India’s role in the birth of Bangladesh in 1971 was nothing short of monumental. From sheltering nearly 10 million refugees fleeing genocide to engaging in a decisive war that brought Pakistan’s military regime to its knees, India’s contribution was pivotal in the emergence of a sovereign Bangladesh.
The legacy of solidarity was once a source of immense pride for both nations. Yet, despite this deep and painful history of alliance, anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh has steadily grown – and in recent years, it has taken a more pronounced, sharper form.
This paradox invites scrutiny. Why would a nation, whose very independence was shaped by Indian blood and arms, now view that same neighbor with suspicion and, in many quarters, resentment and anger?
It would be simplistic to interpret this sentiment as mere hostility or unprovoked resentment. The reality is more nuanced, shaped by years of political dynamics, perceived economic imbalances, and unfulfilled expectations. The sentiment is not uniform, nor is it necessarily driven by animosity toward India or Indians. Rather, it stems from a broader call for equitable treatment, mutual respect, and greater autonomy in bilateral relations.
For many in Bangladesh, India is increasingly seen not as a collaborative partner, but as a more dominant actor in a relationship that feels unequal. And when asymmetry is coupled with perceived overreach, pushback is often inevitable.
One of the most persistent sources of tension has been migration. In 1971, India’s decision to open its borders to those fleeing violence was a humanitarian act that left a lasting impression. However, in recent years, the narrative around Bangladeshi migration in Indian political discourse – particularly in states like Assam and West Bengal – has taken a more adversarial tone.
Concerns have been expressed about India’s implementation of the Citizenship Amendment Act to offer a pathway to citizenship for non-Muslim minorities from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh; and the National Register of Citizens, which is intended to be a list of Indian citizens living in Assam.
For many in Bangladesh, where the foundation of the liberation movement was rooted in secular values, such policies appear exclusionary and inconsistent with the spirit of 1971. Statements by some Hindutva political figures and media outlets in India referring to undocumented migrants in derogatory terms have reinforced the perception that Bangladeshis are increasingly viewed not as neighbours, but as security concerns.
Tensions at the border have also contributed to the growing unease. Despite bilateral commitments to minimise the use of force, incidents of Bangladeshi nationals being killed at the border continue to occur. These confrontations, often arising from disputes over smuggling or border crossings, are deeply sensitive and widely publicised.
While these incidents are complex, involving difficult operational and security challenges, their symbolic impact is significant. They reinforce the belief among many Bangladeshis that Indian enforcement measures do not always reflect the values of mutual respect or proportionality.
Water-sharing disputes compound the resentment. Bangladesh is a delta nation whose economy and ecology are intricately tied to the flow of rivers originating in India. For decades, Bangladesh has pleaded for a fair share of the Teesta River, only to be refused – often not by Delhi, but by political gridlock in Kolkata.
The Farakka Barrage, operational since 1975, remains a symbol of unilateral upstream decision-making that devastates Bangladeshi farmland downstream. The 1996 Ganges water-sharing treaty, which was signed when Sheikh Hasina was in power and is seen by most Bangladeshis as a sellout, is set to expire next year.
Each dry season that arrives without a new treaty reinforces the belief among Bangladeshis that India prioritises its own needs at Bangladesh’s expense. Water, in this context, is not just a natural resource; it is a barometer of power and respect. And the readings are consistently low.
Economic ties between the two countries have grown, but they are perceived as uneven. India remains Bangladesh’s second-largest trading partner, yet the trade imbalance is considerable. In the 2023-’24 fiscal year, Bangladesh’s exports to India stood at approximately $3 billion, while imports exceeded $13 billion. Although efforts have been made to enhance trade cooperation, many Bangladeshi businesses argue that tariff and non-tariff barriers continue to restrict fair access to Indian markets.
At the same time, Indian goods are widely available in Bangladesh.
This disparity contributes to the perception that the economic relationship is not collaborative. India’s abrupt withdrawal of the transshipment facility for Bangladeshi exports – particularly ready-made garments – has further strained bilateral relations. This facility allowed export cargo from Bangladesh to third countries to be shipped using Indian land customs stations.
The political dimension of the bilateral relationship has also shaped public sentiment. For over a decade, India’s Modi government maintained close ties with the Awami League government under Sheikh Hasina. While such alignment ensured policy continuity, it also coincided with a period during which democratic institutions in Bangladesh came under increasing pressure.
Reports of extrajudicial actions, media restrictions, and contested elections have drawn criticism both domestically and internationally.
The Bharatiya Janata Party government’s consistent support for Hasina’s administration, even amid these developments, has led many Bangladeshis to believe that New Delhi privileged political stability over democratic accountability.
The eventual ouster of Hasina in August 2024, following a youth-driven protest movement, was seen by many not just as a political transition but as a rejection of perceived external influence in domestic affairs.
Hasina’s subsequent decision to seek refuge in India, and the BJP government’s willingness to accommodate her, has added another layer to public perceptions. While the move may be understood in diplomatic terms, it has been interpreted by some in Bangladesh as further evidence of India’s involvement in internal political matters
In the days following her departure, public demonstrations included slogans critical of India, reflecting broader concerns about sovereignty and non-interference.
Geopolitical shifts have added complexity to the bilateral equation. When Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus, who is now leading the caretaker government, visited Beijing at the end of March and described Bangladesh as a maritime gateway for India’s northeastern region, the statement was framed as a strategic opportunity for regional integration.
However, it was met with scepticism by the Indian establishment, especially given heightened regional competition with China. In response, the BJP government revoked Bangladesh’s cargo transshipment privileges through Indian ports as a retaliatory measure. The timing and impact of the move contributed to perceptions in Bangladesh that economic tools were being used to express political displeasure.
Religious identity politics have also influenced cross-border perceptions. India’s internal shifts toward Hindu nationalist policies under the BJP have been closely followed in Bangladesh. Events such as the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992, the Gujarat riots a decade later, lynchings over cow slaughter, and rhetoric of “Akhand Bharat” have all been widely reported in Bangladesh, shaping an image of India as a country where Muslims are increasingly marginalised.
This perception has created fertile ground for the rise of Islamist rhetoric in Bangladesh, which now positions itself as the defender of Muslim identity in the region. In turn, Indian media and majoritarian political discourse often paint Bangladesh as a hotbed of Islamist extremism. Each side’s demonisation fuels the other’s fears, creating a vicious feedback loop of mutual hostility.
The younger generation in Bangladesh has emerged as a particularly influential voice in shaping this discourse. Having grown up in a period marked by political repression and limited democratic engagement, many young Bangladeshis view India’s relationship with the Hasina regime through a critical lens. Social media has amplified these perspectives, allowing narratives of inequality, interference, and resistance to spread rapidly.
For many, scepticism toward India is not ideological but experiential – a response to political developments that have affected their lives.
At the same time, it would be inaccurate to suggest that Bangladesh is uniformly antagonistic toward India. Cultural connections remain strong, and there is considerable admiration for India’s achievements in technology, education, and economic development. Bollywood films, Indian universities, and cricket continue to foster people-to-people ties. The historical relationship is not forgotten, and many Bangladeshis continue to value the shared history of 1971.
But admiration does not automatically translate into alignment. Increasingly, what Bangladeshis are seeking is a relationship based on parity and mutual respect.
The relationship between India and Bangladesh was born from a collective struggle for freedom and justice. That legacy carries with it both pride and responsibility. Recognising current frustrations as part of an evolving relationship – rather than reducing them to antagonism – offers a pathway to renewal. The voices calling for change in Bangladesh are not necessarily rejecting India. Many are simply seeking to reclaim their country’s sovereignty and dignity in a rapidly changing world.
Ashok Swain is a professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University, Sweden.
