The Third India-African Forum Summit in New Delhi from October 26-29 is generating some hype in the Indian and international media, but the same excitement is missing from the African landscape. Even in the African think-tank community, the response to the summit seems to be muted, except for a few organisations in South Africa and Kenya, which have produced analytical commentaries in the run-up to the event.
Considering that this is one of the largest gatherings of African leaders and governments in India’s capital, what explains the lack of enthusiasm? This question is particularly pertinent given that South Africa will co-host the 6th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in early December. Summits with two of Africa’s main trading and development partners in the same year make it even more important for the African voice to be heard. Sadly, this voice is rather faint at the moment.
Have African governments or civil society sought, in any way, to define their expectations of the summit in New Delhi? A preliminary mapping of African media on the Internet shows few commentaries about the summit. It does not appear that many African analysts are being asked to provide insights to the Indian and international media about their perspective on the summit. The bulk of the analysis is informed by an Indian viewpoint.
With such a dearth of views from the African side, it is difficult to determine what Africa expects from the summit, or if the 40-plus African leaders and governments in attendance have a broad strategic game plan.
It is also not clear to what extent the African participants will be speaking in one voice at the summit. Instead, the African side appears to be attending merely as guests who have not defined what they want to achieve in their engagement with India.
Defining the relationship
So what should the African bloc think of in terms of pragmatic summit outcomes?
The first expectation must be about less rhetoric and more about coherence in the relationship between the two sides. While historical linkages are important, only these cannot define how India conceptualises its relationship with African countries. It would be useful for the African participants to have some policy coherence that includes concrete steps about how they will shape their relationship with India in the 21st century. Such a document can provide a roadmap for how Africa fits into India’s foreign policy agenda. It is also important for both sides to discuss guidelines for responsible and socially beneficial investment by Indian corporates in African economies.
The second expectation should be about how Africa’s engagement with India serves the continent’s interests in moving up the global value chain at a time when India’s role in global trade is growing. While India seeks to open duty and quota-free market access for Less Developed Countries in Africa, this does not always allow Africa to develop its productive capacities and industrialisation prospects. Africa must become competitive if it wants to fit into the low-cost labour-intensive global value chain.
The nature of its trading relationship with India therefore needs to change. African countries must use the opportunities presented through their trade and investment relationship with India to boost their own capacities and competitiveness, because New Delhi is not going to give up its comparative advantage in the global value chain.
The third expectation centres on Africa’s public health. Both sides must recognise that health diplomacy is more than just access to affordable drugs to combat HIV/AIDS or communicable diseases. The summit could open up a dialogue around collaborative research and development of public health capacities. This can become a significant platform for improving India-Africa health diplomacy.
Better engagement
Finally, Africa must insist that any engagement between India and other actors that involves the continent must be done in consultation with the African Union. For example, an agreement between Washington and New Delhi to train troops in six African countries before they are deployed on United Nations peacekeeping missions was announced in September. Such plans must reflect Africa’s interests first and foremost, and the continent’s role in these deliberations must not be confined to that of a junior partner.
The summit is also an opportunity for India to finally put to rest some of the critiques of its Africa policy, especially that Africa is not a priority in India’s foreign policy. The Narendra Modi government can counter this by publishing its first white paper on its Africa engagement. This will be a departure from the previous two summits and will give the third summit a strategic orientation. Additionally, a think tank forum and a civil society dialogue to complement the business linkages can further strengthen ties between the two sides.
Sanusha Naidu is a Senior Research Associate at Institute for Global Dialogue, a foreign policy think tank in South Africa.
This article first appeared on gatewayhouse.in.
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Considering that this is one of the largest gatherings of African leaders and governments in India’s capital, what explains the lack of enthusiasm? This question is particularly pertinent given that South Africa will co-host the 6th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in early December. Summits with two of Africa’s main trading and development partners in the same year make it even more important for the African voice to be heard. Sadly, this voice is rather faint at the moment.
Have African governments or civil society sought, in any way, to define their expectations of the summit in New Delhi? A preliminary mapping of African media on the Internet shows few commentaries about the summit. It does not appear that many African analysts are being asked to provide insights to the Indian and international media about their perspective on the summit. The bulk of the analysis is informed by an Indian viewpoint.
With such a dearth of views from the African side, it is difficult to determine what Africa expects from the summit, or if the 40-plus African leaders and governments in attendance have a broad strategic game plan.
It is also not clear to what extent the African participants will be speaking in one voice at the summit. Instead, the African side appears to be attending merely as guests who have not defined what they want to achieve in their engagement with India.
Defining the relationship
So what should the African bloc think of in terms of pragmatic summit outcomes?
The first expectation must be about less rhetoric and more about coherence in the relationship between the two sides. While historical linkages are important, only these cannot define how India conceptualises its relationship with African countries. It would be useful for the African participants to have some policy coherence that includes concrete steps about how they will shape their relationship with India in the 21st century. Such a document can provide a roadmap for how Africa fits into India’s foreign policy agenda. It is also important for both sides to discuss guidelines for responsible and socially beneficial investment by Indian corporates in African economies.
The second expectation should be about how Africa’s engagement with India serves the continent’s interests in moving up the global value chain at a time when India’s role in global trade is growing. While India seeks to open duty and quota-free market access for Less Developed Countries in Africa, this does not always allow Africa to develop its productive capacities and industrialisation prospects. Africa must become competitive if it wants to fit into the low-cost labour-intensive global value chain.
The nature of its trading relationship with India therefore needs to change. African countries must use the opportunities presented through their trade and investment relationship with India to boost their own capacities and competitiveness, because New Delhi is not going to give up its comparative advantage in the global value chain.
The third expectation centres on Africa’s public health. Both sides must recognise that health diplomacy is more than just access to affordable drugs to combat HIV/AIDS or communicable diseases. The summit could open up a dialogue around collaborative research and development of public health capacities. This can become a significant platform for improving India-Africa health diplomacy.
Better engagement
Finally, Africa must insist that any engagement between India and other actors that involves the continent must be done in consultation with the African Union. For example, an agreement between Washington and New Delhi to train troops in six African countries before they are deployed on United Nations peacekeeping missions was announced in September. Such plans must reflect Africa’s interests first and foremost, and the continent’s role in these deliberations must not be confined to that of a junior partner.
The summit is also an opportunity for India to finally put to rest some of the critiques of its Africa policy, especially that Africa is not a priority in India’s foreign policy. The Narendra Modi government can counter this by publishing its first white paper on its Africa engagement. This will be a departure from the previous two summits and will give the third summit a strategic orientation. Additionally, a think tank forum and a civil society dialogue to complement the business linkages can further strengthen ties between the two sides.
Sanusha Naidu is a Senior Research Associate at Institute for Global Dialogue, a foreign policy think tank in South Africa.
This article first appeared on gatewayhouse.in.
