Narendra Modi has now made four visits to the United States in two years. In that time, he has also met the United States President Barack Obama on seven different occasions. Right now, Indian and American warships are steaming towards Japan for a major naval exercise. In April, New Delhi and Washington DC agreed in principle to allow their militaries to use each other's facilities. And on Tuesday, in a joint-statement after Modi's latest trip to the White House, America officially recognised India as a "Major Defence Partner."
Those who are comfortable living in a bipolar world – a tendency American analysts still dealing with a Cold War hangover are often accused of harbouring – would find it hard not to pin India firmly on the American side of the modern era's US-China divide.
The Indo-American civil nuclear agreement in 2008 might have been the first big marker of this narrative, but Modi has kicked it into overdrive, most significantly by pushing forward on several logistical agreements that are themselves mundane but could have a massive effect on ties between the countries.
American pies
Tuesday's meeting in the White House, which the Indo-US joint statement described as Obama and Modi's "third major bilateral summit" saw plenty of other deliverables, all of which take the relationship forward.
India will buy six nuclear power plants from Toshiba-Westinghouse, America will help New Delhi build an indigenous aircraft carrier, the two countries will share more information about terrorists, Washington will help launch the next phase of the Indian-led International Solar Alliance and the US has also firmly backed India's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Some of these come with caveats. The logistics agreement for the militaries to share each other's facilities, for example, should have been signed by now, though the joint statement says that the text has been finalised. Pathfinder projects that were supposed to herald further defence cooperation between the countries don't seem to have gone very far, and the statement mentions "new working groups" for these.
And we'll see American nuclear power plants in India only when we see them: Even the Westinghouse deal involves working "toward finalising the contractual arrangements by June 2017."
Chinese crackers
Yet the overall thrust of the relationship, which went downhill after the Devyani Khobragade incident just a few years ago, certainly seems on a fast-track – much of it aimed squarely at China. Who better to note this than the Chinese state-run media itself?
"Four visits to the US and seven meetings with President Barack Obama in two years – Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, since he took office in 2014, has ramped up the India-US relationship to an unprecedented level. How the two countries will engage with each other has raised heated discussions."
— Liu Zhun, Global Times
...
"Although rivalling China in many aspects, India knows its great vision cannot be realized by bashing or containing China. Instead, they should expand cooperation, explore the potentials and build mutual trust for their own good. China is more of a help than a competitor for India."
The fact is of course that we do not live in a bipolar world. China is India's largest trading partner, and New Delhi continues to court investment from up north. India regularly book-ends its American engagement with efforts to also meet Chinese partners and while plenty has been made (and questioned of) the Modi-Obama relationship, it's hard to ignore the images of the Indian Prime Minister taking a stroll down the Sabarmati with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Cold water
Yet read through the joint statement and it becomes clear that even if India isn't entirely on board the US vs China struggle, America wants it to be. The statement affirmed India and America's status as "priority partners" in the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean region, re-affirmed support towards maritime security and reiterated importance attached to ensuring freedom of navigation: All provisions aimed squarely at China.
The fact that China is the lone holdout preventing India from joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which would make flow of nuclear technology and fuel easier, only reaffirms this impression. As does the Indian, and potentially Japanese, investment in an Iranian port soon after the America-led deal to end sanctions on Iran. And the Indo-American-Japanese trilateral relationship only seems to be growing.
We may not be back in a cold war, but the waters of the Indian and Pacific oceans can certainly seem frigid.
