After the Presidential election held on November 17, 2005, the incumbent Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa became the fifth executive President of Sri Lanka. One of the most important promises, among others, he made to the public during the election campaign was to bring about “dignified peace” in the country. For a country engulfed in a civil war for more than 25 years, this gave a sign of hope. The public, Sinhalese, Muslims and the majority of the Tamils were weary of war, mainly due to the atrocities committed by the LTTE, and wanted peace.
The morale of the armed forces was also at a very low ebb. Despite the ceasefire agreement that was in force, the security services had to face humiliation at the hands of the LTTE for the sake of peace. The government ordered the armed forces to exercise utmost restraint when provoked by the LTTE. The ceasefire monitors, the SLMM, who were supposed to monitor the activities of both parties impartially, were heavily biased towards the LTTE.
Against this backdrop, the slogan of “dignified peace” gathered momentum during the election campaign and attracted many votes. After winning the election, the President had to deliver what he promised. And he delivered.
President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s first action after becoming the President was appointing his younger brother Gotabaya Rajapaksa as the Secretary of the MOD. The latter was a decorated army officer, who retired from the army after twenty years of distinguished service. The President also appointed Major General Sarath Fonseka, a battle-hardened officer with a reputation as a good field Commander, as the Army Commander. Such actions by the newly elected President may have given a clear message to the LTTE about his intentions.
The LTTE showed that they heard the message loud and clear by attacking an army convoy in the Jaffna Peninsula on 18 December 2005, with claymore mines, causing damage to the vehicles and injuring a few army personnel.
After the army, the LTTE turned to the navy. The date was 23 December 2005.
Around 7.30 am, I received a call from the Director of General Operations with bad news, “Sir, one of our fibreglass dinghies on a routine patrol to check on fishing boats has been attacked in an area north of the Thalaimannar island, about one nautical mile from the beach. It appears that the LTTE has carried out the attack.”
“How many sailors were there in the dinghy, and was anybody injured?” I asked.
“Sir, there had been two sailors in the dinghy, and both are missing; it appears the LTTE has taken the two sailors with them.”
The LTTE was showing scant respect for the ceasefire agreement and was trying to provoke the government into war again or to gain the upper hand during the peace negotiations through such actions. I decided to visit the place of the incident immediately, to obtain first-hand information and to speak to the officers and sailors there.
“Sam, check with the air force whether it is possible to have a helicopter for me to go to the Thalaimannar island in another 30 minutes. You also get ready to go along with the Director Naval Intelligence and Deputy Director Naval Operations.”
“Aye … aye … Sir.” replied the Director General Operations.
The incident occurred around 7.15 am and we reached the location near the bridge on the Thalaimannar island by 8.30 am. A bridge and a causeway connect the Thalaimannar island to the mainland, at its eastern edge.
When we arrived at the scene, the fibreglass dinghy (FGD), in which the two sailors had gone on morning patrol, was brought to the naval detachment near the bridge. I got into the dinghy and saw a fair amount of seawater in it, mixed with a large amount of blood, indicating that there had been a firefight between the dinghy crew and the LTTE and either both or at least one sailor had been badly injured and could be even dead by now.
The subsequent inquiry into the incident revealed that the two sailors had gone on routine patrol to check the small fishing boats returning after fishing. The LTTE had come from their camp in Vedithalthivu in the mainland, north of the Mannar island, disguised as fishermen, mingled with the fishing boats and attacked the navy dinghy.
Although the ceasefire agreement was in force, I issued specific instructions within two weeks of assuming command of the navy to all the Area Commanders to always maintain a high degree of preparedness and the naval craft were to be deployed in pairs, particularly fibreglass dinghies, inshore patrol craft and FACs. On this occasion, the second dinghy was delayed in proceeding to sea for some reason and the LTTE took advantage of the situation. This incident could have been averted if the dinghies had gone out on patrol in pairs as instructed.
This incident was a serious violation of the ceasefire agreement and a challenge to the government. After explaining the developing situation to the officers and sailors, and emphasizing the need to maintain a high level of preparedness, I returned to Colombo and briefed the Defence Secretary and President regarding the incident. The following day, the LTTE returned the dead bodies of the two sailors through the ICRC. With this attack, it was apparent what the LTTE’s intentions were. Once again, I warned all ships, craft, establishments and detachments of the navy to maintain a high level of vigilance and preparedness to face possible LTTE attacks.
The date was 7 January 2006.
I woke up to a call around 2 am. It was Commander Eastern Naval Area Rear Admiral S.R. Samarathunge, an officer who was to perform exceptionally well during the final war with the LTTE. It was bad news again, and this time, it was incredibly serious and amounted to the LTTE declaring all-out war against the government.
“Sir, the LTTE has attacked a fast patrol craft on patrol covering the outer harbour entrance as part of the harbour defence.”
“How did they attack?”
“Sir, they have used a suicide boat presumably disguised as a fishing craft. There is no news about the crew, including three officers and fifteen sailors. A search and rescue operation is about to commence to search for the survivors.”
“Sam, please warn everybody involved in the search and rescue operation not to get any closer than 100 m from any fishing boat. There can be more suicide boats waiting for the arrival of our rescue mission boats.”
“Sir, I have already done that.”
“Good … I will come there at the earliest possible.”
I instructed the Operations Staff at the Navy Headquarters to prepare to go to Trincomalee by 7 a.m. I waited until daybreak to inform the Defence Secretary. Around 6 am, I informed the Defence Secretary of the incident and that I was leaving for Trincomalee at 7 am by air. He indicated that he would keep the President informed of the situation.
Before the signing of the ceasefire agreement in February 2002, fishing restrictions were in force. Fishing was allowed only in specific areas during specific time periods and there were specific marshalling points along the coast for the departure and arrival of fishing boats, demarcated by the navy, to be able to identify fishing craft quickly. However, after the ceasefire agreement in 2002, the government lifted the restrictions imposed on fishing despite the strong objections made by the navy.
In the year 2003, as the Area Commander east based in Trincomalee, I had repeatedly informed the Prime Minister and ministers of the United National Party government, who visited the Trincomalee navy camp on four occasions during that year, of the danger posed to the naval harbour by the Sea Tigers, from their new camps established in the Sampur area, on the southern border of the outer harbour, just 6 km from the inner harbour entrance. These warnings were not heeded by the authorities. Within a short period of three years, my predictions came true.
When I arrived in Trincomalee in an Air Force Y12, a Chinese-built aircraft, around 8 am, Area Commander Rear Admiral S.R Samarathunge updated me on the latest information.
“Sir, we rescued two sailors from the sea and gathered some information from them. According to them, the sea conditions had been rough and rainy, and visibility also had been very poor. As a result, even the radar appears to have not been able to detect the approach of the suicide boat.”
“Where are the two sailors now?” I asked the Area Commander.
“Sir, they are in the navy hospital and stable. At the time they were rescued, they were in a state of shock but now, they are okay.”
“Let’s go and see them.”
When the hospitalised sailors saw me, I could see surprise in their eyes, as they never expected to see the Navy Commander visiting them in a hospital, within a few hours of the attack. After inquiring about their health, names and a few other details that made them relax, I asked more specific questions from one of the sailors, able seaman Perera.
“Perera, where were you when this happened?”
“Sir, I was performing lookout duties on the portside (left side) behind the wheelhouse. The sea was very rough and it was raining and the visibility was very poor. There were a lot of fishing boats and because of that, we were going at a slow speed of around 10 to 15 knots.”
“Did you see the approach of the suicide boat?”
“Yes, Sir. I saw it on the port quarter of our craft (left-hand side behind the craft), suddenly coming out from a cluster of fishing boats and at that time, it was about 30 m away from our craft and coming at high speed. I realised it was a suicide boat.
I shouted and tried to alert the officer on duty in the wheelhouse but it only took 5–10 seconds for the enemy craft to close in and ram our craft. With the explosion, I got thrown into the sea.”
Both sailors had been performing lookout duties outside the enclosed wheelhouse of the FAC and had been stationed immediately behind the wheelhouse at a higher point, where they could have an all-around vision to observe any suspicious movements.
They escaped death because they had been thrown into the sea with the blast and had been picked up by the naval craft deployed on the search and rescue operation immediately after the explosion. All the other crew members were killed in the blast. The LTTE carried out the attack using a suicide boat to destroy a naval FAC whilst the ceasefire agreement was in force. In the meantime, the new government was preparing for a new round of peace talks with the LTTE, in the first week of February, in a month’s time.
Excerpted with permission from The Turning Point: The Naval Role in Sri Lanka’s War on LTTE Terrorism, Wasantha Karannagoda, Penguin Random House India.
