Explained: How a landmark Supreme Court judgement has ended the governor’s ‘pocket veto’

In a significant ruling clarifying the powers and duties of state governors, the Supreme Court on Tuesday established clear guidelines for how they should deal with bills passed by state legislatures. By limiting their ability to indefinitely withhold action on bills, the decision addresses long-standing concerns about unelected governors delaying or potentially blocking legislation passed by elected legislatures.

This judgment arose from a petition by the Tamil Nadu government in 2023 detailing a protracted standoff with Governor RN Ravi over legislative approvals. Deciding the petition, the bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan held that governors cannot wield absolute power to reject bills outright. They must provide reasons if they choose to withhold assent and return the bill to the state assembly for reconsideration. If the assembly repasses the bill, the governors lack the authority to refer it to the president.

The court introduced specific timelines for these actions and held that the governor’s conduct is subject to judicial review, thus safeguarding the democratic process from being unduly checked by an unelected official.

Scroll unpacks this historic judgement, authored by Pardiwala.

Tamil Nadu versus Ravi

In 2023, the Tamil Nadu government brought its long-running dispute with Ravi to the Supreme Court, highlighting significant delays affecting the state’s governance. Its primary complaint focused on the governor’s prolonged failure to sign into law 12 bills passed by the state assembly, some pending since 2020.

Following the court issuing notice to Ravi in the matter, the governor finally acted in November 2023. He withheld his approval for ten bills, without providing specific reasons for withholding assent. He did not approve the remaining two either, sending them to the president of India for consideration.

The Tamil Nadu Assembly responded within a few days by convening a special session and swiftly passing the ten bills again, without any changes. Under the Constitution of India, when a legislature repasses a bill after assent was withheld, the governor is expected to grant approval. However, Ravi took a different course, reserving these repassed bills for the president, citing supposed conflicts with national laws.

This specific step – reserving bills after they had been reconsidered and repassed – became the central legal issue that the Supreme Court dealt with. While the Tamil Nadu government also flagged in its petition, delays in administrative sanctions and appointments by Ravi, the judgement focused on the governor’s legislative role under Article 200 of the Constitution.

Untangling Article 200

Article 200 lays out the process for when a state legislature passes a bill and sends it to the governor. The governor has three main options: grant assent, making the bill a law; withhold assent; or reserve the bill for the president’s consideration.

Disputes between state governments and governors often revolve around the second option: withholding assent. Article 200 has a specific procedure for this scenario. If the governor withholds their assent for bills, they may return the bill “as soon as possible” to the legislature with a message explaining their reasons or suggesting changes. If the assembly then passes the bill again, with or without accepting the suggestions, the Constitution mandates that the governor “shall not withhold assent” this second time.

This framework raised several critical questions that the Supreme Court’s judgement dealt with. Is returning the bill mandatory or optional for the governor after withholding assent? Can a governor delay this indefinitely – exercising a so-called pocket veto? Can they simply withhold assent without explanation, effectively killing the bill: an absolute veto? Can they reserve a bill for the president after the assembly has passed it again? Does the governor act independently or on the state government’s advice? Are there time limits for the governor’s legislative actions? Can courts review these actions?

Limiting discretion, mandating timeliness

The judgment provided clear answers, significantly restricting the governor’s powers in line with explicit constitutional procedures.

The Supreme Court clarified that the governor withholding assent is not a final rejection. It must trigger the procedure of returning the bill to the legislature with the governor’s feedback “as soon as possible”. The idea that the governor can simply withhold assent without explanation or further action – essentially exercising an absolute veto – has no basis in the Constitution, the court ruled. A bill only fails if the legislature, after getting it back, decides not to pass it again.

The concept of a so-called pocket veto by the governor through indefinite delay was also dismissed by the court. It stressed that the constitutional requirement for the governor to “declare” a decision, along with the phrase “as soon as possible” for returning bills, imposes a duty to act promptly. Keeping bills in limbo indefinitely is unconstitutional, it held.

The ruling also dealt with repassed bills. The court held that once a bill is returned and then passed again by the state assembly, the governor is constitutionally required to grant assent. The words “shall not withhold assent” within Article 200 are a binding command. Reserving such a repassed bill for the president, as Ravi did in this case, is generally illegal. The court acknowledged a narrow, theoretical exception: if the legislature, during reconsideration, were to add entirely new elements that fundamentally changed the bill and raised fresh constitutional issues possibly requiring presidential review.

Regarding the governor’s independence, the court reiterated that they generally must act on the advice of the state’s council of ministers. Article 200 explicitly allows the governor discretion only for reserving bills that could weaken the state’s High Court. Other instances are rare, said the court, such as when the Constitution requires the President’s approval for a state law – such as for resolving conflicts with central laws under Article 254(2) – or in truly extreme situations where following ministerial advice would endanger democracy or the rule of law. Personal dislike of a policy or political differences are not valid reasons for a governor to ignore the State government’s advice, the court held

Addressing the issue of delays, the court prescribed operational timelines, drawing guidance from government-constituted commission reports and previous government guidelines. Accordingly, a governor should act within one month if following ministerial advice, or three months if acting against ministerial advice in returning or reserving a bill for presidential consideration. Assent to a repassed bill should be given by the governor within one month. The president, when considering reserved bills for their consideration by the governor, should decide within three months, explaining any delay beyond that to the state.

Significantly, the court affirmed that the governor’s actions – or inaction – under Article 200 are subject to judicial review. After this judgment, the act of withholding assent or reserving a bill for presidential consideration by the governor, and even the president withholding assent, can be examined by courts. This may be done on grounds of illegality, unreasonable arbitrariness, or actions taken in bad faith or with dishonest intent.

Outcome for Tamil Nadu

Applying these principles, the court declared the Tamil Nadu governor’s reservation of the ten repassed bills for the president illegal and void from the beginning. This nullified any subsequent presidential action on these bills as well.

The judgement also severely criticised Ravi’s conduct in indefinitely sitting on the bills. It said that his actions had “been lacking in bonafides” and were “in clear violation of the procedure envisaged under the Constitution”. He “failed in showing due deference and respect to the judgments and directions of” the Supreme Court. It noted that in the discharge of his functions, Ravi seemed motivated by “other extraneous considerations”.

Considering what the judgement called Ravi’s “attempt to deliberately bypass the constitutional mandate”, the court had to resort to its special power under Article 142. This provision allows the court virtually unfettered power to deliver “complete justice”. The court chose not to send the bills back to Ravi since it found it “difficult … to repose [its] trust” in him to not further delay the matter. Instead, it declared that the ten bills were considered to have received the governor’s assent on November 18, 2023: the day they were presented to him after being repassed by the state assembly.

Why this ruling matters

Federal relations in India over the last decade have been characterised by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party installing hostile governors in opposition-ruled states. As a result, governors sitting on bills is now a common occurrence in Indian politics. Apart from Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Punjab, Kerala and West Bengal have approached the Supreme Court, alleging gubernatorial interference in their work.

In this backdrop, the Supreme Court’s judgement creates a significant judicial check on potential overreach by governors, clarifying the limits of their legislative role. It reinforced the authority of elected state assemblies by removing the unelected governor’s ability to exercise absolute or indefinite vetoes over their bills. The introduction of enforceable timelines and clear procedures, backed by judicial review, creates a vital accountability mechanism against delays that can paralyse state governance.