Less than two weeks after returning from a tour of France, Germany and Canada, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is ready to welcome Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani to New Delhi on Monday. Although Ghani’s maiden visit has got buried in India’s frenetic engagement with the world, make no mistake: it holds great significance because of the emerging geo-political equations.
India has traditionally had good ties with Afghanistan. It was the first to sign a strategic pact with Afghanistan in October 2011, when former President Hamid Karzai visited New Delhi. It is the fifth-largest donor to the war-ravaged nation and the largest among developing countries.
However, Ghani’s ascendancy in September 2014, after a protracted and contentious electoral battle with Abdullah Abdullah, has put a dampener on bilateral ties. In a clear indication of his priorities, the Afghan president toured China, Pakistan and the United States before coming round to India. His government has shelved a request by the Karzai regime for the purchase of military supplies from India, and this move was preceded by the country’s decision to send six Afghan cadets to the elite officers’ academy in Abbottabad for training.
Clearly, Ghani holds Islamabad, or Rawalpindi, as an inevitable partner. Considering Beijing’s leverage in Pakistan, it is no surprise that he chose China for his first official tour. The months since he took office have seen the formation of a China-Pakistan-Afghanistan Strategic Dialogue. This is likely to shape the security contours in a country strategically situated at the crossroads of Central, East, South and West Asia.
Not surprisingly, these developments have left security experts in New Delhi worried about India’s isolation.
Warming China-Iran ties
Ghani’s visit also comes on the heels of a nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1, which includes the US, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany. The final deal is expected to be hammered out by June 30, and experts argue that this calls for India’s re-entry into Afghanistan.
A Shia Iran will be opposed to conceding ground to the Taliban in Rawalpindi. The respite offered after sanctions are lifted will enable Tehran to play an active role in Afghanistan. There are also broader considerations with the growing profile of China in the region and across the globe.
It is unlikely that Tehran will align with New Delhi as this can be perceived as opposed to a Beijing-Islamabad axis. China as a part of P5+1 was an active supporter of Tehran and argued for the quick removal of the sanctions on it. It is the largest importer of Iranian oil and the non-oil trade between the two countries has seen a significant rise in recent years. Two state-owned companies, China National Petroleum Company and Sinopec, have promised investment worth billions in the derelict Iranian oilfields. Iran can also accrue many other benefits from a partnership with China. It has been accepted as a founding member of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and is in line for a formidable investment for China’s ambitious Silk Road Economic Belt.
In comparison, New Delhi has nothing to offer. It promised to develop Chabahar port in 2003. But both the investment of $85 million and the speed of delivery at Chabahar have been modest. Indian investments in the Chabahar-Faraj-Bam railway link have also yet to materialise. When it comes to securing exploration rights, Indian companies have been tardy.
Modi has to play deftly and adroitly if India wants to re-establish its position in Afghanistan. Whether we will be China’s junior partner in Afghanistan or an independent security provider remains to be seen.
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India has traditionally had good ties with Afghanistan. It was the first to sign a strategic pact with Afghanistan in October 2011, when former President Hamid Karzai visited New Delhi. It is the fifth-largest donor to the war-ravaged nation and the largest among developing countries.
However, Ghani’s ascendancy in September 2014, after a protracted and contentious electoral battle with Abdullah Abdullah, has put a dampener on bilateral ties. In a clear indication of his priorities, the Afghan president toured China, Pakistan and the United States before coming round to India. His government has shelved a request by the Karzai regime for the purchase of military supplies from India, and this move was preceded by the country’s decision to send six Afghan cadets to the elite officers’ academy in Abbottabad for training.
Clearly, Ghani holds Islamabad, or Rawalpindi, as an inevitable partner. Considering Beijing’s leverage in Pakistan, it is no surprise that he chose China for his first official tour. The months since he took office have seen the formation of a China-Pakistan-Afghanistan Strategic Dialogue. This is likely to shape the security contours in a country strategically situated at the crossroads of Central, East, South and West Asia.
Not surprisingly, these developments have left security experts in New Delhi worried about India’s isolation.
Warming China-Iran ties
Ghani’s visit also comes on the heels of a nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1, which includes the US, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany. The final deal is expected to be hammered out by June 30, and experts argue that this calls for India’s re-entry into Afghanistan.
A Shia Iran will be opposed to conceding ground to the Taliban in Rawalpindi. The respite offered after sanctions are lifted will enable Tehran to play an active role in Afghanistan. There are also broader considerations with the growing profile of China in the region and across the globe.
It is unlikely that Tehran will align with New Delhi as this can be perceived as opposed to a Beijing-Islamabad axis. China as a part of P5+1 was an active supporter of Tehran and argued for the quick removal of the sanctions on it. It is the largest importer of Iranian oil and the non-oil trade between the two countries has seen a significant rise in recent years. Two state-owned companies, China National Petroleum Company and Sinopec, have promised investment worth billions in the derelict Iranian oilfields. Iran can also accrue many other benefits from a partnership with China. It has been accepted as a founding member of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and is in line for a formidable investment for China’s ambitious Silk Road Economic Belt.
In comparison, New Delhi has nothing to offer. It promised to develop Chabahar port in 2003. But both the investment of $85 million and the speed of delivery at Chabahar have been modest. Indian investments in the Chabahar-Faraj-Bam railway link have also yet to materialise. When it comes to securing exploration rights, Indian companies have been tardy.
Modi has to play deftly and adroitly if India wants to re-establish its position in Afghanistan. Whether we will be China’s junior partner in Afghanistan or an independent security provider remains to be seen.
