It would not be inaccurate to label Dhaka as a “city of protest” these days. Protests have proliferated across the Bangladesh capital since a massive student-led uprising and public support ousted Sheikh Hasina as prime minister on August 5.
Significant protests include those by the Hindu minority community, which organised rallies and sit-ins at the Shahbagh intersection, the site of significant movements over the past decade and a half. Another notable event was a protest by the Ansar paramilitary force in front of the Secretariat, which could have escalated had it not been for the intervention of students and armed forces. The Ansar paramilitary falls under the Home Ministry and handles internal security and law order.
There is a belief, supported by numerous social media posts, that many of these protests are being orchestrated by Hasina’s Awami League to disrupt and complicate governance for the interim administration led by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus. Others feel that under Yunus’s interim government there is a sense of liberation and joy in dissenting freely and voicing grievances.
The Yunus-led interim government has managed these protests with a combination of restraint and adeptness, striving to prevent any escalation or violence.
Of the protests over the past months, two were distinct. These were not orchestrated by factions or supporters of the Awami League – in fact, they were quite the opposite. During Hasina’s 15-year-rule, staging such events would have been unthinkable.
The first event was on September 11 at the National Press Club, commemorating the 76th death anniversary of Pakistan founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The second event took place two days later near the High Commission of India, where an activist group put up a road sign saying “Shaheed Felani Road” to protest against “border killings” – the killing of Bangladeshi citizens by India's Border Security Force.
It is easy to take a simplistic view of these events as an indication of growing anti-India sentiment or an anti-national support within Bangladesh for Pakistan. But both these unique and significant events offer some clues indicating a change in the mindset of Bangladeshis since August 5.
Two contrasting events
The Jinnah commemoration ceremony was organised by the Nawab Salimullah Academy, a relatively obscure organisation with little notable event history over the past 15 years. The event was chaired by the academy’s president, Muhammad Abdul Jabbar. Kamran Dhangal, the Deputy High Commissioner of Pakistan to Bangladesh, represented High Commissioner Syed Ahmed Maroof, the intended chief guest.
The ceremony featured banners displaying Jinnah’s renowned motto, “Unity, Faith, and Discipline” and speakers who talked about various facets of Jinnah’s life, asserting that without him, Pakistan – and consequently Bangladesh – would not have existed. Bangladesh was formed out of East Pakistan after the Liberation War in 1971.
Mohammad Samsuddin, convener of the civic group Nagarik Parishad, argued that had it not been for the formation of Pakistan, Bangladesh may have faced a situation similar to Kashmir. “Bangladesh achieved independence because of Pakistan, which Jinnah helped to establish,” declared Samsuddin.
He questioned the renaming of Allama Iqbal Hall in Dhaka University and Jinnah Avenue, suggesting that these changes were influenced by New Delhi rather than local preferences. In 1969, Dhaka University’s Allama Iqbal hall – which took its name from Pakistan’s national poet – was renamed Sergeant Zahrul Haque Hall following an uprising against General Ayub Khan when Bangladesh was part of Pakistan. In 1972, Jinnah Avenue in Dhaka was renamed Bangabandhu Avenue in 1972. Samsuddin also advocated for stronger ties between Bangladesh, China and Pakistan.
Another participant, Mohammad Shakhawat, claimed that Jinnah ended the political turmoil in the subcontinent. “Thanks to his leadership, East Pakistan remained with West Pakistan,” said Shakhawat. “It’s time for us to reflect on our alliances.” At the event, Urdu poems were recited and Urdu songs were sung.
The September 13 event witnessed clashes between the police and rights activists, who attempted to place a road sign in a diplomatic zone.
Border killings are one of the two most contentious issues in Bangladesh-India relations – water-sharing of transboundary rivers being the other major point of contention. To Bangladeshis, the 2011 death of 15-year-old Felani Khatun has become emblematic of the behaviour of the Indian Border Security Force. The image of Felani, hanging from barbed wire in the winter haze, has fueled significant anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh.
Data from rights organisations shows that between 2000 and 2020, at least 1,236 Bangladeshis were killed and 1,145 injured in shootings by the Indian Border Security Force. A 2020 study by the Border Guard of Bangladesh found a pattern of India’s Border Security Forces shooting Bangladeshis in the chest, back or head and indications of premeditated intent.
On September 13, when the People’s Activist Coalition attempted to install a nameplate saying “Shaheed Felani Road” in front of the Indian High Commission, the police intervened – such an act in a diplomatic zone would not reflect well on any Bangladeshi administration. Despite the altercations, the nameplate was eventually installed but removed the next day.
‘Anti-national’ events?
In Bangladesh, there has long been a binary perspective distinguishing between pro-liberation and anti-liberation factions. This dichotomy, promoted by the Awami League under Hasina, has been ingrained in the public consciousness to advance the party’s political agenda.
According to the Awami League’s narrative, because Bangladesh achieved independence with India’s assistance, aligning with New Delhi has been equated with being pro-liberation. On the other hand, supporting Pakistan has been cast as anti-liberation,
This divide-and-rule tactic is a classic strategy of authoritarian regimes and the Awami League deployed it effectively. It managed to label any dissent as anti-liberation, vilifying and ostracising dissenters through legal and political means.
It took years for Bangladeshis to recognise that the Awami League was not advocating for the liberation war but rather manipulating the 1971 narrative for its political gain. This intensified anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh while fostering a more favorable view of Pakistan.
However, the younger generation in Bangladesh sees Pakistan as a minor and inconsequential entity, with little impact on their daily lives. By contrast, India, which borders Bangladesh on three sides, is perceived as a dominant neighbour with significant influence. The relationship with India, characterised by both support and perceived exploitation during the Hasina administration, has led to a complex and often negative view of Indian involvement in Bangladeshi affairs.
After Hasina’s ouster, events such as celebrating Jinnah’s commemoration or drawing attention to Indian border incidents are likely to occur organically, without any grand, underlying scheme. It is crucial for Indian authorities to recognise this given that a segment of the Indian media is already portraying a Hasina-free Bangladesh as veering towards Islamist fundamentalism or morphing into an Islamic republic.
This is misguided.
The majority of the Bangladeshi population remains genuinely secular and is committed to maintaining communal harmony. The interim administration under Yunus is also fundamentally secular and liberal, working within the constraints of a government that still includes remnants of Hasina’s “fascist” regime.
Despite these challenges, the new administration is striving to ensure an environment where dissent can be expressed and events can be hosted without kicking up a controversy or breaking laws. These two unusual events are simply part of a broader effort of breaking free from years of tyranny and should not be seen as indicative of any larger agenda.
Faisal Mahmud is an award-winning journalist based in Dhaka. He is a recipient of Jefferson fellowship and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Fellowship.