The Supreme Court last month freed a man sentenced for marital cruelty and demanding dowry after he made a financial settlement with his wife , even though the law does not allow compromises. The ruling could end up compromising women's rights.
The apex court delivered the judgement on July 21 in the case of Manohar Singh vs State of Madhya Pradesh, in which it set free a man sentenced to seven years in prison, after he paid Rs 2.5 lakh to his wife, who had filed the charges against him. Singh’s wife had accused him and his parents of torturing her for dowry.
The trial court had convicted and sentenced Singh and his parents under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, which punishes a man for treating his wife cruelly by making demands of dowry, as well as under the Dowry Prohibition Act.
On appeal, the Madhya Pradesh High Court acquitted his parents, but not Singh. Thereafter, he moved the Supreme Court and also made his wife a party to the appeal, praying that he be allowed to pay monetary compensation in lieu of his prison term. His wife agreed to this proposal.
Burying the hatchet
The Supreme Court held that the ends of justice would be served by the execution of Singh’s proposal because both parties were willing to bury the hatchet, and the offences for which Singh was convicted, unlike heinous crimes such as rape and murder, did not have wider social repercussions.
Invoking Article 142, which gives the court the power to “do complete justice”, the court said that the continuation of criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility and the highest ends of justice would be to “restore peace between the parties”.
This isn’t the first time that the Supreme Court has allowed such compromises. There has been a steady stream of similar decisions in the recent past, pointing to a disquieting trend because no legislative provision permits such compromises.
One could argue that since Article 142 imposes no restrictions on the court’s power, there is nothing wrong in rulings prevailing over legal provisions. But justice is not only about the letter of the law. It is also about the spirit, and about the precedents that courts set.
Moreover, criminal law makes a clear distinction between compoundable and non-compoundable offences. The former, which can be settled by mutual consent between the victim and the perpetrator, are petty crimes.
But serious offences – and both dowry and cruelty under Section 498A fall in this category – cannot just be settled by mutual agreement. Once criminal charges have been applied, the case must go for trial, and one has to wait for the outcome, whether conviction or acquittal. Nowhere is compromise mentioned.
In any case, the so-called compromise deeds are just statements on stamp paper. Nothing in the Indian Evidence Act grants recognition to such documents.
But the foremost problem lies in how the court views cases or complaints of marital cruelty. Contrary to what the judgement says, these are not mere personal squabbles, but grave crimes. The assertion that there are no wider social ramifications is astonishing.
Also, although the courts are to satisfy themselves that a complainant has not been coerced into entering into such a compromise, there is no way to make sure. In rural and semi-urban areas, where village elders or panchayats meddle in family affairs, the chances of coercion are high.
Thus, a perpetrator can purchase his way out of punishment because a court did not properly ascertain whether the wife really wanted the money in exchange for her husband’s release from prison.
In many cases, the wife is trapped. If she declines to agree to a settlement, she has to withstand family pressure, and sometimes violence. If she agrees to the proposal, she arouses suspicion and scorn, as if her complaints were either false or driven by vendetta.
Furthermore, the records show such cases as acquittals because the law does not require that the courts pass an additional order setting out the facts and reasons. These records form a part of the National Crime Research Bureau’s data, which courts rely upon.
Mistaken conclusions
Because such cases get classified as acquittals, there is a huge disparity between the number of cases charge-sheeted and the number of convictions. In turn, this has led some to believe that many 498A cases are false and are filed wives who want to settle scores against their husbands.
Courts have also based their decisions on this flawed perception. For instance, based on the NCRB data, the Supreme Court concluded on July 2 that Section 498A was being used as a vengeful weapon by “disgruntled wives”.
In the case of Arnesh Kumar vs the State of Bihar, it watered down Section 498A by laying down very strict guidelines regarding the arrest of people charged under that provision.
These guidelines place such an onerous burden on the police and magistrates that they would be compelled to err on the side of caution and not arrest someone unless there is palpably grave danger to the complainant's life and security.
As a result, arrests may not be made in cases where they would have acted as a deterrent and even prevented dowry deaths and fatal acts of domestic violence.
We welcome your comments at
letters@scroll.in.
The apex court delivered the judgement on July 21 in the case of Manohar Singh vs State of Madhya Pradesh, in which it set free a man sentenced to seven years in prison, after he paid Rs 2.5 lakh to his wife, who had filed the charges against him. Singh’s wife had accused him and his parents of torturing her for dowry.
The trial court had convicted and sentenced Singh and his parents under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, which punishes a man for treating his wife cruelly by making demands of dowry, as well as under the Dowry Prohibition Act.
On appeal, the Madhya Pradesh High Court acquitted his parents, but not Singh. Thereafter, he moved the Supreme Court and also made his wife a party to the appeal, praying that he be allowed to pay monetary compensation in lieu of his prison term. His wife agreed to this proposal.
Burying the hatchet
The Supreme Court held that the ends of justice would be served by the execution of Singh’s proposal because both parties were willing to bury the hatchet, and the offences for which Singh was convicted, unlike heinous crimes such as rape and murder, did not have wider social repercussions.
Invoking Article 142, which gives the court the power to “do complete justice”, the court said that the continuation of criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility and the highest ends of justice would be to “restore peace between the parties”.
This isn’t the first time that the Supreme Court has allowed such compromises. There has been a steady stream of similar decisions in the recent past, pointing to a disquieting trend because no legislative provision permits such compromises.
One could argue that since Article 142 imposes no restrictions on the court’s power, there is nothing wrong in rulings prevailing over legal provisions. But justice is not only about the letter of the law. It is also about the spirit, and about the precedents that courts set.
Moreover, criminal law makes a clear distinction between compoundable and non-compoundable offences. The former, which can be settled by mutual consent between the victim and the perpetrator, are petty crimes.
But serious offences – and both dowry and cruelty under Section 498A fall in this category – cannot just be settled by mutual agreement. Once criminal charges have been applied, the case must go for trial, and one has to wait for the outcome, whether conviction or acquittal. Nowhere is compromise mentioned.
In any case, the so-called compromise deeds are just statements on stamp paper. Nothing in the Indian Evidence Act grants recognition to such documents.
But the foremost problem lies in how the court views cases or complaints of marital cruelty. Contrary to what the judgement says, these are not mere personal squabbles, but grave crimes. The assertion that there are no wider social ramifications is astonishing.
Also, although the courts are to satisfy themselves that a complainant has not been coerced into entering into such a compromise, there is no way to make sure. In rural and semi-urban areas, where village elders or panchayats meddle in family affairs, the chances of coercion are high.
Thus, a perpetrator can purchase his way out of punishment because a court did not properly ascertain whether the wife really wanted the money in exchange for her husband’s release from prison.
In many cases, the wife is trapped. If she declines to agree to a settlement, she has to withstand family pressure, and sometimes violence. If she agrees to the proposal, she arouses suspicion and scorn, as if her complaints were either false or driven by vendetta.
Furthermore, the records show such cases as acquittals because the law does not require that the courts pass an additional order setting out the facts and reasons. These records form a part of the National Crime Research Bureau’s data, which courts rely upon.
Mistaken conclusions
Because such cases get classified as acquittals, there is a huge disparity between the number of cases charge-sheeted and the number of convictions. In turn, this has led some to believe that many 498A cases are false and are filed wives who want to settle scores against their husbands.
Courts have also based their decisions on this flawed perception. For instance, based on the NCRB data, the Supreme Court concluded on July 2 that Section 498A was being used as a vengeful weapon by “disgruntled wives”.
In the case of Arnesh Kumar vs the State of Bihar, it watered down Section 498A by laying down very strict guidelines regarding the arrest of people charged under that provision.
These guidelines place such an onerous burden on the police and magistrates that they would be compelled to err on the side of caution and not arrest someone unless there is palpably grave danger to the complainant's life and security.
As a result, arrests may not be made in cases where they would have acted as a deterrent and even prevented dowry deaths and fatal acts of domestic violence.
