A Madras High Court judgement last fortnight setting aside an order of the Central Information Commission and granting sanctity to the actions of one of its Public Information Officers is an example of the judiciary commitment to the principle of transparency in administration ‒ just as long as it applies only to the other organs of the state.

On January 23 last year, the Central Information Commission heard the appeal of an aggrieved RTI applicant whose requests for information had been turned down by the High Court's Public Information Officer. The applicant’s query related to the selection procedure for appointing the Registrar General, and the action taken, if any, on complaints against the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore.

The applicant had been persistent. He knocked the doors of the high court 47 times, undeterred by every refusal.

The State Information Commission found no fault with the High Court officials' actions, and instead castigated the applicant for his "offensive and intimidatory acts", which were "calculated to bring embarrassment and ridicule" to the institution of the judiciary.

The High Court's judgement will provide every public authority with a judicially-sanctioned right to question an applicant's motives, and refuse disclosure of information on the ground that the request was made in bad faith.

There are no explicit provisions in the RTI Act on which judges can rely to deny an information request. The court held that since the right to information is a fundamental right, it must also be restricted by those very parameters by which the state is permitted to curtail the right to freedom of expression. A distinction must be drawn between the right to information and the right to seek information, and it is the latter that should prevail. But who will be the final arbiter upon this right? The very same judiciary, which the constitution entrusts with the mantle of being the custodian of Fundamental Rights.

Not only should a citizen exercise the right to seek information in utmost good faith, but it must be "legally sustainable" too, the court ruled, while remaining silent as to under which law(s) shall this sustainability be judged.

The court found that the applicant's requests for information regarding if the repeated complaints against the Egmore magistrate had been acted upon, were vexatious and bore the imprint of malice and lack of faith in the judicial system.

As regards the appointment of the Registrar General, an administrative position that involves quasi-judicial functions, all that the applicant sought to know was if there were any standard rules which were followed in setting up the selection committee. He did not seek to pry into how judges discharge their judicial functions, but only to know how the judiciary fulfils its administrative responsibilities. This is something the public has an inalienable right to be informed about.

This right suffered a big blow with the court's ruling that the Registrar General's post is a "sensitive" one, hence providing a valid ground to decline an information request.  Questioning or seeking to know the details of the appointment procedure was tantamount to casting aspersions on the judiciary's impartiality and integrity, the court held.

While court decisions provide a clear insight into how judges proceed with the task, the manner in which the judiciary performs its administrative functions remain shrouded in mystery. It would be facile and disingenuous to segregate the administrative functions from the judicial ones, because both are integral to the process of delivering justice.