After the clash on the Nam Ka Chu on 20 October, the Chinese had rather effortlessly pushed the Indian troops back to the south of Tawang Chu. The Chinese high command was fully aware of all the changes that were taking place on the Indian side as Chinese Intelligence agencies had set up a web of agents over the last few years to monitor and report on all Indian activity.
There was enough reason to suspect that the primitive communication set-up of the Indian Army in NEFA was also compromised and not only were the Chinese listening in, they were also inserting bogus messages at key moments into the chain of command, which helped further unnerve and confuse the Indian commanders.
In 1993 and 1994, two important books were published: the first, True History of China Border War, written in the old Chinese script, was authored by Professor Yan Xun of the National Defence University of Beijing; and the second, China’s War of Self Defensive Counter Attack with India, also written in Chinese, was published by the Academy of Military Sciences. Apart from giving some details of the operations from the Chinese perspective, both these books reveal the extent to which the Chinese had information about Indian deployment, their strengths and weaknesses, and an almost uncanny psychoanalysis of Indian commanders.
Almost all Indian accounts, including those of Brigadiers John Dalvi and Monty Palit, mention this fact. Tashi Sonam, the Tawang-based IB agent during the 1962 clash, was categorical: “The Chinese knew everything, Indian deployment almost to the section and platoon level was known to them. Sometimes they knew what the Indians were going to do even before the decision was taken.”
The head of the Central Military Affairs Commission (CMAC), General Liu Bocheng, was determined to avoid a face-to-face confrontation with the Indian troops.
Towards this end, the Chinese plan for phase two of the operations (which started on 17 November) hinged on the Indians deciding to dig in at Se-la. On 23 October, when the decision to abandon Tawang had been taken, both the Eastern Army Commander Bogey Sen and BGS IV Corps Brigadier KK Singh had ordered the troops to fall back on Bomdila as per the Thorat Plan. In fact, at that stage, Bogey Sen had boasted to the political officer, Nari Rustomji, during the lull between the two phases of the war: “We’ve got those bastards where we want them now. Just let them move one step forward, and they’ll get such a thrashing they’ll never forget. Our boys are now in positions where they can fight and show what they’re worth. They’re just itching for a chance to have a real good crack at the Chinks.”
For Army HQ and the army commander to expect that Se-la would hold out for even two weeks was pure wishful thinking, especially since infiltration routes on either flank had not been studied. Se-la certainly would have been a formidable obstacle had it been selected six months previously and if the Chinese had obliged and assaulted only along the road axis.
One of the key reasons the Chinese did not chase the Tawang garrison across the Mago/Tawang Chu immediately was to lull the Indians into believing that they were happy with the capture of Tawang and would not undertake any further offensive action in the Kameng Frontier Division. Already the Indian leadership had demonstrated to the Chinese just how inflexible they could be. So convinced were they that the Chinese were not going to launch an offensive during the coming winter that even the frenetic construction of the Bum-la-Tawang road (clearly visible from Nuranang) did not shake them out of their complacency.
However, despite everything falling into place for the Chinese, General Liu Bocheng’s plan was a bold but dangerous gamble. To outflank Se-la and push his troops behind the garrison onto the Se-la-Dirang-Bomdila road meant that the Chinese troops would have to be self-contained, each man at best carrying a week’s ration and limited ammunition. Should the Se-la brigade actually dig in and decide to fight an isolated battle, a face-to-face clash would be inevitable.
Following 62 Infantry Brigade’s lead, should 65 Brigade close ranks and hunker down at Dirang Dzong, then 48 and 67 Brigade could mop up the Chinese systematically. But then battles are not won by taking timid decisions and the Indians until then had given the Chinese no reason to believe that they had the stomach for a fight. Bocheng was fully aware of the capability of the Indian troops; now he simply had to make sure he got into the minds of the Indian commanders.
Even the best troops in the world need to be led and until then the HQs of 4 Division, IV Corps, Eastern Command and New Delhi had not been doing a very good job.
On 29 October, orders were issued by the CMAC to the Tibet Military Region that outlined the attack plans for the battle of Se-la, Dirang Dzong and Bomdila. The major guidelines were to cut off Bridge 1 and Bridge 2 between Dirang and Senge Dzong; concentrate forces and strike at the five battalions holding Se-la from multiple directions; and attack Dirang Dzong and then push towards Thembang and Bomdila. Chinese commanders were told that lack of roads should not hinder troop movements and they should always make sure to protect their flanks as they marched.
Accordingly, Lieutenant General Zhang Gua Hua, the commander of Tibet Military Region, formulated his operational plans. Reporting back to the CMAC, Hua emphasised four key aspects. First, he would carry out multiple attacks on Indian troops ruthlessly. Second, deploy the forces after a careful study of the terrain. Third, identify the command elements at Dirang Dzong and destroy them so that the entire Indian force would be headless and unable to reinforce Se-la. Fourth, even if Dirang Dzong held out, he would get behind the Indian troops with three regiments to cut off their escape towards the south.
This plan was not without its risks and drawbacks. Since some of the routes that the troops would have to take to outflank the Indian positions were long, developing and maintaining effective supply lines would be difficult. Chinese infantry could carry seven days’ dry rations themselves while a Tibetan labour force could establish a base with another three days’ dry rations.
The most damning aspect of this attack would be the numbers.
The Indians were known to have seven battalions deployed in the Dirang and Bomdila area. Getting behind Se-la with 10,800 Chinese troops meant that the ratio of Indian to Chinese troops would be barely 1.5:1 which could prove disastrous for the attacking troops. If they managed to overrun Se-la, then the situation could be salvaged but if it held out for even a week, the Chinese campaign would collapse.
The assault on the Indian 62 Brigade at Se-la would be launched using four infantry regiments (equivalent to four Indian brigades), supported by three artillery regiments. This was a ratio of 3:1, which was ideally not enough for an attacking force against well-entrenched troops. Outflanking troops moving along the western side of Se-la would have to take care to stay away from the Bhutan border. Though maintaining supply lines along this axis was expected to be easier, there would be less room to manoeuvre.
The CMAC after deliberation gave the Tibet Frontier Command the go-ahead and deployed 419 Tibetan Unit (Division), 11 Division (32 and 33 Regiments), 55 Division (154, 155, 157, 163 and 165 Regiments), the Shan Naan Army with four companies, Artillery (306, 308 and 504 Regiments), five companies of 136 Engineer Regiment plus other service elements bringing the total Chinese strength to approximately 22,000 combat troops. 419 Tibetan Unit with 55 Division was to execute the main thrust against Se-la. 11 Division was to advance along the Tse-la–Poshing-la axis and cut off Dirang from Bomdila while part of the force would attack Dirang and cut off the southern escape routes.
On 15 November, the CMAC appointed Marshal Mi Liu as the commander of the attacking force. Speaking to his subordinates, Mi Liu pointed out that victory could be achieved only by determined and relentless pursuit of the stated objectives. The Indians in front were well coordinated – “the head,” he said, “is like copper and the tail like tin”.
Pointing to the Indian defence posture at Se-la and Senge Dzong he said, “the right side is like the backbone while the left side deployment is like the stomach. The main thrust towards Se-la and Senge Dzong would be like hitting the Indians in the stomach, which should be comparatively easier than trying to break the backbone.”
Excerpted with permission from 1962: The War That Wasn’t, Shiv Kunal Verma, Aleph Book Company.
