at best had condescension for the common Indian and often let personal egos score over the national cause. For someone who comes from the sacrificing traditions of Nanaji Deshmukh and Deen Dayal Upadhyaya, the choice should be clear.
India is much larger and more complex than the sum of its parts, which implies that Modi has to accept that India is not a mere summation of 29 Gujarats. It is much bigger and far more complex. This has several direct implications for his governance style. First, he (and Amit Shah) will have to re-think the extremely centralised and intrusive style of governance that characterised Gandhinagar. Modi cannot hope to manage India by modelling the prime minister’s office (PMO) in Delhi on the lines of the omniscient and omnipresent CMO in Gandhinagar. This will boomerang if it has not done so already by way of demoralising the rest of his cabinet colleagues and senior bureaucracy, the so-called establishment. As a perceptive former senior bureaucrat who has worked closely with Modi in Gandhinagar said, “He should be creating half a dozen other Modis rather than centralising all decision-making in the PMO”.
Second, he cannot also hope to be in de-facto control of all-important ministries through the PMO.
This will sooner rather than later result in a paralysis of decision making as “all files will float upwards to the PMO”. Unlike in Gujarat, where he was in charge of all important ministries, Modi will have to delegate and inspire his entire cabinet for focusing laser-like on the development agenda and achieving the desired outcomes.
One major reason for him to take on multiple responsibilities can simply be sheer lack of talent in his party and bureaucracy. There is already a widespread perception that his “bench strength” is too weak to cope with the demands that he makes and the timely and effective delivery that he expects. Given the urgency, waiting for talent to find its way in to the government may not be a viable option. Instead, Modi and his cabinet colleagues should pro-actively identify appropriate talent, both within and outside the government, and in the corporate world and civil society to buttress his government’s capacity for timely policy formulation and rapid execution. He may also have to lower the bar for loyalty to be able to attract the much-needed talent in his administration.
Third, Modi will have to restrain his ambitions for a global role until he has addressed the formidable and more urgent domestic agenda.
His hyper-active external relations programme, which has seen him visit 25 countries in 2015 and a total of 33 since he took office, seems to suggest otherwise. This is surely premature.
He has himself said on more than one occasion that the best foreign policy for India at this stage is to strengthen the domestic economy and rid India of its poverty and backwardness. Now that he has completed the first phase of his foreign policy agenda, which was to stake India’s claim to a place on the high table of global governance, it may perhaps be more pertinent for him to put the remaining foreign policy and global ambitions on the backburner until the next term. This will also afford Sushma Swaraj greater operational space and autonomy and contribute to improving inner-party relations within the BJP.
Finally, Modi will also have to re-think his touching reliance on the existing or former bureaucrats.
The “steel framework” of Indian bureaucracy has served India very well over the years. Most critically, it provided the much needed order and continuity after independence. It represented a highly select talent pool that supported the elected representatives over the decades and helped democracy take firm roots in the country.
Things are now different. The Indian economy and its interactions with the global economy have become increasingly complex. The talent pool is also not as strikingly superior to either that in the corporate sector or in other sections of the civil society. The steel frame has also rusted to some extent with seasoned bureaucrats admitting to more widespread corruption among the senior civil servants. This is supported by regular media reporting of bureaucrats being apprehended by the CBI for possessing assets far in excess of their known sources of income.
Therefore, the talent pool represented by the IAS and other civil services needs to be supplemented. To effectively address the challenges India faces currently, would require increasing inputs from external domain specialists, backed by in-depth research and empirical evidence.
Persistence with the IAS as the exclusive source for policy making and implementation runs the risk of further strengthening the chasm between the “rulers and the ruled.” This should be anathema in a working democracy. On the other hand, a “revolving door” policy that allows regular and unfettered entry of talent from the corporate world, academia and civil society into the Government and vice versa can be a strong modality for creating a trust-based relationship between the government and other key stakeholders in the country.
This will result in the formation of a true “India Inc” that can effectively compete globally and increase India’s share in world markets. To avoid regulatory capture by vested interests, it may be useful to follow the Japanese practice of setting up tripartite committees in specific ministries. These committees would have representatives from the civil services, academia and industry and be supported by a full-fledged secretariat to follow up on decisions taken at the meetings of the tripartite committees.
Cognisant of his weaknesses and given his formidable strengths and commitment to Shreshta Bharat, Modi could initiate a historical transformation in India. Though difficult, this is certainly not inconceivable and must surely be his own ambition. This could bring him at par with Asian leaders like Deng Hsiao Ping and Lee Kuan Yew.
To be successful in this heroic and difficult task, he will have to adopt a forward-looking policy framework, to supplement the large number of incremental measures already in the pipeline. His order of priority must be to successfully complete the social and political transitions as these provide the necessary conditions for pushing forward with the economic transition. Thus, pushing forward with all the three transitions together will ensure that he fulfils the voters’ high expectations of him and successfully stake a claim in 2019.
Excerpted with permission from Modi and His Challenges, Rajiv Kumar, Bloomsbury.