![[In numbers] Despite having India's worst sex ratio, Haryana sees record number of women candidates](https://sc0.blr1.digitaloceanspaces.com/large/685580-88a288a8-0d57-4e75-8828-a6c272b6f20f.jpg)
There are many firsts to the 2014 Haryana assembly election. To begin with, this was the Bharatiya Janata Party's first-ever victory in the state: the party registered an astounding climb from four seats in 2009 to 47 seats this year. It is also the first time in decades that the winning party did not place the Jats at the core of its electoral strategy (even though they were not forgotten).
The Haryana election also saw the highest ratio of elected women (12.2%), despite a lower ratio of female candidates (7%) and despite the state having the worst sex ratio in the country. Other indicators, such as the representation of minorities and the performance of defectors, stayed the same.
A quick look at a few basic statistics about candidates and parties will show the extent to which these elections mark a departure from previous trends.
1. General candidates’ information and deposits
Haryana saw a rise in the number of candidates starting before the 1990s, when the Punjab crisis was still ongoing. As in other states, the post-Babri Masjid period led to a sharp rise of independent candidates and to the emergence of a flurry of small local parties. The total number of candidates has dropped by more than half between 1996 and 2000, and it has risen steadily by a few hundred candidates per elections since 2005. Still, we do not observe the kind of candidate inflation that can be seen in most other states, a reflection of the domination of the mainstream parties.
The ratio of candidates who forfeited their deposits – another indicator of the effectiveness of candidates and of the actual state of competition in a given election – generally increases alongside the number of candidates. In the recent assembly election, 83% of all the candidates lost their deposit.
The forfeiture of deposits is also an indicator of a party’s strength, regardless of the numbers of seats it has won or lost. Only 13.3% of the BJP candidates lost their deposit, which indicates that most BJP losers did fairly well in terms of vote share. Of the Indian National Lok Dal candidates, 25% lost their deposit, while 41.5% of the Congress candidates failed to gain more than one-sixth of the total vote share in their constituencies. This last figure indicates that nearly half of the Congress candidates not only lost their race but also emerged badly bruised.
If we look at the socio-demographics of the deposit losers among main parties, we observe that women and young candidates (below 35 years old) tend to lose slightly more their deposit than men and older candidates. The ratio of tainted candidates having lost their deposit (22%) is below average, although not very significantly so. Despite its image as a highly criminalised state, the politics of Haryana counts fewer tainted candidates than most other states.
Overall, slightly more than a quarter of the main parties’ candidates lost their deposit, which is low and indicates to what extent the political scene of the state is dominated by these three parties.
2. Incumbents and seat retention.
Great victories can hide many individual defeats, as the net result of a party’s tally is the difference between gains and losses of seats between two elections.
Overall, of the 59 re-contesting MLAs, 43 lost their seats. Of them, 36 belonged to either the Congress or the INLD, who lost a significant number of previously held seats, despite an overall good performance.
The BJP had only four seats in 2009. Unsurprisingly, it won the essential part of its seats against Congress and INLD incumbents. The BJP generally got higher margins when it defeated a Congress incumbent.
Similarly, large defeats can also hide some gains. Thirty two Congress incumbents were thrown into the opposition benches while the party succeeded in gaining seven new seats.
These observations mean that anti-incumbency at the candidate level was very high, and resulted in the huge shift of seats in favour of the BJP.
If the BJP succeeded in wrestling seats from both Congress and INLD, the two former parties were rarely in a situation of direct confrontation. The INLD took five seats previously held by Congress MLAs and the Congress could only snatch two seats from the INLD. These elections were really about the BJP vs everybody else.
3. Turncoats
As in the case of Maharashtra, the period before the campaign in Haryana was marked by multiple defections of politicians, who shifted their allegiance either because of pragmatic calculation or necessity.
If we look at the entire set of candidates, only five turncoats out of a total of 93 were elected, a strong indication that shifting party allegiance at the last minute rarely pays off. A third of these defectors left one of the three major parties for other formations. Only six left a major party to join another one.
Seven of these 93 defectors joined the BJP – not a high number given the impression that the BJP went on an INLD/Jat candidate poaching spree. Four of them won, including two ex-INLD members.
These numbers are very small and lead to think that the effect of pre-poll defections is marginal. However, the BJP’s close majority of only two seats might have been compromised if it hadn’t poached the two INLD candidates. But this is merely speculative.
Generally speaking, shifting allegiance before an election does not make sense, for candidates nor for parties, unless one joins the winning party. But even then, the probability of being elected is lower than for those who already belonged to the party on the rise, and also lower than the probability of newcomers of being elected in their first election. Most movements occur anyway between marginal parties.
4. Women's representation
Perhaps the most interesting story of these elections is the sharp rise of the number of women candidates, from an all-time low of seven candidates in 1991 to 103 in 2014.
In percentage points, these figures remain however low, from 0.37% in 1991 to 7% in 2012. The larger number of tickets distributed to women by mainstream parties partly but importantly explains this rise. Eight of the 15 women fielded by the BJP won; three out of the 10 women Congress candidates were successful. But only one woman INLD candidate out of 16 won her race.
The share of women MLA has been multiplied by three, to 12% in 2014 in less than 20 years. This indicates that a change is taking place. However, at constant growth rate, it would take at least three decades to reach equal representation.
5. Muslims
Muslims make up hardly 6% of the population of Haryana, according to census data, and are rarely in a position to use their demographic weight politically. As a result, mainstream parties rarely distribute tickets to Muslim candidates, barring the four or five constituencies where they have a significant presence and have sent Muslim MLAs to the assembly in the past – Punhana, Ferozpur Jhirka, Nuh, Hathin, and the erstwhile Chhachhrauli and Taoru (before delimitation).
There are few variations, mainstream party-wise. The BJP fielded a Muslim candidate in Punahana. The Congress fielded three Muslim candidates and and the INLD one, which indicates that the political space is generally closed to minorities in Haryana.
Since 1991, Muslims have won on 17 occasions Three MLAs – Akram Khan, Zakir Hussain and Mohammed Ilyas – have been elected more than once, which reduces the actual number of effective Muslim legislators to 12.
Conclusion
The main takeaways – rather than conclusions – from these observations are that the three mainstream parties, the BJP, Congress and INLD, tend to occupy most of the political space in the state of Haryana, making the rest of the political competition quite irrelevant.
These elections were really about the BJP versus the rest. Survey data from the CSDS indicate that the Jat vote was dispersed between the three parties, paving the way for the victory of the only party able to draw a rainbow coalition. This is a departure from the old politics, as the Jats no longer occupy the centre space of the arena, but have been overwhelmed by the broad coalition of voters gathered by the BJP.
The Congress used to be the rainbow party in Haryana, chasing the Jat-dominated Lok Dal and later on INLD. The INLD built its success in the 1990s and early 2000 by allying its Jat base to the BJP-voting upper castes. The Congress succeeded in bringing the INLD down by becoming itself a Jat party, leaving behind an array of fragmented voters belonging to different backward and lower groups.
These lower and backward groups rallied for a while behind the disgruntled ex-Congress leader, Bhajan Lal, and behind the BSP, who has now totally disappeared in Haryana. Neither of them could build up from their position. The confrontation between two Jat-dominated party – Congress and INLD – and the disenchantment of the backwards and lower groups towards traditional local parties paved the way for a major BJP victory.
This in the long run leaves no specific space for the Congress, torn as it is between its remaining Jat supporters and the need to broaden its social base to hope to make a comeback in five years.
With inputs from Ranveer Katyal, Raunak Mittal, Vibhor Relhan and Kaustubh Khare.
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The Haryana election also saw the highest ratio of elected women (12.2%), despite a lower ratio of female candidates (7%) and despite the state having the worst sex ratio in the country. Other indicators, such as the representation of minorities and the performance of defectors, stayed the same.
A quick look at a few basic statistics about candidates and parties will show the extent to which these elections mark a departure from previous trends.
1. General candidates’ information and deposits
Haryana saw a rise in the number of candidates starting before the 1990s, when the Punjab crisis was still ongoing. As in other states, the post-Babri Masjid period led to a sharp rise of independent candidates and to the emergence of a flurry of small local parties. The total number of candidates has dropped by more than half between 1996 and 2000, and it has risen steadily by a few hundred candidates per elections since 2005. Still, we do not observe the kind of candidate inflation that can be seen in most other states, a reflection of the domination of the mainstream parties.
The ratio of candidates who forfeited their deposits – another indicator of the effectiveness of candidates and of the actual state of competition in a given election – generally increases alongside the number of candidates. In the recent assembly election, 83% of all the candidates lost their deposit.
The forfeiture of deposits is also an indicator of a party’s strength, regardless of the numbers of seats it has won or lost. Only 13.3% of the BJP candidates lost their deposit, which indicates that most BJP losers did fairly well in terms of vote share. Of the Indian National Lok Dal candidates, 25% lost their deposit, while 41.5% of the Congress candidates failed to gain more than one-sixth of the total vote share in their constituencies. This last figure indicates that nearly half of the Congress candidates not only lost their race but also emerged badly bruised.
If we look at the socio-demographics of the deposit losers among main parties, we observe that women and young candidates (below 35 years old) tend to lose slightly more their deposit than men and older candidates. The ratio of tainted candidates having lost their deposit (22%) is below average, although not very significantly so. Despite its image as a highly criminalised state, the politics of Haryana counts fewer tainted candidates than most other states.
Overall, slightly more than a quarter of the main parties’ candidates lost their deposit, which is low and indicates to what extent the political scene of the state is dominated by these three parties.
2. Incumbents and seat retention.
Great victories can hide many individual defeats, as the net result of a party’s tally is the difference between gains and losses of seats between two elections.
Overall, of the 59 re-contesting MLAs, 43 lost their seats. Of them, 36 belonged to either the Congress or the INLD, who lost a significant number of previously held seats, despite an overall good performance.
The BJP had only four seats in 2009. Unsurprisingly, it won the essential part of its seats against Congress and INLD incumbents. The BJP generally got higher margins when it defeated a Congress incumbent.
Similarly, large defeats can also hide some gains. Thirty two Congress incumbents were thrown into the opposition benches while the party succeeded in gaining seven new seats.
These observations mean that anti-incumbency at the candidate level was very high, and resulted in the huge shift of seats in favour of the BJP.
If the BJP succeeded in wrestling seats from both Congress and INLD, the two former parties were rarely in a situation of direct confrontation. The INLD took five seats previously held by Congress MLAs and the Congress could only snatch two seats from the INLD. These elections were really about the BJP vs everybody else.
3. Turncoats
As in the case of Maharashtra, the period before the campaign in Haryana was marked by multiple defections of politicians, who shifted their allegiance either because of pragmatic calculation or necessity.
If we look at the entire set of candidates, only five turncoats out of a total of 93 were elected, a strong indication that shifting party allegiance at the last minute rarely pays off. A third of these defectors left one of the three major parties for other formations. Only six left a major party to join another one.
Seven of these 93 defectors joined the BJP – not a high number given the impression that the BJP went on an INLD/Jat candidate poaching spree. Four of them won, including two ex-INLD members.
These numbers are very small and lead to think that the effect of pre-poll defections is marginal. However, the BJP’s close majority of only two seats might have been compromised if it hadn’t poached the two INLD candidates. But this is merely speculative.
Generally speaking, shifting allegiance before an election does not make sense, for candidates nor for parties, unless one joins the winning party. But even then, the probability of being elected is lower than for those who already belonged to the party on the rise, and also lower than the probability of newcomers of being elected in their first election. Most movements occur anyway between marginal parties.
4. Women's representation
Perhaps the most interesting story of these elections is the sharp rise of the number of women candidates, from an all-time low of seven candidates in 1991 to 103 in 2014.
In percentage points, these figures remain however low, from 0.37% in 1991 to 7% in 2012. The larger number of tickets distributed to women by mainstream parties partly but importantly explains this rise. Eight of the 15 women fielded by the BJP won; three out of the 10 women Congress candidates were successful. But only one woman INLD candidate out of 16 won her race.
The share of women MLA has been multiplied by three, to 12% in 2014 in less than 20 years. This indicates that a change is taking place. However, at constant growth rate, it would take at least three decades to reach equal representation.
5. Muslims
Muslims make up hardly 6% of the population of Haryana, according to census data, and are rarely in a position to use their demographic weight politically. As a result, mainstream parties rarely distribute tickets to Muslim candidates, barring the four or five constituencies where they have a significant presence and have sent Muslim MLAs to the assembly in the past – Punhana, Ferozpur Jhirka, Nuh, Hathin, and the erstwhile Chhachhrauli and Taoru (before delimitation).
There are few variations, mainstream party-wise. The BJP fielded a Muslim candidate in Punahana. The Congress fielded three Muslim candidates and and the INLD one, which indicates that the political space is generally closed to minorities in Haryana.
Since 1991, Muslims have won on 17 occasions Three MLAs – Akram Khan, Zakir Hussain and Mohammed Ilyas – have been elected more than once, which reduces the actual number of effective Muslim legislators to 12.
Conclusion
The main takeaways – rather than conclusions – from these observations are that the three mainstream parties, the BJP, Congress and INLD, tend to occupy most of the political space in the state of Haryana, making the rest of the political competition quite irrelevant.
These elections were really about the BJP versus the rest. Survey data from the CSDS indicate that the Jat vote was dispersed between the three parties, paving the way for the victory of the only party able to draw a rainbow coalition. This is a departure from the old politics, as the Jats no longer occupy the centre space of the arena, but have been overwhelmed by the broad coalition of voters gathered by the BJP.
The Congress used to be the rainbow party in Haryana, chasing the Jat-dominated Lok Dal and later on INLD. The INLD built its success in the 1990s and early 2000 by allying its Jat base to the BJP-voting upper castes. The Congress succeeded in bringing the INLD down by becoming itself a Jat party, leaving behind an array of fragmented voters belonging to different backward and lower groups.
These lower and backward groups rallied for a while behind the disgruntled ex-Congress leader, Bhajan Lal, and behind the BSP, who has now totally disappeared in Haryana. Neither of them could build up from their position. The confrontation between two Jat-dominated party – Congress and INLD – and the disenchantment of the backwards and lower groups towards traditional local parties paved the way for a major BJP victory.
This in the long run leaves no specific space for the Congress, torn as it is between its remaining Jat supporters and the need to broaden its social base to hope to make a comeback in five years.
With inputs from Ranveer Katyal, Raunak Mittal, Vibhor Relhan and Kaustubh Khare.