India and Pakistan are like the pettiest of siblings. They can't live without each other. They've been fighting since the very beginning. And they both want what the other has. Only when it comes to the arguments between New Delhi and Islamabad, real people's lives are at stake. Which is what makes something like the last two days particularly galling.
There's nothing novel about India and Pakistan seeming optimistic about taking their talks forward – as they did at Ufa in Russia in July – and that positivity breaking down within no time. As if on cue after Ufa, incidents on the Line of Control ramped up, two terror incidents took place both of which India claims originated from Pakistani territory, and the two nations grumbled about each other's approach.
What is evident is that the two sides were barely on the same page, even in Russia.
When things go well with international negotiations, the two sides agree to certain concessions – with obvious allowances for whichever one has the upper hand at the moment – but their task is then to publicly sell their achievement to domestic audiences.
See-Saw
US President Barack Obama's public statements about the Iran nuclear deal were aimed mostly at keeping it safe from conservative hardliners in America, not to send the Iranians a message. The same was true of the commentary coming from Iranian President Hassan Rouhani: Most of what he said in public was aimed squarely at his own countrymen, not the Westerners he was negotating with.
When the two sides are not on the same page, however, they attempt to use the bully pulpit of public opinion as a negotiation forum. This way, rather than using public statements as a way of taking external pressure off the talks, they end up making them harder to carry out. Which is exactly what has happened over the last few days.
It is clear now that the sudden joint statement in Ufa came as a surprise to all, even those who came up with the idea. It is clearer still that the civilian government in Islamabad didn't spend enough time thinking of a cohesive way to sell a statement that doesn't include the word "Kashmir" to a domestic (and military) audience. And, clearest of all, is the understanding that New Delhi has picked the pettiest of positions – no pre-meeting talks between Pakistan and separatists – as a signal of its newly muscular negotiating approach.
This led to Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs putting out a statement that sounded like something Anthony Gonsalves might have said: "The [Indian] External Affairs Minister's attempt to draw a distinction between preambular and operative paragraphs in the Ufa statement appears to be an after-thought to justify a position that is counterproductive in terms of the ultimate objective of reducing tensions and improving trust."
Sardonic Diplomacy
But that wasn't the best of the comments put out by Islamabad over the last two days, even as Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj attempted to breathe fire about Pakistan's intransigence. Petty sniping in these matters isn't uncommon, although it's generally avoidable. The last four statements from Pakistan have, however, been a masterclass in foreign policy sarcasm.
First there were the double quotes.
And finally, in calling off the talks, it's almost as if Pakistan's foreign affairs ministry just threw its hands up and decided we can say whatever we want to now. "Considering that many terror 'incidents' blamed initially by India on Pakistan eventually turned out to be fake, it is not improbable that India can delay the Resumed Dialogue indefinitely by concocting one or two incidents and keeping the LoC hot."
(It's not as if India has been any less accusatory in its comments, but Sushma Swaraj's statements were much angrier and less sardonic).
What are we left with, after Pakistan pulled out of the talks as India insisted on a rather petty condition regarding the Hurriyat? No talks, and a bar to even begin discussions that is even higher than what had been laid out before. There are enough commentators on both sides of the border who will conclude that this just proves it is useless to even talk to the duplicitous neighbour. This ignores the fact that the talks themselves never happened and the very spirit of communication between the two negotiating sides is evidently one of one-upmanship, not cooperation.
There are murmurs of a way forward at the United Nations General Assembly in a month's time, and besides other back-channel talks will continue. But if those doing the talking are themselves not convinced that talking is worth it, what are the chances they can convince anyone else of its utility?
We welcome your comments at
letters@scroll.in.
There's nothing novel about India and Pakistan seeming optimistic about taking their talks forward – as they did at Ufa in Russia in July – and that positivity breaking down within no time. As if on cue after Ufa, incidents on the Line of Control ramped up, two terror incidents took place both of which India claims originated from Pakistani territory, and the two nations grumbled about each other's approach.
What is evident is that the two sides were barely on the same page, even in Russia.
When things go well with international negotiations, the two sides agree to certain concessions – with obvious allowances for whichever one has the upper hand at the moment – but their task is then to publicly sell their achievement to domestic audiences.
See-Saw
US President Barack Obama's public statements about the Iran nuclear deal were aimed mostly at keeping it safe from conservative hardliners in America, not to send the Iranians a message. The same was true of the commentary coming from Iranian President Hassan Rouhani: Most of what he said in public was aimed squarely at his own countrymen, not the Westerners he was negotating with.
When the two sides are not on the same page, however, they attempt to use the bully pulpit of public opinion as a negotiation forum. This way, rather than using public statements as a way of taking external pressure off the talks, they end up making them harder to carry out. Which is exactly what has happened over the last few days.
It is clear now that the sudden joint statement in Ufa came as a surprise to all, even those who came up with the idea. It is clearer still that the civilian government in Islamabad didn't spend enough time thinking of a cohesive way to sell a statement that doesn't include the word "Kashmir" to a domestic (and military) audience. And, clearest of all, is the understanding that New Delhi has picked the pettiest of positions – no pre-meeting talks between Pakistan and separatists – as a signal of its newly muscular negotiating approach.
This led to Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs putting out a statement that sounded like something Anthony Gonsalves might have said: "The [Indian] External Affairs Minister's attempt to draw a distinction between preambular and operative paragraphs in the Ufa statement appears to be an after-thought to justify a position that is counterproductive in terms of the ultimate objective of reducing tensions and improving trust."
Sardonic Diplomacy
But that wasn't the best of the comments put out by Islamabad over the last two days, even as Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj attempted to breathe fire about Pakistan's intransigence. Petty sniping in these matters isn't uncommon, although it's generally avoidable. The last four statements from Pakistan have, however, been a masterclass in foreign policy sarcasm.
First there were the double quotes.
Then there was literal sarcasm, with Pakistan's National Security Advisor actually calling India's statement "hilarious".
"The most hilarious part of the statement of the official Spokesperson of External Affairs Ministry is the sentence "The people of both countries can legitimately ask today what is the force that compels Pakistan to disregard the agreements reached by two elected leaders and sabotage their implementation".
The wishful narrative in the statement wants everyone to believe that only Pakistan's military establishment is pushing the agenda towards the Kashmir issue. It is surprising that the Indian foreign policy establishment with all its expertise, has not recognized the stark reality that in Pakistan not only the political leadership but the entire nation is fully committed to provide political, moral and diplomatic support to the Kashmiris struggling for their right of self-determination."
And finally, in calling off the talks, it's almost as if Pakistan's foreign affairs ministry just threw its hands up and decided we can say whatever we want to now. "Considering that many terror 'incidents' blamed initially by India on Pakistan eventually turned out to be fake, it is not improbable that India can delay the Resumed Dialogue indefinitely by concocting one or two incidents and keeping the LoC hot."
(It's not as if India has been any less accusatory in its comments, but Sushma Swaraj's statements were much angrier and less sardonic).
What are we left with, after Pakistan pulled out of the talks as India insisted on a rather petty condition regarding the Hurriyat? No talks, and a bar to even begin discussions that is even higher than what had been laid out before. There are enough commentators on both sides of the border who will conclude that this just proves it is useless to even talk to the duplicitous neighbour. This ignores the fact that the talks themselves never happened and the very spirit of communication between the two negotiating sides is evidently one of one-upmanship, not cooperation.
There are murmurs of a way forward at the United Nations General Assembly in a month's time, and besides other back-channel talks will continue. But if those doing the talking are themselves not convinced that talking is worth it, what are the chances they can convince anyone else of its utility?
